POSITIVITY AND DIALECTIC:

A STUDY OF THE THEOLOGICAL METHOD OF HANS LASSEN MARTENSEN

By

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The frivolity with which systematists concede that Hegel has perhaps not been successful in introducing movement everywhere in logic, about as when a huckster thinks that a couple of oranges more or less is nothing to worry about when the purchase is a large one - this farcical complaisance is naturally an expression of contempt for Hegel, which not even his most violent antagonist has permitted himself. There have of course been logical attempts made before Hegel, but in his case the Method is supposed to be everything. For Hegel himself, and for everyone who is sufficiently alert intellectually to sense what it means to have willed something great, the fact that the fundamental principle supposed to underlie and interpenetrate the whole is not present at this point or that, cannot be a matter of indifference, as when a huckster and his customer squabble over whether there is a little under- or over-weight. Hegel has staked all on this question of the Method. But a method has the remarkable trait of being nothing in the abstract; it is precisely in the application or execution that it is a method. Where it is unapplied it is not the method, and if there is no other method, then there is no method at all. Let admirers of Hegel keep to themselves the privilege of making him out to be a bungler; an opponent will always know how to hold him in honor, as one who has willed something great, though without having achieved it.

Johannes Climacus

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CHRONOLOGY

1808	August 19 Hans Lassen Martensen born, Flensborg, Duchy of Schleswig
1817	Moved with family to Copenhagen
1822	Death of H.L.M.'s father, Hans Andersen Martensen
1823	Entered the Metropolitan School
1827	Matriculated at the University of Copenhagen
1833	Privatdocent in Theology, University of Copenhagen
1834	Autumn Began two year travel and study in Germany, Austria, France and Italy
1836	Return to Denmark
1837	July 12 Defended dissertation, *De Autonomia Conscientia Sui Humanae*, University of Copenhagen
	August 24 Named Privatdocent in theology
1838	April 21 Named docent-extraordinarius in theology with the title of Lektor, on the death of Poul Møller
	Dec. 22 Married to Mathilde Helene Hess
1840	Dec. 1 Named Professor Extraordinarius in theology, effective Jan. 1, 1841
1845	Appointed court-preacher to the court of King Christian VIII of Denmark
1847	Sept. 20 Death of Mathilde Hess Martensen, leaving two children, Julius and Marie
1848	Nov. 10 Married to Virginie Henriette Constance Bidoulac
1850	Sept. 1 Named Professor Ordinarius in theology, University of Copenhagen
1854	April 15 Named Bishop of Sjælland, after the death of Bishop Jacob Peter Mynster
1884	Feb. 3 Died in Copenhagen

INTRODUCTION

> "Thus it comes that by his polemic many a name has been snatched from well-merited oblivion. He has enveloped with the most spiritual irony, with the most delicious humor, not a few paltry scribblers, who are preserved for all future time..., like insects imbedded in a piece of amber."
>
> Heinrich Heine

In the Spring of the year 1836, only a few months after Heine published this characterization of Lessing in the Paris journal Revue des Deux Mondes,[1] Hans Lassen Martensen met Johann Ludvig Heiberg, for the first time, in the city of Heine's self-imposed exile, Paris. Martensen was a little known theological student. Heiberg was already rising to fame in Denmark as poet, dramatist, literary critic, and herald of the philosophy of Hegel as a total comprehension of man in the contemporary world. Yet if today we remember either the young theologian who later became the reigning bishop of the Danish Church or the promising poet and critic who was one of the founders of the Danish theatre, it is largely because, like Lessing's Pastor Goeze, they are forever preserved in the amber of Søren Kierkegaard's polemics. Neither Martensen nor Heiberg has been forgotten in Denmark, but even there the ironic and satiric barbs of Kierkegaard have "by putting them to death ... bestowed on them immortality."[2]

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[1] cf. Religion and Philosophy in Germany, by Heinrich Heine, tr. John Snodgrass, Boston: Beacon Press, 1959.

[2] op. cit., p. 98.

It is a commonplace shared by virtually all interpreters of the thought of Kierkegaard that the polemical Dane's work is largely an attack upon the systematic philosophy of Hegel. What has been noted too seldom, especially outside Denmark, is that the specific character of Kierkegaard's attack upon Hegelianism was shaped by the peculiar form which Hegelianism took in Denmark, in the aesthetics and the essentially aesthetic philosophy of Heiberg [1791-1860] and the speculative theology of Martensen [1808-1884].

The present study hopes to make a small contribution to the correction of this oversight. It is part of a wider study of Kierkegaard and the Danish "Hegelians" which few but Danish scholars have undertaken. What is required, in order that an understanding of Kierkegaard's philosophical and theological criticism of Hegelianism be possible, is a closer examination of the influence of Hegel upon Heiberg and Martensen than has yet been attempted. Such a work as Paul Rubow's Heiberg and his School in Criticism[3] is the foundation for such a study of Heiberg's aesthetics and the foundations of his philosophical position. Yet no examination of H.L. Martensen's speculative theology has concentrated upon that theologian's ambivalent relation to Hegel and upon the development of Martensen's thought as one of the sources for the understanding of Kierkegaard's evaluation of Hegelian philosophy. Skat Arildsen's Copenhagen dissertation[4] is a mass of valuable detail, providing little critical focus upon this problem. Closest to my own ultimate aim here is the work of the late Carl Roos on the place of the Faust-idea in Kierkegaard. In his _Kierkegaard og Goethe_[5] Roos has given a sketch of the work of Martensen and Kierkegaard on the Faust theme during the years 1833-38 which must become the foundation for all later studies of the sources of Kierkegaard's thought.

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[3] Paul V. Rubow, Heiberg og hans Skole i Kritiken, Kbh: Gyldendalske Boghandel, 1953.

[4] H.L. Martensen: Hans Liv, Udvikling og Arbeide. I. Kbh: G.E.C. Gad, 1932; a second volume was proposed, but never issued.

In what follows I have a narrowly limited aim. An adequate estimate of Kierkegaard's thought, in its relation to Danish Hegelianism, has yet to be made. Pioneering work in this area has been done by Niels Thulstrup in his commentaries on the _Philosophical Fragments_[6] and the _Concluding Unscientific Postscript_[7] yet this work remains only a sketch to be filled in. The same may be said of the excellent introduction and notes written by the late Lee Capel for his translation of Kierkegaard's _The Concept of Irony_.[8] Though this work makes available for the first time in English much of the work of Thulstrup, Roos, and other Danish scholars, it does not further our understanding of the modifications of Hegel's thought made in Heiberg and Martensen. In the present essay the effort to undertake an investigation of Kierkegaard's thought in relation to that of

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[5] Carl Roos, _Kierkegaard og Goethe_, Kbh: G.E.C. Gad, 1955.

[6] S. Kierkegaard, _Philosophical Fragments_, tr. D. Swenson, ed. H. Hong, with commentary by N. Thulstrup, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962; cf. _Philosophiske Smuler_, ed. with commentary by N. Thulstrup, Kbh: G.E.C. Gad, 1955.

[7] S. Kierkegaard, _Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift_, intro. and commentary by N. Thulstrup, 2 Vol., Kbh: Gyldendal, 1962.

[8] New York: Harper and Row, 1965.

Martensen is rejected. Rather, I have chosen to discuss in detail the development of Martensen's theological position, concentrating upon his theory of religious knowledge and his view of the relation between the historical or positive elements in the Christian faith and his use of the immanental dialectic of the philosophy of Hegel. In the conclusion some suggestions will be offered for the application of the results of this study to the understanding of certain aspects of the thought of Kierkegaard.

The focus of the present study is upon Martensen only insofar as the study of Martensen's thought can be an aid to the understanding of Kierkegaard. Hence no attempt is made here to trace Martensen's thought beyond the development of his mature theological position, in Christian Dogmatics (1849) and Dogmatic Elucidations (1850). These are the last works to exercise any significant influence upon Kierkegaard's thought before his death in 1855. Even these are of minor importance in comparison with Martensen's dissertation, his discussion of the Faust theme, and his discussions of Heiberg's aesthetics and interpretation of Hegel, all of which have been studied little if at all in Kierkegaard scholarship.[9] The reader interested in the further growth of Martensen's thought and in aspects of his thought which are not the center of concern here should consult the dissertation of Skat Arildsen. A full bibliography of Martensen's writings is to be found in Mindre Skrifter og Taler af Biskop

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[9] As noted above, serious study of the Faust theme in Martensen and Kierkegaard begins with Carl Roos as recently as 1955.

Martensen, published by his son, Julius Martensen, in 1855.[10]

It might be thought that little can be expected from a study with such a limited aim. Is it possible to understand Martensen's thought adequately if the conscious focus of the study is only his relation to Kierkegaard? Such a narrow focus would inevitably be distorting, and no effort has been made to keep the focus this narrow for the period studied. All of the aspects of Martensen's thought have been examined, and all of the works from the first manuscript in 1833 to Dogmatic Elucidations in 1850 studied carefully. But the study does attempt to draw attention to themes and problems which also are significant for the study of Kierkegaard. The limited aim of the present study will be justified if it makes it possible to gain an understanding of the growth of Martensen's theology and its relation to the thought of Hegel and Heiberg. A foundation will have been laid for the examination of the development of some aspects of Kierkegaard's thought and for the study of Kierkegaard's criticism of Martensen during the period 1841-54, preceding the infamous "Attack upon Christendom" in which Martensen was a central figure.

I would argue a much broader thesis than this dissertation attempts to establish if I maintain that the central categories of Kierkegaard's thought were shaped in his quarrel with Heiberg and Martensen over the significance and scope of Hegelian philosophy. On the basis of the work done here, with study of Kierkegaard's work which lies beyond the scope of this essay, I believe that this can be maintained of the notions of the aesthetic, ethical and religious "stages," and of the "boundary stages" of irony and humor. I would argue that this is also true of Kierkegaard's concept of faith and doubt as opposite passions, of doubt as a "pathetic" rather than an intellectual act. If this study succeeds in suggesting that the thought world of the young Kierkegaard may have been composed of problems set by the efforts of Heiberg and Martensen to make use of Hegel, it will have accomplished its aim. The rest is a task for Kierkegaard scholarship for which this is at best a necessary but not sufficient preliminary study.

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[10] J. Martensen, Mindre Skrifter og Taler af Biskop Martensen, Kbh: Gyldendal, 1885.

CHAPTER ONE: PRESENTIMENTS (1808-1827)

1. Childhood

Hans Lassen Martensen was born in Flensborg, in the duchy of Schleswig, on August 19, 1808. His father, Hans Andersen Martensen (1782-1822) was a seaman and an author. His mother, Anna Maria Truelsen (1781-1853) was the daughter of a Flensborg book seller. The family, like the city of Flensborg itself, was split between Germany and Denmark. The northern half of the city was the more Danish sector; the part of the city to the south of the Flensborg fiord was culturally a part of Germany. The duchy of Schleswig was in 1808 under the Danish crown. Even so, German culture was prominent. Low-German was the language most commonly spoken, and high German was taught in the schools, where, as Martensen recalls in his autobiography, Danish was treated as a foreign tongue.[1] The Danish language always remained for Anna Maria Martensen a foreign tongue which she spoke only occasionally and only with difficulty. If the mother turned toward Germany, her husband turned toward Denmark. His language and affection were Danish, and it was in the Danish language that he wrote many works on navigation and nautical signal-systems. Martensen's birth in Janus-faced Flensborg, into a family which itself bore the double visage of the city, was to stamp his whole career, as we shall see.

Hans Andersen Martensen's life as seaman ended with the involvement of Denmark on the side of Napoleon in the war with the British. His ship was captured and he was imprisoned, a misfortune wich cost him both his investment in his ship and his health.[2] When he returned to his family he determined to earn a living by teaching navigation and by writing. The small success of his Danish writings in predominantly German Flensborg led him to move his family to Copenhagen in September of 1817. Here he was able to support the family with his writing, though only for a short time. His health had continued to fail, and in 1822, at the age of 41, he died.[3] In the marriage of Hans Andersen Martensen and Anna Maria Truelsen, three children had been born: Hans Lassen about one year after the marriage in 1807; a second son, Niels Truelsen Martensen, born February 4, 1813, died on November 24, 1816; a third child, a daughter, was still-born in the summer of 1815.

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[1] H.L. Martensen, _Af mit Levnet_ (København: Gyldendal Forlag, 1882-3), Vol. I, p. 3.

In his autobiography the elderly Bishop Martensen recalls very little of his childhood in Flensborg. He was baptized, in the German language, in the Marienkirche in the northern sector of Flensborg on August 30, 1808. Martensen describes himself as a happy and healthy child, raised in a God-fearing and upright home. He notes that the faith of his parents rested upon the first article of the creed, faith in God the Father, and that from them he learned to trust the providence of God both in good and evil times, "of which latter they had not few."[4] Martensen recalls that the spirit of the school which he attended was rationalistic and that he found little that interested him in school, least of all the fragments of physics and other natural sciences which were "inflicted" upon the children "perhaps as a counterbalance for superstition."[5]

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[2] cf. Skat Arildsen, H.L. Martensen, Hans Liv, Udvikling og Arbejde (København: G.E.C. Gads Forlag, 1932), p. 8. The time of H.A. Martensen's capture by the British and the period of his imprisonment is uncertain, though it seems to have been between December, 1808 and June, 1812. It is likely that Martensen was owner of the boat which was taken by the British.

[3] Little is known of the illness from which H.A. Martensen died. After his return from imprisonment he was troubled with severe rheumatic pains. He is said to have died of dropsy. Cf. S. Arildsen, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

[4] H.L. Martensen, op. cit., I, 2.

It may be significant that Martensen includes in his autobiography the childhood impression that the culture of Flensborg lay to the south of the fiord, in the dominantly German sector. It would be only with his journey to Copenhagen that he would be truly 'planted in Danish soil' and discover the genius of a Danish culture which was not subordinate to the German.[6]

It is also notable that Martensen's earliest memory of Copenhagen centers on the celebration of the three-hundredth anniversary of the Reformation, held Oct. 31 - Nov. 2, 1817. The celebration made only an external impression on the nine-year child as he stood in Store Kannikestræde watching the splendid glass coach of King Frederick VI approach the Trinitatis Kirke, but the 300th anniversary of the Reformation was to have more than an external influence in the life of the established Lutheran Church in Denmark. One might well take the year 1817 as symbolic of a turn within the Danish church away from a predominantly rationalistic theology toward a theology which placed increasing emphasis upon the Bible as the source of Christian truth. This movement did not begin with the Reformation Jubilee, nor did it end there, but the new emphasis is clear both in the official documents published by the Church for the celebration and in the sermons which were preached to memorialize Luther's rediscovery of the Christian gospel.

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[5] ibid., p. 4.

[6] H.L. Martensen, op. cit., II, 153ff. See here Martensen's discussion of Schleswig as a bridge between Scandanavia and Germany.

In connection with the tri-centennial of the Reformation two documents were sent by the bishops of the Danish Church to all of the Lutheran pastors in Denmark: a new edition, in Latin, of the Confessio Augustana; a joint episcopal pastoral letter, written by the Bishop of Seeland, F.C. Münter.[7] In Münter's letter one is conscious of the hold of the Enlightenment upon Danish theology, but one senses as well an attempt to reassert the central authority of Scripture. The bishops remind their readers that the chief authority with which faith has to do is Scripture, 'rightly interpreted by the guidance of reason.' What the Reformation has established is that Scripture is not to be interpreted on the basis of the Church Fathers, or on the basis of the councils of the Church but only by reason, rightly trained:

> "With the evangelical dogma there is laid down a firm and unshakeable foundation: where the holy Scripture, interpreted according to the law of reason, is acknowledged as the only source of religion the other types of authority work together. This source is indeed sufficient and answers as well to the dignity of reason as to the majesty of the divine revelation. It was this faith-in-agreement-with-reason which flowered in the apostolic age and which Luther re-established."[8]

Had the young Martensen entered the Trinitatis Kirke the preaching he heard during the three days of the festival would have resembled closely the position outlined in the letter of the bishops. Two things can be said about the pastoral letter and the official preaching upon the texts which were chosen for the festival: there was a conscious effort to give the Bible a more central place in the teaching and preaching of the Church than had been the case since the last quarter of the eighteenth century, and the attention drawn to the Lutheran Reformation, as can be seen in the sermon texts themselves, (Ephesians 2:8-10; Corinthians 3:11; Hebrews 13:8; John 8:12) was to work its way as a leaven into the interpretation of Christianity in the Danish Church.[9]

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[7] Münter was one of the pioneers in the history of Christian dogma, an historian of religion, and an archaeologist. Born in 1761, he became professor at the University of Copenhagen in 1788, bishop of Seeland in 1808, died 1830.

[8] Cited from the joint episcopal pastoral letter of F.C. Münter in Den Danske Kirkes Historie, ed. Hal Koch and Bjørn Kornerup (København: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag, 1954), Vol. VI, p. 178. No closer citation of the letter is given here.

The splendid glass coach of Frederick VI which nine-year-old Martensen watched in Store Kannikestræde was perhaps the most splendid thing about the kingdom of Denmark in the year 1817. In the Seven Years War (1807-1814) Denmark not only lost possession of Norway, with whom she had been united for more than four hundred years; the expenditures of the involvement in the Napoleonic wars drained the financial resources of the kingdom beyond the breaking point. The State had first increased taxes, issued bank-notes without sound security, finally, after a sudden fall in the exchange, had gone bankrupt in 1812. Bank closure and the issuance of new money in January, 1813 failed to better the situation and the government was unable to raise a foreign loan, even on the promise that the Crown Jewels could be pawned. There was widespread suffering in Denmark during the years 1807-1830. Fortunes were lost; businesses failed. Only the farmer and the peasant found life little altered, occasionally even bettered, by the financial collapse of the government.[10]

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[9] Koch and Kornerup, op. cit., VI, 178ff; see also J.O. Andersen, A Survey of the History of the Church in Denmark (Copenhagen: O Lohse, 1930), p. 43: "The pastoral letter settles the belief in Christ the Redeemer as belonging to the Gospel, and the evangelical understanding of the Confessio Augustanta as the standard for the doctrines of the Church, although the symbol in its form, decided by time, does not bind us in detail."

[10] Cf. J.H.S. Birch, Denmark in History (London: John Murray, 1938), pp. 312ff. It was in the bank collapse of 1812, when many of the Danish fortunes were ruined, that Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard, the father of Søren Kierkegaard, found his own fortune enhanced. He had made a private royal loan, which the monarch made good.

The Martensen family arrived in Copenhagen in a time of change. It might better be called a time of reflection, however, for change on all fronts was still to come. One now began to reflect upon the peculiarity of Denmark and consequently, upon the meaning of *Danish* Christianity. We will see the guide lines which had already been prepared for this task of reflection as we look at Martensen's school years in Copenhagen.

2. School Years (1817-1823)

Martensen's interests during his first school years in Copenhagen at the Brendstrup - von Westen Institute are a mirror for the interests of the cultured circles of the city. Without doubt his main concern was aesthetic. Though he studied Latin, Greek and Hebrew during these years he found little to excite him either in the grammar of the classical languages or in their literatures. Only the elegant Latin and the phantasy of the *Fables* of the first century poet, Phaedrus, interested him. Martensen describes this period of his life as a period of drifting in which he did his work rather from a sense of duty than from desire.[11]

Quite different was the case with the Danish language and literature. Here the father's love of the Danish language led the young boy from Flensborg (Martensen whimsically recalls that he was constantly introduced in school as 'the new boy from Holstein' in spite of his protestations that he was from North Schleswig!)[12] to read avidly all of the Danish literature that he could absorb. The father's library held the didactic and satiric poetry of Jens Baggesen (1764-1826) and here young Hans also found most of the poetry which was now looked upon in the cultured circles of Copenhagen as 'old', outdated by the 'new poetry', heralded by Schack von Staffeldt (1769-1826) and incarnate in the person and work of Adam Oehlenschläger (1779-1850). It was the latter, whose works Martensen had to find for himself, who stirred the boy in ways that he did not himself understand. Oehlenschläger's ability to awaken the old gods of the North, to bring the old Norse religion once more to life in much the way that Keats recreated classical Greece, stirred his nascent Danish spirit.

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[11] H.L. Martensen, *op. cit.*, I, 12.

[12] *ibid.*

Here Martensen's awakening to Oehlenschläger's poetic world of phantasy and imagination followed the current of the age. If the age was, as we have said, highly self-conscious and reflective, there was a small circle of the 'cultured' among the Danes whose self-consciousness and reflection moved along lines which had been drawn already at the beginning of the century. A series of lectures by the young Henrik Steffens, given in 1803, often has been pointed to as the beginning of the Romantic movement in Danish literature. Steffens (1773-1845) was of Norwegian birth, a graduate in theology and natural science of the University of Copenhagen, and a brilliant student of Schelling's philosophy of nature. Steffens had returned to Copenhagen in the winter of 1802 after having steeped himself in the intellectual life of Germany, in the Weimar classicism of Goethe and Schiller, and in the speculative philosophy of Fichte and Schelling. He had not only drawn much from the men with whom he studied; his work in natural philosophy, especially in geology and mineralogy, had been appropriated by Schelling and had given more factual content to Schelling's philosophy of nature. With Steffen's return to Copenhagen, the university officials had hoped that he would lecture on his investigations in natural philosophy, but to limit himself to this area was far from Steffens' intention. It is clear that it was his hope that through the lectures he might introduce to the North the world of spirit and intellect that he had found in Weimar and Jena. Through the lectures he tried to bring to birth a new life in Denmark. In this he was fortunate in his hearers, for among them were the men who became the cultural leaders of Denmark in the first half of the new century: Oehlenschläger, N.F.S. Grundtvig (1783-1872), who was Steffens' cousin, the theologian J.P. Mynster (1775-1854, from 1830 Bishop of Seeland), and the brothers H.C. Ørsted (1777-1851) and A.S. Ørsted (1778-1860).

It will be worth our time to examine the lectures briefly, since they prove to be of major importance both for the development of Danish culture generally and for Martensen's thought in particular. I hope here only to suggest some of the currents which passed from Steffens to Oehlenschläger and which first stirred the young Martensen. The first nine lectures delivered by Steffens in the winter of 1802-3 were published in 1803 under the title Introduction to the Philosophical Lectures.[13] The series opens with a strident attack upon what Steffens takes to be the shallow empiricism of eighteenth century natural science. Truth is not to be found in a piecemeal assemblage of individual facts but only through what Steffens calls Ahnelse, a presentiment[14] of the presence of the Eternal in the finite:

"If we agree to this we relinquish the universal postulate of the

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[13] H. Steffens, Indledning til Philosophiske Forlæsninger i København 1803, ed. B.T. Dahl (København: Gyldendal, 1905).

[14] The modern Danish is Anelse, from Ane, to anticipate by feeling.

> understanding (Forstand) which would make our age and its way of thinking into the norm for all. ...With this the giants awaken from their grave; gods and goddesses walk among us; every sound from the most remote ages speaks again with its own voice. ...This presentiment, whose object is always infinite, is called Poetry, since the living and creative manifests itself in an exalted mood (Gemyth). ...An infinite sense seems to have concealed itself behind every visible form and beams forth mystically toward us. ...a deep longing awakens within us."[15]

The science which makes the infinite and eternal the subject of its investigation is speculative philosophy. Both natural science and historical study fall under philosophy, since the latter is the science in which truth unfolds itself. The solution of basic questions in the "pure" empirical sciences is only to be found in the creative Idea "which is able to create difference in identity and identity in difference" and is therefore the key to a true theory of nature.

Steffens' seventh Copenhagen lecture began his discussion of history. Behind history proper lies mythology, and it is here, says Steffens, that the purest poetry is at home. Here the whole life of the people was religion, and everything in life was seen as the expression of the Eternal in the finite. But this "religious middle-point" disappeared in late antiquity and was replaced gradually by the spirit of the nations, a spirit which was centrifugal in its character, pulling apart the many different forms of life. Here the finite became the only real. But it was to such a world that the reconciling God revealed himself in Christianity, a religion which had as its character contempt for a finite which had lost its significance, a religion which prophetically pointed to the Eternal, the mark of which had faded from life. With the rise of Catholic Christianity and its new penetration of all the forms of human life holy devotion, "true poetry", could again come to life and create a new mythology, for without religiousness and its myythology, poetry, claims Steffens, cannot exist. In the true significance of the word "poetry", nothing can bear this name unless it bears the creative mark of the Eternal. The spirit of Enlightenment, however, was to destroy the Catholic unity of life, with its poetry, and the mark of the present age, for Steffens, is an irreligiosity and a predominance of the prosaic such as the world has never seen. The spirit of poetry has been driven out by prose.[16] The spirit of Protestantism is contrasted with that of the Enlightenment, and is described as involving a sense for the Eternal and divine as found in the individual. By contrast the Enlightenment, seen as preeminently French in character, has neglected the individual for the universal and the Eternal and the divine for the finite and secular. In German idealistic philosophy the spirit of Protestantism has found expression, as it sometimes has in the new poetry of the *Sturm und Drang* and Romanticism. Here, in contrast to the tendency of Catholicism to universalize and to forget the individual, the Protestant spirit is expressed. The individual now becomes an expression of the Eternal, and the entire movement of nature and history can be seen as a development toward the fuller manifestation of the Eternal within more highly individualized forms. At the acme of the development is the genius who is the very radiance of the divine itself:

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[15] H. Steffens, op. cit., p. 21.

> "I can . . . speak more clearly. It is the divine in us which is *that* which is one with *all*, the image of the divine, our own essence, which arises in unconditioned *Ahnelse*, which expresses itself in every scientific effort, which discloses itself with

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[16] *ibid*., p. 111.

talent, which reveals itself in its fullest glory in the magnificent genius."[17]

What idealistic philosophy and the new poetry have shown is that it is possible to find a plan in history. Here the Eternal Idea, says Steffens, unfolds itself, manifesting itself in an infinite evolution, not only containing in itself the possibility of everything which is to become actual, but as well the actuality of everything possible. To attend to the expression of the Eternal in Ahnelse is the beginning of wisdom, and the most evident expression of Ahnelse is poetic. The task of philosophy, which aims at a purer and more clear expression of the content of Ahnelse, is to attend to the expression of the eternal, wherever it can be found. Its primary source is in the exalted awareness of the poet.[18]

As Hal Koch says in his discussion of Steffens' lectures, it is clear that the young natural philosopher was only speaking here of what was to come. The lectures are introductory in the narrowest sense of this word. They point foward to the future task of poetry and philosophy in such manner that the task clearly remains to be accomplished. But they do set a task for Danish poetry and philosophy and it is this that is important for us here.[19]

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[17] ibid., p. 118.

[18] ibid., p. 119f.; the reader will find in Steffens' lectures many themes familiar in the young Schleiermacher. There is a marked similarity between certain aspects of Steffens' treatment of Ahnelse and Schleiermacher's "Anschauung und Gefühl des Universums". Steffens' interest in individuality and the process of individuation in natural philosophy was of great interest to Schleiermacher, and there was mutual influence during the years 1804-1806 when both were teaching at Hallé. Cf. H. Steffens, Was Ich Erlebte, Breslau, 1840-45, on this period, and see Schleiermacher's letters from these years. Each man acknowledges the influence of the other, especially in the area of his thinking on individuality.

[19] Koch and Kornerup, op. cit., VI, 133f. Steffens was disappointed in

Steffens' lectures seem to have made no profound impression among his hearers. Many were momentarily stirred, but found no substance for further development in them. The natural philosopher, H.C. Ørsted, found them to confirm many of his own thoughts in a general way , and N.F.S. Grundtvig, though he scoffed at the lectures at the time, later came to say that all of his own later development was the fruit of Steffens' words.[20] Similarly, the seventeen-year-old F.C. Sibbern regarded the part of the lectures he heard as "nonsense", but ten years later found more in Steffens than anyone else with whom he studied in Germany. Here he placed Steffens above Schelling, Schleiermacher and Fichte.[21] Steffens was to place his mark upon the young Martensen through Grundtvig, but perhaps even more through Oelenschläger who, as a result of Steffens' lectures and, more, as a result of a marathon eighteen-hour conversation with the natural philosopher, became Steffens' poet. Oehlenschläger was led to suppress two volumes he already had in the press and to turn his genius to the reawakening of the Norse gods, to use the historic-poetic power of the saga to create new life in his country-men.[22] The

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the hope that his lectures might secure for him a position in the philosophy faculty of the University of Copenhagen. In the academic circles the lectures were not well received, and the position sought by Steffens went to Niels Treschow (1751-1833), at this time a follower of Leibniz and Wolff and a critic both of Kant and the development of German philosophy since Kant. Steffens was embittered by his failure to secure the appointment, as he was by the cool reception his lectures were given.

[20] Hal Koch, Grundtvig, tr. Llewellyn Jones (Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press, 1952), p. 14.

[21] Cf. J. Himmelstrup, Sibbern, en Monografi (København: J.H. Schultz Forlag, 1934), Ch. 1.

[22] H. Koch, op. cit. p. 14, 32.

time had not yet come in Danish philosophy when Steffens' ideas could find fertile soil. But through Oehlenschläger and Grundtvig, as later through Sibbern and Steffens own writings, they began to take root in Martensen. And it was through Martensen that they began to bear fruit in Danish philosophy, when their time had come.

During the years 1817-1823 at von Westen's Institute young Martensen gladly avoided, when he could, the study of arithmetic and mathematics, which he found most difficult. He spent his time in reading poetry and history, and gave hours of practice to the study of the violin, in which he was greatly encouraged by his father. At home, he was much left to himself and became a quiet and introverted child. But he followed with enthusiasm in his father's literary journals the poet Baggesen's losing battle with Oehlenschläger for what Baggesen conceived to be poetry's proper place as a didactic enterprise, the literary Seven Year War (1813-1820). There was not much of the battle, nor much of Oehlenschläger's poetry that Martensen understood, as we have seen. Yet its influence was present: "Poetry often influences us by the power of its music and by the presentiments (Anelser) which it awakens."[23] These are the words of Bishop Martensen in 1882, but we may take them as a valid presentiment of what was to come in the career of the young Martensen.

3. Student Years (1823-1827)

If we follow Martensen's description of his development during the years 1823-27 we see a continuing and deeping of the interest in romantic poetry which began with Oehlenschläger. He uses his time free from studies to read widely in Oehlenschläger's works: "My love for this poet, who I name here with deep gratitude, developed fully at this time, and took root for my entire life."[24]

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[23] H.L. Martensen, op. cit. I, 10.

It had been during the last year of his studies at von Westen's that Martensen's father had died (October 7, 1822) and only through financial aid from friends had his mother been able to keep him in school. Now, at the Metropolitan School, he was on scholarship; his mother took in boarders in order to be able to maintain the home. For two years during the period 1823-27 the Danish composer Andreas Peter Berggreen was a boarder in the Martensen home, and from him young Martensen borrowed the poems of Oehlenschläger. Berggreen was a close friend of the poet, and was enthusiastic for his poetry; there is little doubt that Martensen's love for Oehlenschläger was deepened through Berggreen.[25] Now it is the 'richness and fullness' of Oehlenschläger's fantasy, his plastic energy, and the beauty and freshness of his imagery which stirs Martensen and in which qualities Martensen finds him 'incomparable'.

But it was not only Oehlenschläger who occupied Martensen during these years. He notes that he acquainted himself with most of the Danish poetic literature and much of that in foreign languages. The earlier dislike of classical literature had passed, and now, largely through the eyes of the "unforgettable" Poul Møller, who was teaching classical languages and literature in the lower forms at the Metropolitan School, Homer and Ovid came to life, as did the historical and the literary-philosophical writings of Herodotus and Cicero. Philology now, far from having no interest, became for Martensen an 'ideal' of study.[26] He read widely in Foersom's Danish translation of Shakespeare and, with Berggreen, steeped himself in the literature of the Sturm und Drang and of German romanticism: Goethe, Schiller, Tieck, Novalis, and Werner. It is doubtless fair to say that Martensen's autobiography paints his chief interest in this period, as in the preceding one, as aesthetic. We shall have to keep this in mind as we examine the other interests which occupy him in the years before his entrance into the University.

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[24] Af Mit Levnet, I, 18.

[25] Cf. Af Mit Levnet, loc. cit., and J.O. Andersen, "H.L. Martensen's Ungdom", (Kirkehistoriske Samlinger, Series VI, Vol. I, 1933).

Two events of the years 1823-27 which form the background of Martensen's development in these years deserve attention: the famous battle between N.F.S. Grundtvig and H.N. Clausen (1793-1877) professor of dogmatics in the theological faculty of the University of Copenhagen, and the clamor stirred up by the second appearance of Henrik Steffens on the Danish scene with the publication of his book, On the False Theology and the True Faith.[27] It is likely that the impact of both upon Martensen stems from the same year, 1825, when Martensen was seventeen years old.

Indirectly, Steffens has his part in both events, since the German original of On the False Theology and the True Faith had helped Grundtvig in his own struggle for a clear understanding of the Christian faith. Steffens' book, which represented the author's 'conversion' from an interpretation of the Christian religion developed with the help of Schleiermacher to a strict Lutheran-evangelical orthodoxy, was widely attacked both in Germany and in Denmark. But Grundtvig found in the work a sound representation of the central teaching of the Christian faith, and he came to its defense.[28]

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[26] H.L. Martensen, op. cit., I, 16.

[27] Von der falschen Theologie und dem Wahren Glauben. Eine Stimme aus der Gemeinde durch Henrich Steffens (Breslau, 1823); Om den falske Theologie og den Sande Troe. En Stemme af Menigheden ved Henrich Steffens, tr. M.P. Kruuse (København, 1825).

Earlier, we noted the initial reaction of Grundtvig to his cousin's lectures, and we have seen that he came to value Steffens as the source of his own later development. In the period since 1803 Grundtvig had gone through a severe battle with Romanticism and those gods of the North who first Steffens, then Oehlenschläger and finally Grundtvig himself had done so much to awaken from their tombs. Still dubious of the significance of Steffens' viewpoint, Grundtvig had buried himself in the study of the northern past, had learned Icelandic and studied Saxo Grammaticus, Snorri Sturlason and the Icelandic sagas. In 1805 he had turned to the study of Schelling, and now for the first time he began to see the meaning of Steffens' call for a new direction in Danish poetry and philosophy.[29] In an essay on Religion and Liturgy written in 1806 Grundtvig describes man as living in a valley bounded by a limitless sea, but as possessed with the idea that beyond the sea is a purer world which is his original home. Poetry and philosophy are the only messengers from across the sea. Poetry never gives us an answer: "we only see that it is surrounded by a passing splendour which we suspect to be the effect of the still more beautiful rays of that sun which we place in the unknown."[30] Philosophy can only explain the origin of that land across the sea, but cannot bring us there. It finally must become a morality which would lead us toward the distant land. But in religion the distant land is present; the Eternal is present in the finite, not as united with it, but as lifting the finite up to itself. In the religion of Jesus Grundtvig saw this reconciliation.

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[28] cf. N.F.S. Grundtvig, Udvalgte Skrifter, ed. Holger Begtrup (København: 1904) IV, 217ff.

[29] cf. P.G. Lindhart, Grundtvig: an Introduction (London S.P.C.K., 1951), pp. 14ff.

One can see here the influence of Schelling's philosophy of identity, even more the influence of Steffens, upon Grundtvig. But in contrast to Schelling, and in a manner more definite than Steffens, religion is made the culmination of philosophy, a direction which Steffens himself had begun to take in the years following the 1802-3 lectures, as we shall see.

Now Grundtvig began to develop a philosophy of history, much influenced by Steffens' view of Christ as the 'Idea' at the center of history. He developed a concept of "the coherence of the Ages with Christ as their center", and, during the years following 1807 and the beginning of the Seven Years War, he set himself the task, through studies in northern myth, drama, and poetry, of awakening the Danish people to their destiny.[31] The years 1810-11 mark a major crisis in Grundtvig's life and in his view of the Christian faith. If his effort to awaken the Danes through bringing to life the old gods had brought him to find in Odin a brother to Christ, he now began to shrink before the question which he repeatedly asked himself: "Are you yourself a Christian? Have your sins been forgiven?"[32] In his struggles with this question Grundtvig came near mental collapse and entered a long period of depression which did not lift in any great measure until more than a decade later, in 1823.

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[30] N.F.S. Grundtvig, Udvalgte Skrifter I, 136f., cited in P.G. Lindhardt, op. cit., p. 15.

[31] cf. Lindthardt, op. cit., p. 16; N.F.S. Grundtvig, Udvalgte Skrifter I, 383f.

But the permanent effect of Grundtvig's crisis, the deeper sources of which we cannot examine here, was to be a break with the religiousness of Romanticism. In New Years Morning, a poem written in 1824, later deeply to affect Martensen, Grundtvig described his breakthrough to Lutheran Christianity:

"I deemed that the staff was broken upon me,
To worse than the grave cast off by the Lord.
Then I felt, wretched me, in the cold of mid-winter,
That light without warmth is the torment of hell.
Thou clod of earth, thou sinner, what thinkest thou upon?
What the flesh commences, the spirit must scorn.
Only to me was it given, from death to life on wings to raise
himself.[33]

Even the intellectual understanding of the Christian faith which Grundtvig had begun to reach already in 1810 had been only "light without warmth", "torment of hell". Now a breakthrough had occurred and Grundtvig saw himself as a fallen creature, no longer a beam from the divine radiance, but a "clod of earth", a sinner dependent upon God's grace in Jesus Christ.

The source of Christian authority for Grundtvig now became the Bible. His former enthusiasm for the religion of the North turned into a cold hatred, and the scorn for his own past fixed Grundtvig's attention upon Oehlenschläger, who now embodied the reawakening of the North. Grundtvig appealed to the poet to cease "playing with spiritual things" and to base his poetry upon the

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[32] cf. Grundtvig, Værker i Udvalg ed. Georg Christensen and Hal Koch, I, p. 330f; cited in P.G. Lindhardt, loc. cit.

[33] Nyaarsmorgen, Udvalgte Skrifter, IV. p. 260f.

Christian faith, to which Oehlenschläger replied that he would not be advised by the curate of a small parish. The ensuing break between Oehlenschläger and Grundtvig placed the latter for a time outside the circle of the cultured and outside the mainstream of Danish culture. The isolation of Grundtvig expressed itself as well in his unsuccessful attempt to make common cause with the young clergyman J.P. Mynster in the war with unbelief. Both personally and in their view of the Christian faith Grundtvig and Mynster were too far apart for any meeting to take place.

The years 1811-21 were years of relative isolation for Grundtvig. He shocked his contemporaries in 1812 with a Short View of World History as a Continuity (Verdenskroniken) in which he attempted a universal history, written as a prophetic, biblical judgement upon the whole of the past. Here, again with Steffens in mind, Christ is made the center of the Ages. The whole of history is judged on the principle that all true virtue rests upon faith in grace received through the crucified Christ. As Hal Koch has noted, the work is a milestone in Danish history, not only because two thirds of it was devoted to the Lutheran period and a large part of that to scathing judgements upon contemporary Denmark, but also because, in spite of its many defects, it was the first history written in Denmark which had not been what Steffens scorned as a "mere assemblage of facts".[34]

With the cool reception of the World History and the gradual closing to Grundtvig of any hearing in Danish cultural circles, the poet-prophet realized that his path as a preacher of repentance to the Danes was blocked. He now determined to turn again to Denmark's past. Now, though, there was no linking of Odin and Christ; rather there was the growing conviction that Christianity could have no future in Denmark if the people were demoralized by war and depression. After the loss of Norway at the Treaty of Kiel in 1814 Grundtvig conceived the idea of creating a spiritual fortress for the Danes, a Dannevirke of the spirit like the physical Dannevirke, the Danish rampart against the Germans built south of Flensborg already in the ninth century. From 1816-19 he published a journal under this name, printing translations of significant documents, numerous of his own essays, and many ancient ballads which he had adapted. In the years 1815-21 Grundtvig carried through the massive task of the translation of the chronicles of Saxo and Snorri, in six volumes.

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[34] Hal Koch, Grundtvig, pp. 62ff.

During all this time, though, Grundtvig was longing to preach. During these years he again and again sought a religious post in Copenhagen and was repeatedly refused. Finally, in 1821, he was called to a small church at Præsto and in 1822 to the Vor Frelsers Kirke in Copenhagen. Here he drew large crowds, but was astonished at the spiritual torpor of his people. He decided that the time had come for a decisive battle with what he called the Eighteenth Century "enlightenment in the matter of salvation", and in 1824, stirred by Steffens' new direction in The False Theology and the True Faith, he joined with the theologian A.G. Rudelbach and Hebraist, J.C. Lindberg, then Martensen's teacher at the Metropolitan School, in publishing the Theologisk Maanedsskrift.

What Grundtvig now sought was a firm basis from which to attack the rationalistic theology which he found so prevalent in Copenhagen. We have seen already that Danish theology was moving by 1817 in the direction of a more closely biblical Christianity. Yet we have seen as well that the Reformation was interpreted as a victorious battle for the right of reason in the interpretation of Scripture. Grundtvig had himself taken his stand upon the Bible, but now, in his battle with the rationalistic spirit, he discovered that an emphasis upon the text of Scripture alone as the valid test of true Christianity would lead only to an "exegetical papacy".

Nowhere did this become more clear than in the battle, noted above, with Professor H.N. Clausen over the nature of the Church and its relation to Scripture. In 1825 Clausen brought out a major, thorough study, *Catholicismens og Protestantismens Kirkeforfatning, Lære og Ritus* (*Constitution, Dogma and Rite in Protestantism and Catholicism*). In this work Clausen argued that in Protestantism the Bible must be treated as the "principle" of theology but that it is an inadequate and unclear manifestation of Christianity until it has been treated with philological study and philosophical criticism. Theology's task is "...by philological learning and philosophical criticism to supplement its vagueness and to bring about a higher unity between the different types of doctrines and their methods of presentation."[35] In the interpretation of the Bible, then, the layman must depend upon the theologian.

Clausen's scholarly study was met by Grundtvig only a few days after its publication with a stinging answer, *Kirkens Gjenmæle mod Professor Theologiae Dr. H.N. Clausen* (*The Answer of the Church to Professor of Theology H.N. Clausen*).[36] Stating that he himself has only recently arrived at what it is that constitutes the unchangeable foundation of the Christian Church, Grundtvig, in the name of the Church, demands that Clausen "...make the Christian Church a formal apology for his unchristian and scandalous teaching or lay down his office and drop his Christian name."[37] Clausen's manner of defining true Christianity is, says Grundtvig, a "ridiculous enthusiasm" since he would ride back across the centuries, overleaping historical Christianity, to Scripture itself, there to decide by the aid of reason what true Christianity is. Against this Grundtvig sets his own "matchless discovery", that in order to find out what true Christianity is, one need only ask the Church, as he finds it now, in the present. It is significant that Kirkens Gjenmæle bears on its title page a line from Article VII of the Confessio Augustana: "Una sancta ecclesia perpetuo mansura sit" and that the work is dated on "the blessed day of Irenaeus", for it was Irenaeus' view of the regula fidei which had led Grundtvig to fix upon the unbroken chain of believers united by the sacraments of the Church and the confession of faith connected with the sacrament of baptism as the sign, the one sure sign, of the continued existence through history of true Christianity. The view which Grundtvig had reached, though still more vague than he then realized,[38] is clear in a sermon preached in July, 1825, one month before the outbreak of the battle with Clausen:

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[35] cited from H.N. Clausen, *Catholicismens og Protestantismens Kirkeforfatning, Lære og Ritus* in P.G. Lindhart, op. cit., p. 37; no closer citation given.

[36] cf. Grundtvig, *Udvalgte Skrifter*, IV, 395ff.

> "It is known to us all that as long as Christians have existed, so have there always been people who were baptized in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost; there have always been people who professed that Jesus Christ was God's only Son, by whose Word they were baptized, in whose Name they worshipped, in whose Name in baptism they

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[37] Kirkens Gjenmæle, in Grundtvig, op. cit., p. 395.

[38] it was much later, likely 1840, to harden into the view that the Apostolic Symbol was itself given to the disciples during the forty days between the Resurrection and the Ascension.

> received the Spirit of God with the forgiveness of sins, in whose communion of body and blood they found eternal life as God's gift in Him. Lo, this is what you cannot deny without becoming the laughing-stock of each other and of the congregation; it is to this the enemies of the Church bear witness just as loudly as its friends; it is the confession of the Apostolic faith, which is sealed by the blood of all those who shed it in testimony to our Lord; it is that confession of faith which we still find in all Christian congregations, which also was made for you, when you accepted baptism as a rebirth and a renewal ... this is the profession of faith you yourselves have acquired, if you have not excluded yourselves from the congregation by despising the Table of the Lord."[39]

Grundtvig's "matchless discovery"[40] did not provide the solid basis on which the true Christianity could be separated from the false, and Clausen did not respond with repentance.. Rather, his answer to the "Church" was a suit for libel, which he won, with the result that Grundtvig was placed under police censorship which was not lifted for twelve years, until 1837. The controversy brought Grundtvig into another period of deep depression. He resigned his pastorate and took no permanent pastorate again until 1839.

What must occupy us now is the impact of this "Church Battle", as it was called, upon Martensen. The Metropolitan School was not impervious to the polemics of the "battle". The Danish church had been deeply stirred by Grundtvig's accusations, and, through the formation of a vigorous Grundtvigian party in the Church, many far-reaching changes were to come in the years following. Without a doubt the most active and polemical of all the sympathizers of Grundtvig was Martensen's teacher, J.C. Lindberg. Kierkegaard was later to describe him as "...the clever and dialectical Magister Lindberg, the talented chief advocate and defender of the matchless discovery."[41]

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[39] Udvalgte Skrifter, IV, p. 386f.

[40] cf. S. Kierkegaard's ridicule of this phrase, used frequently by Grundtvig and his followers, in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, tr. D. Swenson and W. Lowrie, (Princeton, 1944).

In the Metropolitan School Grundtvig had his advocate in Lindberg. Clausen found a more quiet and circumspect defender in the lecturer in religion, P.A. Plum. Plum's lectures were philosophically oriented and it is notable that he seems to have made no impression upon Martensen at this time.[42] Quite other was the case with Lindberg. Martensen recalls that he was drawn to Lindberg, and evidently as well, to Lindberg's propaganda effort on behalf of Grundtvigianism. In the school there were only two ways of thinking about the questions raised by the "Church battle". One believed that Clausen should either recant or resign, or one believed that the Church had been right in its censure of Grundtvig. "Orthodoxy and heterodoxy were the only categories we had."[43] And it is clear that Plum and Clausen fell into the heterodox camp. Martensen followed Lindberg into the orthodox camp so far indeed that the rector of the Metropolitan School, N.L. Nissen, himself a disciple of the Heidelberg theologian H.E.G. Paulus (1761-1851), and lecturer in Greek and Latin for the upper classes, warned Martensen, to no avail, that Lindberg was a brilliant propagandist.

Lindberg brought to Martensen some of Grundtvig's writings, the Verdenskroniken of 1812 and a volume of the Dannevirke. Martensen recalls that, like his earlier reading of Oehlenschläger, he understood little of what he read, but he found there "flashes of lightning" and sudden glimmers of insight which stirred him deeply.[44]

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[41] Kierkegaard, op. cit., p. 36.

[42] cf. J.O. Andersen, op. cit., p. 145.

[43] Af Mit Levnet I, 20.

[44] ibid.

The "Church battle" evidently awakened the question of religion, at least intellectually, for many of the students. The question raised by the battle, which echoed and reëchoed in the decade after the battle was "What think ye of Christ, whose Son is He?", and this question led Martensen and his fellow students to consider whether they had an answer.[45] Here Grundtvig was stirring, but vague.

Perhaps through Grundtvig's and Rudelbach's defense of Steffens' On The False Theology and the True Faith in Theologiske Maanedsskrift III (1826)[46], or perhaps directed to it by Poul Møller, who found Grundtvig "bewitching" but not convincing, Martensen found in Steffens' outline of his newly won confessional Lutheranism something "more accessible" than the Verdenskroniken or the Dannevirke.[47] It will be useful to examine this work of Steffens briefly, then to ask what it was that Martensen found here.

Steffens begins the work with the comment that he has for a long time been wearied by a battle with a kind of knowledge (Wissen) which wishes to ground in itself not only that which is within its limits but also that to which it has no access. He says that he turned toward Christianity as he "began more to suspect (ahnen) than to believe that the saviour of the world is also the redeemer of thought, the deliverer of errant reason (Vernunft) from its own waywardness."[48] Readers, he says, will have noticed this Ahnung in his works. But now he has come to believe. The "true faith", for Steffens, is founded upon the Lutheran concept of justification.[49] There is in the work a desire to grasp in knowledge the whole of existence, and in this we are reminded of the young Steffens of 1802-3, but this knowledge is now in no sense man's gift to himself or in any way based in human nature. Rather, sin has altered fundamentally the relation between God and man, and the only access of man to God is through God's grace given in Jesus Christ. The sinfulness of man is a riddle, an enigma which cannot be penetrated by reason. Yet the man who is touched by the grace of God knows himself and the human race to be alienated from God in a manner for which God cannot be made responsible.[50]

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[45] ibid.

[46] cf. Grundtvig, Udvalgte Skrifter IV, p. 246.

[47] Martensen, op. cit. p. 22; cf. J.O. Andersen, op. cit., p. 147.

[48] H. Steffens, Von der falschen Theologie und der Wahren Glauben, p. iii.

Steffens' book is a polemic against the interpretation of the Christian religion in Schleiermacher's Speeches on Religion. There is no mention of Steffens' close friend and colleague of the Hallé period (1804-6) in the work, though the target of the book is obvious in the critique of Gefühl as the foundation of the relation between man and God, as it is throughout. The "false theology" knows nothing of the love of God for man, for the only love known by man in his immediate feeling is his sick self-love, the very principle of sin. The advocates of the false theology maintain that in the love of man for God there is indeed an object of this love. And they are right, but this object is only self-created.[51] This self delusion of love is grounded in a natural feeling. For deep in the consciousness of man there lies a human demand for possession of an object which we can indeed give to ourselves.

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[49] ibid., pp. 74ff.

[50] ibid., p. 112.

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Steffens argues that he can see how one might come to view the nature of religion as his opponent has done, but he cannot see how he could compare this with what is contained in Scripture and believe that they are the same. One must either believe, Steffens now maintains, that everything that man possesses comes from man, or hold with Scripture that faith can come only by revelation. There is no alternative.[52] One knows by revelation of the Holy Spirit that Scripture is a true divine witness.[53]

There is only one holy and eternal object of Christian love, and this one cannot make himself known in immediate feeling. The object of the love of the believer and the one who gives his love are the same. But genuine love is no part of the fallen human domain. If it is revealed to us, we must acknowledge it. But it is as clear that we cannot truly love of our own power as it is that we cannot by our own power know the one who gives this love. The power both to love and to know must be made felt within us by revelation. And it is this that God has done in the bringing of the New Creation, the Second Adam, in Jesus Christ.[54] To the Christian who has given up the false theology for the true faith "Es ist ihm wie ein Schleier von den Augen gefallen...".[55] "Christianity is a permanent miracle. The glory of the phenomenal world, the law of nature, the divine order of the natural man, understanding, reason, the moral law - none of these can give rise to it nor can they grasp it."[56]

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[51] ibid., p. 78: "Wohl hat diese verirrte Liebe einen Gegenstand, aber nur einen selbsterschaffenen, der sich nie as dem Gefühl herauswagt, in dieses verhüllt bleibt; und ewig suchend und nie findend betet die kranke Seele das eigne Geschöpf an."

[52] ibid. pp. 84-86.

[53] ibid. p. 122.

[54] ibid. pp. 126-7.

The above is clearly the main direction of Steffens' book. What did Martensen find it in? His comment on the book in his autobiography is remarkable:

> I was greatly captivated by his characterization of mythology and the poetic imagination, which springs from a far higher source than the understanding (*Forstand*) and the world of which is inaccessible to the mere understanding. He spoke of true Christianity with the greatest enthusiasm, also of the inner state of the Christian life, of inner experiences which I did not know but to the description of which I listened as to a wonderful music. I will not here undertake any judgment on the work, which without naming him is essentially an attack on Schleiermacher, and about which there is certainly much to be said. I speak here only of my impression at the time. And of that I can say that I received from the work as a whole a pre-sentiment (*Anelse*) that there might be possible a view of the world and of life (*Verdens*-*og* *Livsanskuelse*) in which everything in existence which has significance, Nature and Spirit, Nature and History, Poetry, Art, Philosophy, join themselves harmoniously together in a Temple of the Spirit in which Christianity is the all ruling and all illumining center (Midpunkt)."[57]

It is difficult to determine precisely what this tells us about Martensen's thought at the time he read *On the False Theology and the True Faith*. The autobiography tells us as well that the young Martensen did not understand the basic ideas of Steffens' book.[58] Even so, there was much in the book that attracted him, especially the characterization of mythology and the poetic imagination as superior to mere understanding. Indeed an examination of mythology and of the poetic imagination in relation to understanding and reason is a part of Steffens' book, but it is not central there, as Martensen seems aware in saying that he had no basic understanding of the book. The description of the inner states of the Christian life he listened to as to "wonderful music" but the personal life which would have made sense of Steffens' searching remarks on sin and grace, doubt and belief, was lacking.

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[55] *ibid*. p. 196. It is hardly necessary to point out the word-play.

[56] *ibid*. p. 199.

[57] *Af Mit Levnet* I, pp. 22-23.

[58] *ibid*. p. 22: "Heller ikke dette Skrift forstod jeg fra Grunden af."

In all, the impression of the work at the time awakened a suspicion in Martensen that a comprehensive Weltanschauung might be possible in which all of the realms of human culture would take their place, ordered and illumined by the Christian faith. We need to ask ourselves how much this owed to Steffens and how accurately it can be said to describe Martensen's state of mind during the final years before he entered the University. The first question can be answered more readily than the second. From Steffens Martensen could have received no more than a "suspicion" that such a Weltanschauung might be possible. The very title of Steffens' work contrasts the false theology with the true faith, and the book remains consistent to the suggestion that, though faith may be the "center" for a new way of looking at the world, constructive theology is to be viewed with scepticism.[59] The Bible interpreted in itself and through the creeds with the guidance of the Holy Spirit is opposed to the

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[59] This view underlies an entire section of the work devoted to the rôle of the teacher in the Christian community, cf. pp. 211-236.

Bible exegeted by the biblical theologians as a source of Christian authority. Steffens' criticism of "exegetical papacy" here is quite similar to that of Grundtvig in his attack on Clausen. Martensen's Anelse may have been drawn from Steffens, but there is little positive basis for the development of such a view in the work.

The question of how accurately Martensen's memory of his Anelse describes his state of mind at the time can best be answered by an examination of the development of his thought in the period which follows, the university years. If we try to give a general characterization of his situation on entrance into the University, we again have his own words: "In this dawning state (with respect to the Anelse) aspiring to the future, I left for the University in 1827."[60] I will try to show in the following that the sun was slow in rising, though Martensen was conscious already that the dawn had come. He had a vague pre-sentiment of his task, but no more than this.

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[60] ibid. p. 23.

CHAPTER TWO: POSITIVITY AND NATURAL THEOLOGY

1. Development of Martensen's Thought 1827-1833.

Already in the last year at the Metropolitan School young Martensen had decided to study theology. His way to the University was paved by excellent work on his *examen artium* in October, 1827, and in the three years of university study prior to his admission to candidacy for theological study he was exposed to the new directions in Danish theology which began to make themselves felt at the end of the 1820's.

The intellectual orientation of Martensen in the years 1827-33 is a matter for debate. This is true of his personal religiousness as well. This period of Martensen's life has been examined more carefully than any other both by Skat Arildsen in his dissertation on Martensen, presented to the theological faculty of the University of Copenhhagen in 1932, and by J. O. Andersen, who disputed Arildsen's interpretation of Martensen in this period, at the public examination on Arildsen's dissertation.[1] The central difficulty in the interpretation of this period lies in the absence of direct sources. We have only Martensen's memories of this crucial period of his life, supplemented by information about Martensen drawn from the writings of men who knew him in these years. There are no Martensen letters, no journal, no writings of significance, before 1833. There are two sermons preached for the pastoral seminar, and, of major importance for understanding the direction of Martensen's thought at the end of his years of theological study, a prize-medal essay (*Priisopgave*) on the question of the basis of natural theology, its scope, and its relation to positive theology. From 1834 there exists a review article on a book discussing the authorship of the book of Revelation. The major part of this chapter will be given to an examination of the latter two writings, but it will first be necessary to look at the problems of the period 1827-33, with some attention to the dispute between Arildsen and Andersen.

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[1] cf. Skat Arildsen, *H.L. Martensen, Hans Liv, Udvikling og Arbejde* (Kbh. 1933), Ch. 4, pp. 31-74, and J.O. Andersen, *H.L. Martensen's Ungdom* (Kbh. 1933).

Arildsen's approach to this period is quite clearly indicated in his interpretation of the *Anelse* which Martensen received from Steffens, discussed at the end of the previous chapter. For Arildsen, the reading of Steffens' *On the False Theology and the True Faith* is the central event of Martensen's early life, and the suspicion of the possibility of a total, Christ-centered *Weltanschauung* is the key to the whole of Martensen's later unfolding. At this point Arildsen believes that he can characterize Martensen's "psyche" as *essentially* "religious-speculative" and take the task of the reconciliation of these two facets of his "psyche" as Martensen's central problem.[2] Andersen, on the other hand, thinks that in placing such weight on the *Anelse* received from Steffens, Arildsen has produced a picture of the 19-year-old Martensen which is "psychologically absurd".[3] He attempts to support this judgment with a close study of Martensen's relation to his friends during the years in question.

Much of the quarrel, which will not be examined in detail here, turns upon the meaning of "religious-speculative" in Arildsen's definition of Martensen's "psyche". Arildsen tries to make clear his meaning: the

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[2] S. Arildsen, *op. cit.* pp. 26-29.

[3] J. O. Andersen, *op. cit.* p. 155.

"religious" involves questions concerning the inner relation of the individual to God; the "speculative" concerns the relation of the individual to the totality of the world outside him.[4] In Steffens' book, he argues, Martensen saw at this time the "speculative" significance. He was prompted by Steffens to the attempt to reach a total world-view. What is notable, says Arildsen, is that Martensen makes nothing of the "religious" element in Steffens' work. The strong emphasis upon sin and grace which is present throughout the work is ignored by Martensen. Rather the young reader of Steffens, as we have seen, speaks only of the "wonderful music" of Steffens' words about the inner Christian life. Arildsen concludes from this that Martensen is more highly developed in the "speculative" direction than in the "religious" at this time, yet insists that the Anelse from Steffens is a pre-sentiment of the union of the two, a union which Martensen now takes as his task.

It is on this latter point that I believe the objections of Andersen to Arildsen's thesis are valid. There is no evidence in Martensen's autobiography to indicate that this early in his career there is any intention to make speculative theology a life-task. In fact, Arildsen has borrowed from a much later period, near the end of Martensen's years of theological candidacy, Martensen's own description of his reaction to J.P. Mynster's Betragtninger over det christelige Troeslærdomme (1833).[5] At that time it was doubtless true that for Martensen "religious interest was throughout found up with speculative interest," but it is not at all clear that this is true of Martensen in 1827, or at any time in the period prior to 1833.[6]

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[4] Arildsen, op. cit. p. 27.

[5] S. Arildsen, op. cit. p. 54.

The issue between Arildsen and Andersen is in one respect substantial, in another superficial. It is superficial in that Andersen chooses to use the term _speculative_ in a far more narrow sense than either Arildsen or even Martensen has chosen. Thus Andersen can argue that there is no speculative interest in Steffens' book and hence that Martensen could have received from it no speculative thrust. This is to presuppose that speculation is essentially autonomous, a presupposition which we cannot make about Martensen's later thought, and which will be subject to inquiry later in this chapter.

The issue is substantial, however, in that Arildsen claims the reconciliation of "speculative" and "religious" as Martensen's central task already in 1827. Given the definitions of the speculative and religious tendencies so far provided by Arildsen, it is not at all clear what is to be united, if the union of these two tendencies _is_ in fact Martensen's aim. Regarding the _manner_ of the union, Martensen himself seems to have been far more impressed by the power of the _poetic imagination_ in Steffens' book than by the power of _speculation_, if speculation is taken as a peculiarly rational (_fornuftlige_) operation.[7]

In summary, if we take Arildsen's definition of "religious-speculative" at face value little more is said than at the time of his entrance into the University Martensen was essentially occupied with the question of the

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[6] H.L. Martensen, _Af mit Levnet_ I, 53.

[7] cf. J.O. Andersen, _op_. _cit_. pp. 147-8.

"inner" relation between man and God and the relation of man to the total world of his experience, that he had more than a suspicion that these two interests could be united and that their union was his basic task. It is only if we try to narrow this claim to the point where it says something definite that we have to face Andersen's objections. The one objection which would apply in any case is that Arildsen has attempted to define Martensen's "psyche," to give it a stamp at this point, with results which are, and here I agree with Andersen, absurd. The psychological absurdity of the characterization appears from the evidence for the period 1827-33 which Andersen has collected.

On the presupposition that a close allegiance with the followers of Grundtvig would preclude any interest in the union of the "speculative" and the Christian faith Andersen has examined very closely Martensen's relations with the Grundtvigian circle during his last years at the Metropolitan School and his university years. Given his presupposition his results are positive. Martensen maintained a close relation to a circle of committed Grundtvigians from 1825 until the end of 1832: therefore, argues Andersen, until the winter of 1832 Martensen had no central concern for "speculation".[8] On a second presupposition, that Martensen, were Arildsen correct, would have been concerned with the work of those men in the University who were seeking to unite the interests of the "universal human" with the positive Christian faith, Andersen has carefully examined the University records of the period 1826-34. Here again, given the presupposition, the result is positive within limits. Martensen had a highly "Platonic"[9] relation to the theological faculty, attending no theological lectures at all for the years 1831-1833, his two middle years in the theological faculty, and he derived his greatest influence from the three men, Poul Møller, H.N. Clausen, and F.C. Sibbern, who held promise in the supposed area of his greatest concern, only after 1832.[10] Andersen finds this entirely consistent with the strong Grundtvigian party spirit which had nothing but contempt for the whole "academic hotchpotch" at the University during these years.[11]

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[8] ibid. pp. 168ff.; Andersen bases his conclusions here on the recollections of the church-historian Fr. Hammerich, Et Levnetsløb, 1822. Hammerich was a close friend of Martensen, and a member of the Grundtvigian circle in which Martensen moved during this period.

Andersen has effectively established, I believe, the sympathy of Martensen with the Grundtvigian or "orthodox" position during the period 1826-32. It is important, however, to note that adherence to the position reached by Grundtvig in the quarrel with Clausen needed by no means to exclude an interest in the comprehension of the whole of human life under a single point of view. Again, the question here is the meaning of the term "speculation". It is clear that there was little sympathy for autonomous thought among the Grundtvigians. Martensen recalls having made the remark once in a circle of his Grundtvigian friends, in which Lindberg was present, that he had read recently a "beautiful" sermon of Schleiermacher: "I received a serious rebuff for the word I had chosen. What an heretic had written could not possibly be beautiful. He added that these natural philosophers are dangerous fellows."[12] Yet Grundtvig's writings themselves contained a kind of total world-view. Indeed Martensen's very words are that he found in Grundtvig's "many-sided authorship," "a world-historical outlook (Anskuelse), related to that which had already flashed out at me in Steffens, an outlook in which history and human life appear as a battle, in which the basic opposition is between faith and unfaith, the Christian and the un-Christian, truth and falsehood, light and darkness, with the goal of victory in the distance, the triumph of truth and light, an outlook which he found pre-figured in the myths of the North...".[13] Here the Anelse felt in Steffens is more clearly defined, and we are able to see that no "speculatively" autonomous approach is indicated. Rather, the center of orientation is the Christian faith, from which the whole of world-history and human life appear as a battle for truth.[14]

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[9] ibid. p. 162.

[10] ibid. pp. 178 ff.

[11] cf. the series of articles on Danish theology from the beginning of the nineteenth century to 1824 in Hengstenberg's Evangelische Kirchenzeitung, No. 50-51 (1827); No. 55-57, 62-63 (1828). The articles, under the title "Das Christenthum und die Rationalisten in Dänemark seit dem Ausgange des vorigen Jahrhunderts," though unsigned, were by A.G. Rudelbach, at the time joint editor with J.C. Lindberg and Grundtvig of Theologiske Maanedsskrift and, notably, Martensen's first private tutor in theology, 1827-28.

If we follow Martensen's own characterization of his reading of and reaction to Grundtvig in the years 1826-34 we can see readily how Arildsen arrives at his definition of Martensen's "psyche" and of his "problem" as the union of the speculative and the religious. With regard to his appreciation of Grundtvig Martensen insists that even at the time[15] his opinion of Grundtvig was critical on two crucial points: he found in Grundtvig a "muddy" mixture of Christianity and nationalism, in which the "Christian-religious" was an arbitrary addition; he believed that in spite of his protest against the German idealists that his own definition of true Christianity was "strictly historical". Grundtvig in fact treated what he called tradition very much as the German philosophers treated the "Idea," using it to sift, direct, and order history, to distinguish what in the course of time is merely appearance and what is reality.[16] Martensen can be believed here only, I think, if we accept the qualifications of Andersen and place Martensen's break with the Grundtvigian party no earlier than the fall of 1832.[17]

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[12] Af Mit Levnet I, 27.

[13] ibid. p. 31.

[14] On the Grundtvigian theology as providing a total world-view cf. A. G. Rudelbach in Evangelische Kirchenzeitung, No. 63 (Aug. 6, 1828), p. 502.

In coming to the break with Grundtvig it is likely that no one was more important for Martensen than F.C. Sibbern (1785-1872), himself a trenchant critic of what he called the "crass concepts" of the Grundtvigians. It is clear from the autobiography that Sibbern brought to light in Martensen the views of which he had felt only the faintest stirring when he read Steffens.[18] It is also clear that Sibbern is seen as exercising an influence which Mynster's Betragtninger (1833) could not exert. It is difficult to say how seriously we can take Martensen's judgment that Mynster had "already" provided a viewpoint above the party spirit of the Grundtvigians and the rationalists, but, if Sibbern's "philosophy of the Christian religion" which Martensen says was at root a speculative theology, did not exert its major influence upon the young theologian until after he had read Mynster's book, we can clearly date the genuine speculative interest and the effort to find a union of speculation and religious faith after Martensen's reading of the Betragtninger in 1833. In fact, Martensen virtually says as much himself. He tells us that he read the Betragtninger and others of Mynster's works with enthusiasm and approval for the joining of the Christian and the human which Mynster achieved. Yet he was not influenced by Mynster in such a way that he could say that he had found a position in which he could rest or from which he could develop further:

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[15] Af Mit Levnet I, 34; the time referrent is unclear. Martensen is referring to his reading of Grundtvig, and this could fall anywhere within the university student and candidate years.

[16] ibid. p. 32f.

[17] cf. J.O. Andersen, op. cit. pp. 183ff., and 224f. for a summary of his arguments on this point.

[18] Af Mit Levnet I, 61.

> There was in me a persistent unrest, aspiration and searching. I had to look for the solution of my own problem. I sought a unity of faith and knowledge (Tro og Viden). My religious interest was bound up with my speculative interest; they walked, so to speak, as one, and I could only rest when the two together were satisfied.[19]

2. The Priisopgave (Dec. 1833)

If it is difficult to determine clearly Martensen's intellectual leanings before 1833, the task becomes much simpler after that time. The analysis which follows is based upon works from the period 1833-34.

As I have noted above the earliest and most significant writing from the university years is the prize essay, or Priisopgave, completed in December, 1833. The work exists only in manuscript, an 89-page quarto volume, written in Danish. The essay is addressed to a question set by the theological faculty of the University: "What is the basis of natural theology, its scope, and its relation to positive theology? [*Quodnam est fundamentum theologiae naturalis, quis ambitus, et Quaenam relation eius ad theologiam positivam?*"]

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[19] ibid. p. 54-5.

I will first set out Martensen's conclusions in the *Priisopgave* in the form of a number of propositions. Then I will turn to the text of the essay and examine the propositions in their context:

1) Natural theology cannot be separated from positive theology on the basis that the former is rational while the latter is irrational.

2) Natural theology has its basis in revelation.

3) Revelation is the basis of all religion.

4) Thus the distinction between natural religion and positive religion cannot be made on the basis that natural religion is the religion of reason, while the basis of positive religion alone is revelation.

5) Natural theology is related to natural religion only as a reflective, rational, speculative discipline to the root concepts which it seeks to develop and fully to understand.

6) There is in man a primitive (*oprindelige*) religious consciousness. The "revealed" content of this primitive religious consciousness is man's awareness of his simultaneous *separation from* and *unity with* God. Here there is an indisputable certainty of the religious consciousness that God is revealed.

7) This "revealed" element in the primitive religious consciousness must be termed rational in the sense that it is present as a primitive idea not given to consciousness by phenomena but brought to awareness through phenomenal experience. It is in this sense a religious *a priori*.

8) The task of the natural theologian is to search for the manifestation in phenomena of the primitive religious consciousness and to observe its development through phenomenal expression to its own highest and essential form.

9) It is only with its development to its essential form that what is already present in the primitive religious consciousness can be grasped in concept, as Idea.

10) The highest development of the primitive religious consciousness to conceptual form is to be found in the Christian religion, where separation and unity of God and man are seen as universal Process, Life, Spirit. Here revelation is God as infinite personality placing finite personality outside himself, yet eternally overcoming this opposition in bringing the finite personality back into himself. Religion is man's sundering of himself from God, the overcoming of this separation, and God's return of himself and the world to the Eternal.

11) As a natural religion, there is a "Christian religious idealism" which is itself the essential natural religion. Such a natural religion cannot as such treat history as significant, but can only see the positive as myth and symbol for the eternal ideas.

12) Natural, or speculative, theology is therefore that science which has as its task the unfolding of this Christian Grundgnosis and the conceptualization of this unfolding, in intelligible form. Natural theology is speculative because its concepts are developed with the necessity of thought. The speculative unfolding of the content of the primitive religious consciousness is a necessary unfolding.

13) The fundamentum of all speculative theology is expressed in the

ontological argument for the existence of God, since what is expressed there is "the unity of the human consciousness with the divine consciousness as the token of all revelation".[20]

14) Though in a sense speculative theology is an autonomous science of God, free from any external authority, yet it is not free to ignore the positive content of human experience. As concepts without percepts are empty thought-forms, so knowledge of God without the perception or intuition of God's presence in phenomenal experience is without content.

15) On the other hand, dogmatic theology, which deals exclusively with the content of the given in phenomenal experience, expressing it in organic fashion and seeking to give to it its own form, is blind to its *essential* significance without the structure which is given to experience by speculative theology.

16) A genuine science of God is possible only on the basis of the joining of the two sciences, speculative and dogmatic, in a single effort, the "great organism" of Christian theology. Here the speculative theologian works outward from the Christian *Grundgnosis* and the dogmatic theologian supplies the "organic intuition," the perceived content which is structured by speculative theology.

Martensen maintains in the *Priisopgave* that the view of natural, or as he chooses to call it, *speculative* theology outlined above is necessarily characteristic of Protestantism.[21] In contrast to Catholicism, which sees the primitive religious idea expressed only in the Church, which is objective and universal, Protestantism sees the primitive religious idea expressed individually and subjectively in the religiousness of the individual subject. Catholicism stands upon an objective tradition accepted as authoritative. Protestantism, by contrast, bears an essential relation to historical and philosophical criticism, since the Protestant can only accept tradition when his conscience (Samvittighed) and thought (Tanke), his primitive or original consciousness (oprindelige Bevisthed), affirms it.[22]

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[20] *Priisopgave*, xlii, xliv, *passim*.

[21] *ibid*. p. iv.

This claim brings into focus the central question of the Priisopgave, the relation between faith and knowledge in Martensen's appraisal of the relation between natural theology and positive theology. We have seen that at the basis of all religion there is a natural element, the awareness of God in the primitive religious consciousness. Yet we have also seen that this natural element in the religious consciousness is only known through its manifestation in positive form. If the term "positive" is linked to the term "revealed," then we could say that rational analysis of the primitive religious consciousness discloses the revealed element in this consciousness, namely that God gives himself in consciousness. But such use of the term "positive" Martensen finds misleading. The positive element in all religion is to be found in the manner of disclosure of that which is natural, its disclosure in time and space, in history.

How, then, are we to distinguish between faith and knowledge? Faith would appear to be acceptance of the positive on the basis of an authority not yet warranted by reason. Knowledge would appear to be acceptance of perhaps the same content, warranted and comprehended by reason as proceeding from its own nature. This would seem to follow from the basic premises of the Priisopgave already examined. Yet Martensen refuses to follow consistently this line of argument. He wishes to value more highly the positive element in religion, as it is given in history. In fact, with regard to the positive element in the Christian tradition, he wishes to maintain it "unabridged" (ubeskaaret) in the face of philosophical analysis.[23] Though it is alone consistent with the Protestant principle that each man must appropriate for himself (tilegne sig) the content of the Christian faith, and must therefore know it, the manner of his knowing may, must, change from one generation to another, with the changing currents of philosophical opinion. The scientific form of Christian theology will change with the changes in philosophical orientation, yet the positive content, the objectively given in the whole of history, the sacred history (den hellige Historie) will remain the same.[24]

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[22] ibid.; note here the agreement in principle with Clausen against Grundtvig on the relation between Protestantism and historical criticism. This question will be examined more fully below in the discussion of Martensen's review of a defense of the Johannine authorship of Revelation.

Here we find quite a different sense of the term "faith" than we found above. There faith was contrasted with knowledge as an acceptance of external authority distinguished from a knowing appropriation of the content. Now it appears that the positive element in the Christian tradition is to be accepted unabridged by the Christian believer, i.e. to be held by "faith" independent of the task which reason has in raising from faith-form to cognitive-form the content of the given tradition. Faith now would seem not to be made only a passing moment in the movement toward knowledge. Rather, faith has become an indispensable organ for holding fast the tradition, whether known speculatively, seen in the mirror of the divine presence in human consciousness, or only found, apprehended, as positive content. What accounts for this curious inconsistency in Martensen's analysis? On the one side his manner of treating the positive would appear to agree entirely with Hegel's relegation of the positive to the position of a cancelled moment in the Spirit's knowledge of itself, the moment in which that which the Spirit has given to itself appears outside it, in the form of mental image (Vorstellung). On the other side his attempt to preserve the positive as something valid in and for itself[25] is something else. Are the two elements in any way combined here, or are they joined arbitrarily?

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[23] cf. S. Arildsen, op. cit. p. 80f.

[24] ibid. p. 75.

The answer to this question will have to be sought in Martensen's discussion of the knowing process. The epistemological question from this point forward becomes the basic question for Martensen's theology, and much of our later discussion will center on it. The question can be examined only briefly here, since Martensen is sketchy in his analysis of the problem in the Priisopgave, not the least of the defects of the work. The discussion of the relation between reason and the positive rests here upon a separation of the knowing process into "two opposing moments," intuition (Anskuelse) and concept (Begreb).[26] Reason objectively seen, says

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[25] In Kierkegaardian language, "to give the moment significance"; cf. Philosophical Fragments, tr. Swenson, (Princeton, 1941), Ch. I, B, passim.

[26] cf. Arildsen, op. cit. p. 66, passim.

Martensen, is Absolute Concept;[27] subjectively seen, it is speculative power in the form of the Concept. Intuition[28] and the concept must be combined in the knowing process in order that there be knowledge. Similarly there can be no knowledge without the combination of the rational and the positive moments: "Genuine rational knowledge with its absolute thought-content must thus be combined with an intuition of the rich fullness of the actual. Speculation must be combined with experience; only then will there arise from purely rational knowledge, spiritual (aandelig) knowledge in the highest sense."[29] Martensen argues that this duality in knowledge arises from the fact that speculation grasps only the universal, while intuition grasps only the individual. The latter cannot be deduced from the former with necessity and universality. In being individual it is not universal. It must therefore be intuited, or experienced, as it is given.[30] "Reason manifests itself fully only in the manifold interchange of the eternally new individual forms, and our knowledge only becomes living when the concept illumines a full and rich intuition."[31]

There is a point of union for intuition and concept, the positive and reason. This is found by Martensen in Spirit. It is in Spirit that the whole is known as such: "The entire universe is accessible to our spirit, but that which is of a different nature must also be apprehended with different senses (Sandser) and the varied kinds of truths come to us in different ways; yet all is made one in the midpoint, the Spirit, which is the common element."[32]

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[27] A more literal translation, closer to Martensen's meaning would be "Absolute Comprehension," since, like the German Begriff, the Danish Begreb contains the idea of grasping, comprehending.

[28] Anskuelse, like Anschauung, a manner of presentation to consciousness as if external for consciousness.

[29] cited in Arildsen, op. cit. p. 70.

[30] cf. ibid. p. 66.

[31] cited in ibid. p. 69.

In the Priisopgave the concept of Spirit is developed no more fully than this. It is made to bear the weight of the claim that a total view of the world (Totalanskuelse) such as Martensen had found foreshadowed in Steffens and Grundtvig, is possible. But the concept, clearly borrowed, as is so much of the language of the Priisopgave, from Hegel, is clouded by a poetic haze. The haze seems to clear when Martensen argues that knowledge is only made living by the combination of reason and intuition. Yet such terms as richness, fullness, spirituality, applied to "genuine" knowledge have no more definite meaning in the essay.

The basic weakness of the work lies at the root of all this lack of analysis; the epistemological split between concept and intuition, between reason and the positive, is never grounded. In many passages in the Priisopgave Martensen appears to presuppose a distinction, such as is found in Leibniz and Lessing, between necessary truths of reason and contingent historical truths. Here the basis of the distinction is the distinction, within God, of intellect, supporting the system of necessary rational truths, and will, giving the contingent basis of all existential propositions. There is, however, in the Priisopgave no clear appeal to such a fundamental distinction. Indeed the Hegelian identification of

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[32] cited in ibid. p. 75f.

Absolute Spirit with Absolute Idea has so captivated Martensen that he both asserts the ideal character of all of the positive elements in the Christian religion and at the same time wishes in some way to maintain their significance as moments in and for themselves. Nowhere is this more clear than in his conviction that such positive contents of the Christian dogma as Trinity, sin, incarnation, and redemption, have an ideal or supra-historical character.[33] From this point of view Martensen can "save the phenomena" only by giving to phenomenal experience the power to bring "life," "richness," "fullness," to the ideal content, the "Christian religious idealism" discussed in proposition 11 above. But this is inadequate. What is lacking is any basis whatever for a fundamental distinction between the ideal and the historical.[34] Epistemologically, Martensen has so far failed to make an adequate distinction between knowledge and belief. On the one side he appears to look, with Hegel, for a form of knowledge in which belief becomes a cancelled moment. On the other side, he appears to maintain belief as an organ for the positive, as we have seen above, in a manner reminiscent of Leibniz and Lessing or the later "positive" philosophy of Schelling.[35]

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[33] cf. Arildsen, op. cit. 23, 33, and p. 71; the theological faculty at Copenhagen found the Priisopgave worthy of reward, but expressly objected that he sometimes gave for problems "non tam solutiones quam symbolae ad solvendum" and that especially in the present case he was content with no closer investigation to claim that the most central concepts of Christianity might lend themselves to speculative, ideal development independent of the positive, given. Cf. "Censuren over de inleverede Priisopgaver"in H.P. Selmer, Akademiske Tidende, II, pp. 68, 76 (Kbh. 1834).

[34] This defect, too, was noted by the members of the theological faculty in their examination of the Priisopgave. H.N. Clausen, M.H. Hohlenberg, and C.T. Englestoft held that Martensen "had not with sufficient firmness defined the relation between natural theology and the significance and authority of positive revelation." Cf. H.P. Selmer, op. cit. p. 76.

The influences upon the Priisopgave are many, and it is impossible, I think, to sort them satisfactorily. In his autobiography Martensen indicates that the main influences upon his thought in this period were F.C. Sibbern, Schleiermacher and Hegel. He mentions having read Schelling's Vorlesung über die akademische Studium and Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, Fichte's Die Bestimmung des Menschens and Reden an die deutsche Nation, as well as J.L. Heiberg's Hegelian analysis of human freedom, Om den menneskelige Frihed.[36] Most illuminating for understanding Martensen's attitude toward the relation of philosophy and theology at this time is his judgment on Schleiermacher's theology. Here we can draw both on the discussion of Schleiermacher in the autobiography and the criticism of Schleiermacher expressed in the Priisopgave.

In September of 1833, four months before the completion of the prize essay, Schleiermacher was expected in Copenhagen for an eight-day visit. The occasion was his participation in the tri-centennial of the Augsburg

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[35] cf. Schelling's Of Human Freedom, tr. J. Gutmann (Chicago, 1936), pp. 75ff.

[36] cf. Af Mit Levnet I, 80f.; Heiberg's essay was published in Kiel in 1824, cf. J.L. Heiberg, Prosaiske Skrifter, 2 Vol. (Kbh. 1861), I, 1-110. Heiberg's Of Human Freedom was a volley in the battle stirred up in Copenhagen by the publication of a defense of Hume's scepticism and an attack upon the Kantian concept of freedom by a Danish medical professor, F.G. Howitz (1789-1826). Howitz' article appeared in the Juridsk Tidsskrift, edited by A.S. Ørsted, and was the occasion of a major philosophical controversy which raged in Copenhagen for two years, involving not only Howitz and Heiberg, but also F.C. Sibbern, A.S. Ørsted, J.P. Mynster and others. Heiberg's essay is basically a defense of the Hegelian identification of freedom and necessity as viewed from the standpoint of the Absolute Idea; cf. below, Ch. V, pp. 108ff.

Confession. To this time Schleiermacher's influence in Denmark had been relatively minor. Though he and Steffens had earlier influenced each other, as we have seen, it had been Steffens who, with his On the False Theology and the True Faith, helped to turn a generation of young Danish theologians against Schleiermacher. Most sympathetic to the German theologian were Sibbern and Clausen, though Sibbern's interest in the possibility of a speculative theology stood in contrast to Schleiermacher's consistent effort to maintain a strict separation of the two disciplines, philosophy and theology.[37] Clausen did not share Schleiermacher's fundamental metaphysical orientation, but in his interpretation of many points in Christian dogma and in his moral philosophy he found much that was compatible in Schleiermacher. It is likely that the "enthusiasm" with which Martensen awaited Schleiermacher's visit had been awakened in him by Sibbern and Clausen.[38] Yet, even then, if we can trust the autobiography, Martensen had reservations about Schleiermacher's theology. At first dissuaded by Rudelbach in 1827 from reading The Christian Faith because of its difficulty, if not also because of its content, Martensen had by 1833 made the work the object of careful study. In the spring of 1834 he was to serve as Søren Kierkegaard's tutor in the reading of The Christian Faith. Martensen recalls that he found the work "hard to understand" but was captivated by Schleiermacher's basic ideas about sin and redemption as well as by the architectonic of the work "in which there was something overpowering". "His sharp distinction between philosophy and theology, which are to have nothing to do with each other, I could not understand, for the whole work appeared to me to have been produced from speculation and to be shot through with it."[39]

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[37] cf. N.M. Plum, "Schleiermacher i Danmark" (Kbh: 1934).

[38] Af Mit Levnet I, p. 65.

During Schleiermacher's stay in Copenhagen the young Martensen was often with him, and one conversation is recalled in the autobiography:

> One day I asked him in a naive way whether he believed that a philosophical knowledge of the essence of God in himself, the inner, eternal life-process in God, might be possible; I was thinking, without naming them, of Hegel, or Schelling, Baader, J. Boehme and similar thinkers. He answered very quietly, without naming anyone - he spoke of Hegel reluctantly - : "I consider it a fraud," and added to that some words which expressed an idea I later understood better from the Dialectik. The meaning was: we can think in no other manner than in contrasts. But, according to Schleiermacher, God is, as the absolute, or the essence of all essences, lifted above all contrasts; therefore, when we think of him in contrasts we think of him, he held, finitely, anthropomorphically, ktisomorphically. If we think of God as personal, or with Spinoza as natura naturans, even so we think in contrasts. But this is according to Schleiermacher a "fraud" (Täuschung), an illusion, self-deception and pure appearance, if by it one actually pretends to have thought the absolute in such definitions. God is to him the purely mystical, possessing in his kingdom oneness above all differences. God is the eternal presupposition of our thought, but he cannot be the object of our thought or of our concepts.[40]

On another occasion during the visit Schleiermacher made a remark which deeply impressed Martensen. The two had been together to view the collection of paintings at the Christiansborg Palace, though Martensen recalls that he saw "next to nothing" of the paintings, having eyes and ears for Schleiermacher alone. The two had left the palace and were walking through the streets engaged in a discussion of Schleiermacher's work in editing the Dialectik. Schleiermacher had just said that he should not be expected to linger very long in the purely metaphysical realm, that his interests had been turning more and more in the direction of the real sciences (reale Videnskaben):

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[39] ibid.: Martensen goes on to say that at this time he did not understand the basis of Schleiermacher's epistemology which he later found in the Dialectik.

[40] ibid. p. 69f.

> ...but suddenly he stood still for a moment and said with great energy: "Theology must be separated from philosophy, and the Church from the State; else we shall return to Scholasticism." This was for me a portentous (vaegtfuld) and unforgettable remark.[41]

Greatly drawn to Schleiermacher and urged by him to come to Berlin to study, Martensen recalls in the autobiography that his real sympathies at this time were with Hegel. Again, in Hegel, he was stirred by the pre-sentiment of a world-view which, on the background of the Trinity, would interpret Christ as the midpoint of existence and the universe as a series of concentric circles all related to the innermost, which is Christ, finding only in him their rationale. But there was still some question in Martensen's mind whether such an accomplishment might not require a system wholly other than the Hegelian.[42]

How much of the above is Martensen's judgment in 1833 we can ascertain from the Priisopgave. What is most apparent there, as we have seen, is the limping between a genuinely autonomous speculative theology such as Hegel's and a confessional theology based upon Scripture and tradition, like that of Schleiermacher. The warring principles of these two approaches to theology are never clearly isolated and confronted. Has the question been clarified any further with Martensen's first appearance in print in March, 1834?

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[41] ibid. p. 71.

[42] ibid. p. 67: the interest in the Hegelian system and the reservation about its final adequacy, as well as the general "system" suggested here, shows Sibbern's influence. Cf. Af Mit Levnet I, 61ff. and S. Arildsen, op. cit. pp. 42-51.

3. The article against Kolthoff.

In the July, 1834 issue of the Maanedsskrift for Litteratur Martensen wrote a critical review of a defense of the Johannine authorship of Revelation by E.G. Kolthoff, Apocalypsis Joanni Apostolo vindicata (Hafniae, 1834).[43] The review affords another view of the development of Martensen's thought in the last year of his study in Copenhagen. It is also important in giving us a glimpse of Martensen's mind during the early months of 1834 when he was Kierkegaard's private tutor in theology.

The critical review begins with an attack upon rationalist biblical criticism from the time of Semler onward as having been lacking in the Idea (ideeløs). With this is contrasted J.G. Herder's work on Hebrew poetry. With the rationalists, says Martensen, one could never discover what it was in Scripture that had given it the power to hold sway over history, but in Herder this critical defect had been overcome. Especially in his interpretation of the Apocolypse (Maran Atha: das Buch von der Zukunft des Herrn, 1779) had Herder turned the tide against a biblical criticism which found the Apocalypse at best embarrassing. In the Maran Atha, says Martensen, Herder has held fast the historical principle; he has tried to understand the work in its genuine historical context. Yet the given events of history become for Herder only the basis for seeing the "world-historical" aspect of the development of God's kingdom and its progress toward ultimate victory.[44] Mainly, Herder has been able to make the Apocalypse a living and concrete poetic work, partly by interpreting its symbols in relation to the work itself as a whole, partly by understanding the peculiarity of Hebrew poetry and applying its principles to the interpretation of these symbols. Herder not only has employed historical criticism to illumine the Apocalypse; he has seen the "religious-speculative" significance of these symbols. He has succeeded in making historical criticism subordinate to theological interpretation. The former is required, but:

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[43] Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, Bd. 12 (1834), pp. 1-31.

> Just as that which stirs the writer of history is not the mere historical fact, but the Idea, or the eternal history which manifests itself through the individual, empirical events; just as this also pertains to the deepest historical myths, where the mythical persons represent the spiritual powers of life which ever anew reproduce the same scene in manifold and changing forms; so was it the great ideas of the universal Church which the Seer dimly spied, but hidden in the symbols for which his age and its historical situation could give material.[45]

The neglect of the Apocalypse in recent years, says Martensen, is warranted, for it has been taken literally for too long. Of course the prophet could see no further than possible for his human eyes. Yet in the mirror (Speil) of the Christian Idea he was able to see reflected the fundamental spiritual forces which constitute the eternal world-crisis and which continually express themselves in every moment of the world-historical evolution of the Church. What the Seer of the Apocalypse has grasped is the _essential_ meaning of the history of the Church. He has seen the infinite manifold of the historical process brought together in an _immediate ideal presence_. He does not see the infinite manifold of history _as such_ in its endless variety, but views it in the mirror of the Christian Idea as from the viewpoint of Eternity, the "true infinite".[46] The use of the Apocalypse in the Church will thus be to see in it the powers at work in the history of the Church, and there must be "freely created poetry" in every era of the Church which will take from the Apocalypse material for its own development, poetry which will make more living and contemporary the _significance_ of the apocalyptic symbols.

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[44] H.L. Martensen, in Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, Bd. 12, p. 2.

[45] ibid. p. 4.

Martensen now turns to Kolthoff's defense of the Johannine authorship of the work. Johannine authorship is denied by Martensen on the basis of internal arguments concerning the date of the work and the inadequacy of external witness in its favor.[47] Kolthoff is attacked for seeking to vindicate the Johannine authorship of the work and to establish its canonicity on the basis that those books are to be received by the Church as genuine norms of faith which the whole Church tradition has always received ("..._eos libros genuinae fidei normam semper esse habendos, quos plenus ecclesiasticae traditionis concensus admiserit_"). Here, says

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[46] _ibid_. p. 5; cf. Hegel's discussion of the "bad infinite" in the smaller _Logic_, tr. W. Wallace (London, 1873), §94, pp. 174ff.

[47] _ibid_. pp. 6-18.

Martensen, Kolthoff has first established the authenticity of the books, then admitted them to the "whole" Church tradition, and then cited the unanimity of the Church tradition for the authenticity of a particular book. Such a procedure is "Catholic". Kolthoff would finally depend upon an external tradition, while the Protestant principle demands individual assent to the authenticity of any witness received.

We can leave Martensen's discussion of Kolthoff at this point and concentrate upon the counter-position which he now develops. The differences between Catholicism and Protestantism pertain not only to their content but also to the manner in which the content is appropriated (tilegnes).[48] The Reformers laid their chief emphasis upon faith, and attacked the Catholic fides historica. Against this they set "the subjective moment," appropriation, inwardness, the individual's own conscience, the witness of the Spirit.[49] Now, according to the Protestant principle, says Martensen, the Protestant theologian can as little let another "see and know" for him with regard to the canon as any Protestant believer can allow another to do his praying for him or let the priest take the sacrament for him: "As faith in Christ involves the conviction of a genuine and original (oprindeligt) witness to Christ, he must according to the Protestant principle have this conviction at first hand, i.e. he must know its originality and genuineness as such."[50] The

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[48] cf. Priisopgave, p. iv.

[49] Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, Bd. 12, p. 21.

[50] ibid. pp. 21-22.

"canonicity" of Scripture is directly related to this genuine and original witness to Christ, must be seen as deriving from it. The believer first comes to believe through his membership in the Christian community, not through the acceptance of the external authority of Scripture:

> On the contrary, everyone must admit that faith has become active in him through the living, immediate influence of the Christian community, with Christian upbringing and instruction, with the preaching of the Word and the sacraments, but that the Church has referred him to Holy Scripture which contains the divine Word about which he can judge for himself. From this it follows that faith in and for itself can stand, though an attack which cannot be beaten back immediately is made upon Scripture. For essentially faith has its roots in the religious consciousness, and as long as it can prove its divine power there it is elevated above every attack.[51]

Could, for example, the disagreement between the initial chapters of Matthew and Luke, and the silence of Mark and John about the Virgin Birth undermine belief in the divine nature of Christ?

> Such an assumption is not bound up with that which is the basic point in the Christian consciousness, the source of the whole of the Christian life, faith in the holy person of the Saviour, so that this dogma necessarily would have to be accepted, even if there were no definite word about it in Holy Scripture. That, on the other hand, the existence of faith becomes less certain and more easily disposed to be cast into the shadow as a human fabrication when it loses its objective foothold, or finds this shaken, this neither can nor should be denied.[52]

The position of the Protestant Christian in an age of criticism is indeed precarious. Grundtvig and his followers have tried to escape this risk by their "in many respects remarkable" position on the Apostolic Symbol, but this too is "un-Protestant" in that the subjective moment, the moment of appropriation, is not given its right.[53] To canonize the Creed would be to leave Scripture free for investigation, but it would make the Creed inviolable to criticism. Is there not, then, the danger that criticism will destroy the scriptural canon? To hold that this is possible, says Martensen, is to overlook that it is an established presupposition, necessarily connected with faith in revelation in Christ, that a "complete, holy tradition" is given, which faith only wants to know and appropriate in its canonicity. The critic who admits the possibility that his work will destroy the canon as such sets himself outside the standpoint of Protestant Christianity. There will in any case be a Christian canon where there is faith. Even from the point of view of the secular critic, thinks Martensen, such a scepticism is absurd. No investigator of the Platonic dialogues believes, in spite of the fact that some traditionally accepted dialogues have been found inauthentic, that criticism will ever show that there was never a Platonic philosophy.[54] The Protestant is certain that a canon is given. Yet the historical-critical investigation of the canon must be a Protestant task, and the limits of the canon can only be discovered ever anew by the effort of individual appropriation.

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[51] ibid. pp. 28-29.

[52] ibid. p. 29. The contrast of this claim with that of Kierkegaard in Philosophical Fragments is readily apparent.

It is notable here that personal appropriation in faith is linked to the task of historical-critical study. The Protestant demand for free appropriation is the basis of higher criticism, Martensen argues, "the demand that all which is acknowledged as true must be appropriated through freedom, that we should have the witness of the Spirit for all." But the witness of the Spirit requires for its own completion the objective moment, the historical witness, which criticism finds in its investigation of Scripture. Criticism, Protestant criticism, looks in each of the "Scriptural" writings for its "specific canonical character".[55]

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[53] ibid. p. 30.

[54] ibid. p. 25; Martensen overlooks the distinction between the Platonic philosophy as a system of thought and the Christian faith as a specific historical claim, however.

4. The central problems of the period 1827-34.

As we have seen above in the discussion of the Priisopgave, the major interest of Martensen during his years of theological candidacy might be called epistemological. Yet his concern is not with the problem of knowledge as such but rather with the specific problem of religious knowledge. Interest in the unity of human culture with Christ as its center seems to have marked Martensen early. It is chiefly with the manner in which this union is to take place that we are concerned. When Martensen first decided to study theology, in 1826, the organ of union was almost certainly the poetic imagination, exalted above the "mere understanding".[56] This view, essentially vague, could be combined with the "neo-orthodoxy" of both Steffens and Grundtvig, and it was only with the quest for something more definite than the "crass" concepts of the Grundtvigians that Martensen came, in the last years of his theological study, to seek a more definite manner of achieving the unity of human culture with Christ. Now the problem appeared in the intellectual realm.

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[55] ibid. p. 24.

[56] cf. Af Mit Levnet I, 22-23.

Now the organ of union is "speculation" or the "concept," and the "primitive religious Idea" is the content which is developed through this "speculative power in the form of the concept".

If we ask Martensen how God is present in the primitive religious consciousness we receive no certain answer either from the Priisopgave or the Kolthoff essay. We noted in discussion of the Priisopgave that there was in the work no adequate distinction between knowledge and faith. What was true there becomes still more clear in the Kolthoff essay. Here Martensen appears to meet the objection to the Priisopgave that the positive element in the Christian faith is not given sufficient attention by arguing, as we have seen, that it is necessarily connected with faith in revelation that a "complete holy tradition" is given. Faith, in accepting Jesus Christ as saviour, appropriates certain historical facts, the sacred story. Yet the relation between this history and the "eternal history" which is seen in the mirror of the Christian Idea remains obscure. Is faith only the organ for the historical, the existential, as, for example, in Jacobi? Or is faith the manner of appropriating the essentially timeless content of the primitive religious consciousness? And if this is true how are faith and knowledge distinguished in relation to this consciousness? We have seen that Martensen attempted, in the Priisopgave, to establish the necessity of historical development in the coming-to-consciousness of the religious a priori. There he was unable to establish the necessity of holding fast the positive as such. In the Kolthoff essay he has again failed in that task. The concept of a holy tradition, a holy history, is unclear. Is it distinguished from the "secular" events of passing time by comparison with the vision in the "mirror of the Christian Idea"? Or is it somehow given in faith? The latter would seem to be required, since otherwise the distinction between speculative and dogmatic theology made in the Priisopgave would be invalidated.[57]

The central problem set by Martensen's first efforts at a speculative theology, then, is the meaning of faith. And it is with this problem that his theological work in the years immediately following is concerned. It remains to be seen whether he can answer the questions raised by his work thus far.

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[57] cf. Ch. 2, pp. 12-14.

CHAPTER THREE: THE MODERN PHILOSOPHER AS FAUST

1. Study Tour Abroad (1834-36)

In the summer of 1834, with a travel stipend from the university, Martensen left Copenhagen for a two-year period of study abroad. His companion during most of the trip was a close friend and fellow theological student, F.C. Bornemann.

It is during these two years that Martensen's characteristic theological position was shaped. Fortunately, we do not have to rely upon his autobiography alone to gain an understanding of his thought during this critical period. We have letters from Martensen to H.N. Clausen and F.C. Sibbern, and, most important, an essay, *Ueber Lenau's Faust*. The latter will be the focus of our examination of Martensen's thought in this chapter.

The major part of the two years on the continent was spent in Germany and the greatest part of this time in Berlin. In June, 1835, Martensen and Bornemann went to Heidelberg and in September to Munich. At the close of 1835 they journeyed to Vienna, and, in the late spring of 1836, to Paris, where they remained for about two months, returning to Copenhagen in the late summer. Each of the cities named can be made to represent a major influence upon the young theologian in the coming years. In Berlin he heard the lectures of Steffens and Philipp Marheinecke. In Heidelberg he became well acquainted with the writings of the German mystics, in particular the then little known work of Meister Eckhart. In Munich he heard the lectures of Schelling and of Franz Baader, perhaps the most influential of all the men Martensen came to know during these years. In Paris, where he resumed his study of German mysticism and conceived the idea of writing a treatise on the German mystics, he began a long and close friendship with the Danish poet-critic and interpreter of Hegel, J.C. Heiberg, and his wife, Johanne Luise, one of Copenhagen's best known actresses.[1]

The Berlin months were for Martensen a period of crisis. Martensen's own crisis had its broader manifestations in the unrest among the philosophers and theologians of the Prussian capital. Hegel had died in 1831, Goethe in 1832 and Schleiermacher in 1834. In many ways, an era seemed to have ended. In Berlin a battle already had begun over the leadership of the Hegelian "school" and the proper interpretation of Hegel's philosophy in its significance for Christian theology. The study of Hegel's thought became a passion for Martensen, and he found himself, in examining Hegel's logic, the Phenomenology of Mind and the Encyclopedia "enfolded in a magical net".[2]

A split in the Hegelian ranks over the question of Hegel's position on the immortality of the soul stirred Martensen's interest. Both Marheinecke and K.F. Göschel (1781-1861) argued from the so-called "right wing" of the school that Hegel's philosophy either directly supported a Christian view of the soul's immortality or allowed a consistent deduction of such a view.[3] On the opposite side Friedrich Richter, who was one of the first leaders of the Hegelian left, had, in 1833-34, interpreted the "secret" of Hegel's system: that in truth Hegel disavowed immortality, and along with it the whole of the Christian faith.

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[1] cf. below, Ch. V, VI.

[2] Af Mit Levnet I, 95.

[3] cf. Göschel's Von den Beweisen für die Unsterblichkeit der menschlichen Seele im Licht der speculativen Philosophie (Berlin, 1835).

The unrest in the Hegelian camp was further spurred by the sudden reappearance, after nearly a twenty-year absence from the philosophical scene, of Schelling, who now bitterly denounced Hegel's philosophy as a fruitless effort to grasp reality with pure reason alone. Martensen describes the scorn with which Schelling was now pictured by the Hegelians as "a philosophical cripple who belonged in a sanitarium," but notes as well that his words "stuck like a thorn in the soul" and that "many of those who now polemicized against him later came over to his side".[4]

That the unrest of the Hegelians was shared by Martensen during the Berlin months of 1834-35 is clear. Yet there may have been more in the crisis which developed for him at this time. We know from a letter to H.N. Clausen dated April 25, 1835 that Martensen had delayed his departure from Berlin because of illness and that at the writing of this letter he felt sufficiently recovered to plan to leave for Potsdam a few days later. Perhaps we will not err if we connect with this observation a comment from a letter to F.C. Sibbern written from Vienna on January 26, 1836. The letter opens with Martensen's apology to Sibbern for failing to answer a letter received some months earlier in Berlin: "All along, Herr Professor, I have intended to reply to your letter which I received last year in Berlin; I wished to wait until the intellectual ferment (videnskabelige Gjæring) in which I found myself had further clarified itself. Now, since I believe I have gotten beyond Hegel I have it in mind to let you hear from me."[5]

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[4] ibid. p. 98; cf. Schelling's preface to H. Becker's translation of V. Cousin's history of modern philosophy, Ueber franzøsische und deutsche Philosophie (Stuttgart u. Tübingen, 1834).

The warrant for relating these apparently isolated incidents in Martensen's letters, his illness in Berlin, and the "intellectual ferment" largely connected with Hegel, comes mainly from the autobiography. The picture presented there corresponds well enough with what we can know first-hand of Martensen during this period that the autobiography can be trusted. In Af Mit Levnet Martensen relates that while the revolution among the Hegelians was taking place, a revolution was going on within him as well. He does not find his own revolution a direct result of the inner split among the Hegelians, but sees it mainly as a result of personal feelings and inner turmoil. He became physically ill, an old illness recurring, poorly treated by an incompetent physician, finally succumbing to better treatment, but followed by deep depression (Hypochondrie) which staggered his whole thought-world:

> I suffered frequent sceptical moods in which the doubt of everything gnawed at me: what had before seemed sure to me in these moods appeared to me unsure and precarious. But this was not what was worst. The worst was that this hypochondria led to a kind of weariness with life in which everything was a matter of indifference to me and the whole of reality, the world of things as well as the world of thought, was dissolved into shadows.[6]

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[5] cf. "Breve fra H.L. Martensen til F.C. Sibbern" in S. Arildsen, H.L. Martensen, p. 508.

[6] Af Mit Levnet I, 99; it is not unlikely, though there is no direct proof, that Martensen referred to this period of doubt when he discussed

In the autobiography as well as in the Sibbern letter Martensen speaks of the antithetical views which fermented (gjærede) within him during the Berlin months:

> What fermented in me was the antithesis (Modsætning) between theism and pantheism. What presented itself to me as a question to be decided was not this or that single point, not just the belief in immortality, but the whole matter (det Hele). The question turned upon God and the concept of God, whether the living God, the God of the revelation, is the true God, or, instead, the God of paganism. Or, more particularly, whether a mediation (Formidling) of this antithesis was possible for thought. Much in pantheism indeed had strong attraction for me, because it was unquestionably true. Many of the theological interpretations of the concept of God appeared to me entirely untenable, and, above all, I had a decided antipathy to the lifeless God of Deism who dwelt beyond the stars or floated as a spirit about the universe, in infinite rarity.[7]

A demand for "a God who is genuinely present in his world, a God whose fullness penetrates this earthly existence" also turned Martensen against Kant:

> I also felt antipathy toward the Kantian doctrine of the pure subjectivity of our knowledge, that we are able only to know things as they are for us, but not as they are in themselves, only the phenomenon, but not the essence. However significant this Kantian view is when it is seen as a part of the development of philosophy it is in and for itself a piece of narrow-mindedness which must be overcome. As I had to demand that the fullness of the divine power should flow through the whole of existence, I had also to require that the categories of the divine thought should reveal themselves in existence. Hegel's logic stirred me and I demanded a unity of thought and existence (Tænkning og Tilværelse). However many false applications of this thesis have been made I must still maintain its essential

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the role of doubt in modern philosophy as a lecturer at the University of Copenhagen. Cf. Kierkegaard's unpublished manuscript, Johannes Climacus, or De Omnibus Dubitandum Est, tr. T.H. Croxall (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958).

[7] ibid., 101.

truth."[8]

As we have seen already in Martensen's letter to Sibbern of January 26, 1836, Hegel's viewpoint, however satisfactory for Martensen in many respects, was the cause of the intellectual ferment, was something he had to "get beyond". We can best see the position Martensen now reached by an examination of a book which was the direct result of the struggle we have been describing, a brief essay on the dramatic poem Faust by the Austrian poet Niembsch von Strehlenau or "Lenau" (1802-50). Martensen had come to the place in his struggle with the Christian faith where his intellectual demands led toward pantheism. Yet the abandonment of the personal God of his Lutheran tradition appeared a demonic temptation: "...doubt took on the character of temptation and the ancient Pan promised me the kingdoms of this world and their glory if I would only give up all ideas of a [higher] personality...".[9] The Faustian element in the young theologian's temptation is clear enough: ennui with life, a desire for absolute knowledge, reaching to the depths of God, the urge to deny God existence as a "person" for the sake of knowing him as an omnipresent force. And, in the Faust of the thirty-three-year-old Lenau, Martensen could view his own temptation and his own struggle. More than this, Martensen found in the troubled Roman Catholic's poem an understanding of the crisis of "modern" thought which he applied to the whole period in philosophy since Descartes. In Vienna, during the early months of 1836, Martensen and Lenau became close friends, and the poem took its final form during many coffee house conversations. By April of 1836 Martensen had completed his book on Lenau's Faust, and in December 1836, two months after Martensen's return to Copenhagen, the work was published. Publication, by a Stuttgart press, was anonymous, or nearly so. On the title page we read: Ueber Lenau's Faust, von Johannes M.......n.[10]

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[8] ibid., 101-102.

[9] ibid., 103.

2. Ueber Lenau's Faust

The state of Martensen's mind on the eve of writing the Faust essay is clear to us from a letter written to F.C. Sibbern on March 19, 1836. Again, the reckoning with Hegel's philosophy is the subject for discussion:

> What concerns the course of my studies is that which no longer satisfies me in Hegel, the principle of autonomy in his philosophy, and that I have come more and more to the insight that it is irreconcilible with all positive religion; for the attempt which has been made in one place to reconcile it therewith, as in, e.g., Göschel's doctrine of immortality is, I must confess, inadequate. The basis for the Hegelian philosophy is given already with Descartes, who, with his *cogito ergo sum*, which he posits as the only thing certain, cuts himself loose from the *credo ut intellegam* of scholastic philosophy. One now demands a philosophy free from authority and without presuppositions, which grounds itself absolutely and allows nothing to be valid which does not carry the necessity of pure thought; it is now characterized as *causa sui*, or as critical, autonomous reason, or as pure ego, finally as absolute concept, where presuppositionlessness has achieved its highest reach with a beginning-point in pure thought. This abstraction from all authority and pre-supposition, it seems to me, can only have reality if there is in fact no presupposition and authority prior to man, that is, if man has no

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[10] cf. Julius Martensen, Mindre Skrifter og Taler af Biskop Martensen (Kbh. 1885), p. 1. In 1837 a revised version was printed in Danish, and aspects of this will be discussed below, cf. Ch. VI, pp. 1ff.

> auctor. If there is on the other hand a creator, and the religious relation is man's basic relation, then it seems to me that every abstraction therefrom is irreligious, if it is serious and not simply a problematic discussion intra fidem. For if I posit the cogito ergo sum as the only thing certain, it is at root the created which posits itself as certain instead of seeing itself together with the creator in the conscience (Samvittigheden). With Hegel there is no creator and no creation, but only a cosmogonic and theogonic process, and in all of these systems the conscience is treated only as the reason's immediate certainty of its own reality, but not as the proclamation of a higher will. I maintain therefore that it will do just as little to begin philosophy by abstracting from God and religion, or to philosophize as if Christianity did not exist, as it will do in practice to act as if there were no such thing as conscience. The act of philosophizing must also be a religious act.[11]

"It will do just as little to begin philosophy by abstracting from God and religion ... as it will in practice to act as if there were no such thing as conscience." The truth of these words Martensen found brought to life in Lenau's poem. Goethe had not, he thought, plumbed the depths of the Faust-idea, for he had missed the deep roots of the Faust-theme in the Christian world-view and in its delineation of doubt. The specifically Faustian doubt is the creature's doubt of its own creaturehood. For the idea of the creature in its relation to the Creator is for Martensen "the central point of the whole Weltanschauung in which all religious-ethical concepts, of good and evil, of faith and knowledge, of mystery and revelation, have their deepest root."[12] There can be no genuine Faust-poem in which the creature-Creator distinction is not held fast. The presupposition of the Faust-idea is that a free and almighty creator of heaven and earth exists; only with this presupposition is the origin of the Faust-saga to be understood and its tragic character grasped. In Goethe's *Faust* one has only the *disjecta membra* of the Faust-saga, but there is no consistent world-view, certainly none which grasps the Faust theme entire.

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[11] cf. Julius Martensen, op. cit. p. 90f.

[12] Ueber Lenau's Faust, p. 4.

Lenau, thinks Martensen, *has* grasped the world-view from which a Faust must be written. And he has seen the Faustian thrust of modern philosophy:

> The philosophy of the modern period abandoned the ancient *credo ut intellegam* and with Descartes took up its standing point in doubt. It has fulfilled its *cogito ergo sum*, this self-positing of the human spirit in its abstraction from the Creator, in Hegel, and the different forms of philosophical rationalism are taken up as moments into the Hegelian pantheism.[13]

Lenau's Mephistopheles has understood, where Goethe's, following in the rationalist tradition, could not, that the matter of real doubt is not so much theoretical as practical. Faith is not simply some indeterminate or indefinite knowledge but, rather, an obedience to the Creator. The only possibility of an absolute knowledge independent of faith must rest upon the possibility for man of absolute *being* (*Seyn*) independent of the Creator-God. If there can be no *absolute being* outside God, then there can be no absolute, autonomous knowledge and no departure from faith.

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[13] *ibid*. p. 11f.; Martensen cites the *Vorlesungen über religiöse Philosophie* (München, 1827) of the Munich Roman Catholic philosopher Franz Baader, and we are here able to see the powerful influence of Baader upon Martensen's understanding of the Anselmic *credo ut intellegam* and in the theological interpretation of the conscience. It is notable that it is two Roman Catholic thinkers, neither orthodox in his own confession, who confirm Martensen's suspicions about the Faustian element in modern philosophy. Both Lenau and Baader were deeply impressed with the antipathy of the modern era to authority and tradition.

It is here that Lenau's Mephisto attacks Faust. To the devil, says Martensen, as the first theoretical and practical atheist, it is clear, as it is not to Faust, that the unbeliever must part with both his creaturehood and his belief, and that his desire to know exclusively through himself is only a covert desire to be God. The first step toward "divinization" is taken by Faust when Mephisto brings him to value truth above God himself:

> Faust: Den Herrn nicht lieben, wäre schwer,
> Doch liebt mein Herz die Wahrheit mehr.
>
> Meph.: So, Faust, du hast es recht begonnen,
> Die Wahrheit mehr, ist viel gewonnen.[14]

What Martensen describes as the first, principle moment of Lenau's poem is Mephisto's effort to make over Faust's human mode of knowing into the divine. He must annul the difference which is grounded in God's absolutely self-productive and entirely transparent knowledge and man's clouded vision and precarious grasp of his own created being, a being which ever remains a mystery. Man can only grasp in concept that divine life which he has attained in himself through unity with the spirit of God. The man who would know absolute truth must ground that knowledge in faith "in which man himself and his knowledge of God rest". But this knowledge in faith Mephisto cannot give to Faust. His sole offer must be that knowledge of good and evil which was given to Adam in Paradise. And this can be only the knowledge of the evil conscience, the knowledge of life outside the Garden, the realized potential of the abstract knowledge of good and evil which was integral to man's existence as a creature. Now Faust succumbs to Mephisto's temptation. He _will_ have the knowledge of good and evil, for he would know as God himself. But he passes over to quite another and more real knowledge of evil than when he remained in faith as a creature; _eo ipso_ the good now becomes something foreign to him and, like the _evil_ before the fall, now the good becomes only a potency in thought. As Martensen puts it in the 1837 Danish revision of the essay, Faust has chosen the _praesentia realis_ of evil, _eo ipso_ has no longer the _praesentia realis_ of the good.[15]

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[14] cited in Ueber Lenau's Faust, p. 19.

Faust began with the desire for a theoretical knowledge of good and evil. Now Mephisto leads him to demand their practical union as well. The second chief moment of the poem follows Faust's murder of the betrothed of Maria, a young princess with whom Faust has fallen in love. Faust is unable, says Martensen, to accept the grace which has been given to him in this love, will not receive the love of Maria as a medium of divine grace: "...just as his initial love of truth turned to egoism, so now with his love of beauty." He demands only sexual love of her: he would hear his own "I" echo in her, and "had he not already sold his blessedness for truth, he would now have given it away for beauty."[16] But nature itself rises up against Faust the murderer. For nature is itself but a reflection of the divine Idea. In jealously turning against fellowman Faust has turned against his own conscience (Gewissen) and even nature has become his enemy. Every stirring leaf becomes a terror.

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[15] cf. "Betragtninger over Ideen af Faust. Med Hensyn paa Lenaus Faust" in _Perseus_, Nr. 1 (June, 1837), p. 134.

[16] _Ueber Lenau's Faust_, pp. 38-9.

If initially Faust bound good and evil together theoretically, in order to know them as God himself, Mephisto has now led Faust across the boundary into the practical knowledge of evil. Nature itself is nemesis, and in order to escape the Furies Faust must now make the binding together of evil and good not simply the means toward the goal of knowledge, but an end in itself (Selbstzweck). If before he had only tried to overcome the split between good and evil in knowledge (Erkentniss) it now is necessary for him to will the transformation (Umkehrung) of good into evil, of evil into good, obliterating the conscience, and to turn his own sin into a dream-image.[17]

Dialectically, the third moment of the poem is a return to the first and a recapitulation of the second: the enmity toward the Creator with which the poem began has become fully conscious for Faust and has "through the mediation of a false life" redoubled its force. It is against nature that Faust must turn now, for nature, external and impervious to his wish, still remains to remind him of his creaturehood. Nature is the limit which his soul hates, and the still and harmonic life of pastoral nature becomes unbearable. Only the elemental wildness of the sea, matching the turmoil of his spirit, can solace him:

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[17] The Danish of the "Betragtninger" in 1837 reads: "To annul (ophæve) the difference between good and evil becomes his essential interest; he must dissolve the great antithesis of life in a foggy vapor in order that his sin may vanish as an airy dream-image." p. 148f.

> Ich will nun fort, hinaus ins Meer,
> Das ist so einsam, wild und leer,
> Das blüht nicht auf, das welkt nicht ab,
> Ein ungeschmücktes, ew'ges Grab.
> Dort zwischen Wellen, zwischen Winden,
> Soll mir der kleine Kummer schwinden.[18]

He glories in the storm which threatens his ship, hurls the frightened captain overboard and shouts his defiance to the clouds:

> Mach' was du willst mit deiner Sturmesnacht!
> Du Weltenherr, ich trotze deiner Macht!
> Hier klebt mein Leib am Rand des Unterganges,
> Doch weckt der Sturm in meinem Geist die Urkraft,
> Die ewig ist, wie du, und gleichen Ranges,
> Und ich verfluche meine Creaturschaft![19]

Faust must himself be the Absolute Life. He must take into himself all of the happiness and all of the suffering of mankind. He must be the central human heart in which pulses all the life of man:

> So lang ein Kuss auf Erden glüht,
> Der nicht durch meine Seele sprüht,
> So lang ein Schmerz auf Erden klagt,
> Der nicht an meinem Herzen nagt,
> So lang ich nicht allwaltend bin,
> Wär ich viel lieber ganz dahin.[20]

The storm recedes and Faust is left with the tormenting shadows of his own guilty ego, demanding an absolute present, haunted by a past with which he cannot be finished. Mephisto is a faithful servant in bringing him ever greater clarity in theoretical knowledge but he can neither give to Faust the lost praesentia realis of the good nor free him from his own past. He can only initiate Faust into his own "idealism of evil". Mephisto now describes for Faust the dark forests of Hungary and pictures a herdsman sitting by his watchfire, singing in a strange tongue to his black stallions as they graze, weirdly illumined by the glaring fire:

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[18] Ueber Lenau's Faust, p. 44.

[19] ibid. p. 50.

[20] ibid. p. 46.

> Da kam aus Schattendickicht eine Eule,
> Und schwirrt' unheimlich krächzend um sein Ohr,
> Und der geneckte Hirte sprang empor,
> Und rasste einen ungeheuren Brand
> Und schwang ihn um sein Haupt in wilder Hast
> Die Eule scheuchend fort, den schlimmen Gast.
> Wie jener Hirt in Waldeseinsamkeit
> Ums Haupt im Kreise schwang das Flammenscheit,
> So schwingt der ew'ge Hirt mit starker Hand
> Im Kreis ums feste Haupt den Weltenbrand,
> Zu scheuchen fort aus seiner Nacht die Eule,
> Die sonst ihm krächzend naht: die Langeweile.[21]

What, then, are the horses which the herdsman watches, asks Faust? And Mephisto answers:

> Die Rosse, die dem Hirten weiden gehen,
> Und die allein dem alten Hirten theuer,
> Um derentwillen brennt das Weltenfeuer,
> Die Rosse nennt der Philosoph Ideen;
> Mir aber ist's ein inniges Ergetzen,
> Heranzuschleichen mich mit seinem Tritt,
> Und plötzlich mich auf so ein Ross zu setzen,
> Und durch die Welt zu machen einen Ritt,
> Bis mich das Ross abwirft, und scheu zurück
> Zu seinem Hirten flieht und Weideglück.[22]

Only on the steed of the Idea can Mephisto take his ride through world-history, and on the man who lacks the Idea he can find no hold. Through Faust's quest for autonomous knowledge Mephisto has caught him, yet Faust's demand that he himself become God he cannot meet. The evil is only the rider on the steed of the Idea, the Idea only one of the horses in the stable of a herdsman frightened by boredom. But the steed returns to the herd and to its pasture. The whole is without meaning. Even the Devil himself can make it seem otherwise only for a moment. Mephisto fails Faust, as he must, and can now only scorn Faust's fruitless effort to be the All.

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[21] ibid. pp. 51-52.

[22] ibid. pp. 50-51.

Faust sits by the sea, brooding upon his past, longing to forget the creaturehood of which his conscience still convicts him. Is it not all a dream? Is not evil Mephisto himself only a dream of God, a turbid God-awareness? Is not Faust himself God, Faust the murderer only a dream of passion, guilt and pain?

> Doch - ist das Alles nicht ein trüber Schein?
> Und dass ich abgeschnitten und allein?
> So ist's! Ich bin mit Gott festinniglich
> Verbunden und seit immerdar,
> Mit ihm derselbe ganz und gar,
> Und Faust ist nicht mein wahres Ich.
> Der Faust, der sich mit Forschen trieb,
> Und der dem Teufel sich verschrieb,
> Und sein und alles Menschenleben,
> Des Guten und des Bösen Uebung,
> Der Teufel selbst, dem Jener sich ergeben,
> Ist nur des Gottbewusstseyns Trübung,
> Ein Traum von Gott, ein wirrer Traum,
> Des tiefen Meers vergänglich bunter Schaum.
> Und zeugt der Mensch, wie Faust, ein Kind,
> Ein Traum dem andern sich entspinnt;
> In jedem Kind, in jedem Morgenroth
> Sich Gottes Phantasie erfrischt.
> Und schlägt ein Mensch, wie Faust, den andern todt,
> Ein Traum den andern nur verwischt.
> Ergreift den Menschensohn mit Macht
> Des Forschens Trieb und Ungeduld,
> Dass er bei Tag und später Nacht
> Um einen Blick der Wahrheit buhlt,
> So ist's vielleicht, dass Gott im Traume spürt,
> Er träume nur, und dass Erwachensdrang
> Im Morgenschlaf an seinem Traume rürht?

Und schlummert er vielleicht nun nimmer lang? -
Du böser Geist, heran! ich spotte dein!
Du Lügengeist! ich lache unserm Bunde,
Den nur der Schein geschlossen mit dem Schein,
Hörst du? wir sind getrennt von dieser Stunde!
Zu Schwarz und bang, als dass ich wesenhaft,
Bin ich ein Traum, entflatternd deiner Hast!
Ich bin ein Traum mit Lust und Schuld und Schmerz,
Und träume mir das Messer in das Herz![23]

Faust ends his life with a dagger, and it would seem that the poem is ended as well, but Mephisto, indeed no dream, no shadow, holds his own epilogue over the body of Faust:

Du warst von der Versöhnung nie so weit
Als da du wolltest mit der sieberheizen
Verzweiflungsgluth vertilgen allen Streit,
Dich, Welt und Gott in Eins zusammenschweiszen.
Da bist du in die Arme mir gesprungen,
Nun hab' ich und halte dich umschlungen![24]

Never so far was Faust from reconciliation as when he tried, at last fully conscious of his act, to melt into one himself, the world and God. Mephisto is not at last, as Goethe pictured him, the well-working leaven of the universe. He is no necessary factor, but the fiend, the constant enemy of God and man, the destroyer of life. Faust has been destroyed.

3. Martensen in 1836: retrospect.

"The philosophy of the modern period abandoned the ancient *credo ut intellegam* and with Descartes took up its starting point in doubt. It has fulfilled its *cogito ergo sum* in Hegel, and the different forms of philosophical rationalism are taken up as moments into the Hegelian pantheism."[25] We can now see how these words, quoted earlier, clearly indicate Martensen's approach to the interpretation of Lenau's poem. Modern philosophy has moved from theoretical doubt in Descartes to the conscious union of theoretical and practical doubt in the pantheism of Hegel. The Cartesian doubt was the break with the Anselmic *credo* and the beginning of modern unfaith.

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[23] *ibid*. p. 56f.

[24] *ibid*. p. 57.

When we compare the Martensen of the Faust essay with the Martensen of the *Priisopgave* and the Kolthoff essay examined in the previous chapter, three new themes stand out sharply: conscience (*Samvittighed* - co-knowledge) as the creature's awareness of creaturehood; the awareness of creaturehood as the distinctive human trait; faith as the acceptance of creaturehood.

Martensen's central problem in the period immediately before the continental tour had been, as we have seen, the relation of the historical content of the Christian tradition to the content of the religious *a priori*. There it was unclear whether faith was simply an organ for the historical or was rather a manner of personally appropriating the essentially timeless content of the primitive religious consciousness. In this case there could be no firm distinction between faith and knowledge. In the Kolthoff essay we were told that "faith has its roots in the religious consciousness" but we are never clear whether this faith is, in its content, to be distinguished from "the basic point in the Christian consciousness, the source of the whole Christian life, faith in the holy Person of the Savior..."[26] Now, in Ueber Lenau's Faust Martensen has further specified both the content and nature of the religious consciousness and of faith itself. The viewpoint reached here is basic for the development of his later theology.

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[25] *ibid*. p. 11f.

The new insight gained by Martensen in the Faust essay is that radical doubt, far from being only theoretical in its consequences, has practical results, that the opposite of faith is not only doubt, but sin as well. If Martensen had earlier found it impossible to establish a clear distinction between faith and knowledge, such that there was a reason for maintaining both faith and the positive as such, he now finds an anchor for faith. The Hegelian goal of absolute knowledge, scorned by Schleiermacher as a "fraud," is now abandoned except insofar as this knowledge is given in faith. The absolute knowledge which, Faust-like, would know the very depths of evil is abandoned. The fundamental dogma of revealed religion, the "idea of the Creator in the relation to the creature" is made the content of man's co-knowledge with God, the conscience. But this co-knowledge can itself be denied. Even the knowledge of God as Trinity, says Martensen, is mediated through the awareness of God as Creator. All knowledge of divine things has its root in this awareness of creaturehood and finds there its immovable point of reference.[27] The theoretical possibility that the denial of creaturehood can occur is a condition of human freedom, but the necessity that it should occur is denied. Martensen would appear here to agree that anima naturaliter Christiana, and he would appear to place each man in the place of Adam with respect to God. Whether this is indeed his intention will remain to be seen. The systematic outworking of the fermenta contained in Ueber Lenaús Faust remained for Martensen's licentiate dissertation at the University of Copenhagen, written in 1836-37. To this and to the view of faith and knowledge contained there we turn now.

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[26] Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, Bd. 12, pp. 28-29.

[27] Ueber Lenau's Faust, p. 4.

CHAPTER FOUR: CONSCIENCE AS A THEOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE

1. Martensen's Licentiate Dissertation (1836-37)

In the autumn of 1836 Martensen returned to Copenhagen and began work on his dissertation for the licentiate degree in theology. What we have seen in Lenau's Faust is set in prose in Martensen's Ueber Lenaus Faust and in his dissertation is given its philosophical justification. Martensen will try to show that the interpretations of the Christian faith found in Kant, Schleiermacher, and in Hegel must lead to "Faustian" results. The future thesis topic was earlier indicated in the letter of Martensen to Sibbern on January 26, 1836, quoted above.[1] H.N. Clausen had written to Martensen, asking him whether he would be interested in a lectureship in church history at the University of Copenhagen. Martensen's letter to Sibbern outlines his objections to taking such a post ("Where a theological faculty is well-organized a church historian basically must be a deeply learned man ... who so to speak represents the learning of the whole faculty...") and describes his own basic interest:

> My real pleasure would be in reading Christian Dogmatics, as well as the so-called natural theology, which I would desire to change into a historical examination of the philosophy of religion, e.g. from Kant to Hegel, and show in what negative and positive relation philosophy independent of Christianity stands to the Christian dogma.[2]

The basis of a later book on Meister Eckhart and German mysticism also is indicated in this letter, for Martensen acknowledges unwillingness to lay aside the work on Eckhart, Suso and Tauler which he had earlier begun in Heidelberg.[3]

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[1] Ch. 3, p. 64.

[2] cited in S. Arildsen, H.L. Martensen, p. 508f.

Martensen's Latin dissertation, completed February, 1837, followed up the theme indicated in the letter to Sibbern and was titled De Autonomia Conscientiae Sui Humanae in Theologiam Dogmaticam Nostri Temporis Introducta. The work, which was translated into Danish with minor changes in 1841, examines the development of what Martensen calls "the principle of autonomy in modern philosophy" in the work of Kant and Hegel and attempts to show its influence in the dogmatic theology of the period since Kant, mainly in Schleiermacher. Only a small portion of the work is devoted to Hegel. The major part of the 135-page essay is given to an examination and criticism of the principle of autonomy and its results in Kant and Schleiermacher.[4]

Initially, philosophy and theology are defined by Martensen as having the same goal: a striving for a knowledge of absolute truth or God. Whether this knowledge is to be reached through God's self-revelation or through man's autonomous effort, the goal is in any case the same. If philosophy and theology can be found to differ at all, they must differ in method of attaining their goal rather than in the goal itself.

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[3] cf. supra, Ch. 3, pp. 62-3.

[4] Martensen's reckoning with Hegel's philosophy appeared late in 1836 in a review of J.L. Heiberg's "Introductory Lecture for the Logical Cursus at the Royal Military High School begun Nov. 1834". Cf. Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, Bd. 16, pp. 515-28 (Kbh: C.A. Reitzel, 1836). Though this article preceded the publication of the dissertation in 1837 I will postpone discussion of it until we have examined the basis of Martensen's arguments against autonomous philosophy in the dissertation.

The difference in method between philosophy and theology has sometimes been expressed in the claim that theology has faith as its *principium cognoscendi* while philosophy uses reason as *principium*. Such a distinction is acceptable, however, only if method itself is a matter of indifference with respect to whatever the truth may be. But method cannot be indifferent:

> Method is, if we are not mistaken, the law which the truth itself has imposed upon human thought (*lex menti humanae ab ipso vero imposita*) that it may come to knowledge of the truth, the eternal path upon which the infinite truth will be discovered by the finite spirit; it is the necessary link between the object of knowledge and the knowing subject.[5]

Martensen argues that to doubt that there is any such "objective method" is to doubt that there is any point of contact (*forbindelse Sted*) between God and finite knowledge. If Cartesian doubt is to be the beginning of the knowledge of God, then theology must become a form of philosophy if it would do any more than gain a relative and representative or imaginative apprehension of the truth. But it is something else indeed if man can know the truth only through faith. If beginning to think in faith is no mere whim of a theologian but instead a demand of the truth itself, in its own self-communication, then even philosophy cannot reject faith, must operate within faith. But here philosophy becomes a form of theology. It remains to be seen, though, whether knowledge of the truth must presuppose faith.[6]

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[5] *De Autonomia*, p. 3; *Den menneskelige Bevistheds Autonomie*... (Danish translation, 1841), p. 2.

As a quest for the truth itself philosophy is the most universal and fundamental science (Videnskab) but as philosophy it has not only the truth but itself as well as object. Herein it differs from theology. And, in this respect, philosophy becomes not only a quest for truth, but also a science of knowing (scientia scientiae; Videnskabernes Videnskab). As such a science of the scientific activity philosophy becomes the presupposition of every kind of positive knowledge. Even the theologian must recognize the necessity of this epistemology, since his work is always bound up with specific theses from philosophical epistemology and since these are rightly termed "architectonic". The awareness of the fundamental position of epistemology in the theological task is recognized already in the claim of Augustine and Anselm that all theological knowledge begins with the principle: credam ut intellegam.

In one or another form, Martensen argues, this thesis, credam ut intellegam, remained the foundation of medieval theology, though it seldom found systematic expression there. It was not until after the Reformation that the newly freed human spirit claimed the divine right to investigate and comprehend everything human and divine, apart from faith:

> One required now not just that which one in the exact sense could call jus circa sacra, not simply a right over everything which man discovers in the lower world, but one impressed upon the human consciousness in the most eminent sense the ancient

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[6] De Autonomia, p. 5 (hereafter DA); Den menneskelige Bevistheds Autonomie, p. 4 (hereafter MBA).

> maxim, "know thyself." Thus knowledge became the very object of knowledge and the theory of self-consciousness the most essential task of the whole of recent philosophy.[7]

If the essential task of philosophy is epistemological and the characteristic nature of "modern philosophy" epistemological, a further question must precede the inquiry: _ought_ consciousness to mark off a limit beyond which it cannot go; should it consider itself transcendent? Can thought be separated from the light of religion in its investigation of the human and divine? Martensen argues that a concept of the highest principle of knowledge cannot dispense with God as the constitutive principle of all things. The difference between theology in its acceptance of God in faith and a philosophy which would know all without God is the difference between Being (_to esse_) and Thought (_to cogitare_).[8] The fundamental question raised here concerns what is highest in human consciousness. Is the "divine light," which is the principal of all consciousness and in which all things are known, the light of religion itself, in its _intelligent_ activity, or is the divine light in man of a nature superior to religion?

Now the question turns upon the problem of deciding what _is_ highest in the human self-consciousness, "man's inner and original consciousness itself" (*Quaeritur, quid sit summum in conscientia sui humana, quaenem sit intima et primitiva hominis conscientia*...)[9] Every theory of knowledge must arrive at a form of consciousness which is constitutive and essential and which takes precedence over all other forms of knowing. In direct question to the Hegelian school Martensen asks: "Is it thus religion, or is it speculative thinking, which must be posited as this essential, basic principle? Is it religion which must borrow its authoritative significance from speculative thinking, or is it perhaps speculative thinking which is in need of religion, God's revelation?"[10] The answer is given by Martensen in terms which mark a decided rejection of Hegel's view, but Kant and Schleiermacher too are caught in the attack. The *punctum saliens*, the original, inner *moment*, or motive force, in human consciousness of God, is *conscience*, in what Martensen takes to be the proper meaning of the word, co-knowledge (*conscientia* - *syneídēsis* - *Gewissen*). This is no purely practical concept, excluding theoretical reason, as Kant had argued, nor is it to be defined narrowly in "another but similar fashion":

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[7] _DA_, p. 8f.; _MBA_ 7.

[8] Martensen here uses the Greek definite article with the Latin infinitive. His meaning in this passage is not entirely clear. That the concept of God may be given, as in Kantian usage, a _regulative_ sense, for the purpose of _conceiving_ the unity of thought and being, is clear enough. That it _must_ be given _constitutive_ usage if the thinker is to be sure that he deals with "reality" and not with phantasms of thought would seem to be Martensen's claim. Theology deals with God as Being, philosophy, insofar as it omits God, only with Thought.

> For it is a universal and a religious concept which with immediate clarity and certainty defines man's absolute condition, his place in the entire universe, his position in relation to God, and illumines his entire situation in life. This innermost recess (*intimum* ... *adytum*) of the soul is far from being an obscure feeling (*sensus obscurus*), but is clear knowledge and is not merely human but equally human and divine. The human spirit does not here move in the world of thing and thought, all of which stands below it, since it is itself the subject of all those things and ideas which

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[9] *DA* 10; *MBA* 9.

[10] *DA* 10; *MBA* 9.

> lack subject in themselves. But by no means does the mind rest in this precedence over nature conceived purely objectively, but in the light of conscience it knows itself to be conceived (comprehensam) by God's absolute knowledge, yet in such a way that even in the most intimate union it separates itself from it.[11]

Man's knowledge of God is not his own. Yet he possesses a knowledge of God through God himself which is inescapable. God is the auctor of man, and the conscience of man is the character indelibilis which the Creator has stamped upon his creature. Here Martensen's view closely parallels his argument in the 1837 introduction written for the translated and revised Faust essay. There he will write:

> For conscience, which is the created spirit's character indelibilis, contains the ineradicable certainty (Vished) that as God's creature it has God for its presupposition, and can just as little ground its own thought as it can its being. Evil appears here [in Faust] in its full significance, not simply as irrational, or as discrepancy with an impersonal law, but as enmity against God, as conflict with His holy will. The doubt which turns itself against this dogma [that man is God's creature] eo ipso turns itself against man's own conscience.[12]

As in the later Faust revision, Martensen now links conscience with awareness of creaturehood. In conscience is an awareness of the pleroma of God's knowledge and being, as shared by man and yet not as man's possession. Only in relation to God is man rational, for only the awareness of the existing God in conscience brings a rational ground into being. That man is essentially a rational creature, Martensen finds, is untrue. There are, as with John Scotus Eriugena, three categories of existents:

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[11] DA11; MBA 9f.

[12] "Betragtninger over Ideen af Faust" in Perseus, I (June, 1837), p. 49.

natura naturans, *natura naturata et naturans* and *natura naturata non naturans*. Applied to the sphere of cognition, these categories yield three further classifications: 1) that nature which thinks but which, outside itself or apart from itself, is not "thought of" or conceived; 2) that nature which both thinks and is thought of; 3) that nature which does not think and is only thought of. God, then, like man, is rational, hence the term "rational" will not "specifically" qualify man. Rather, the essence of man is to be found in conscience, for here man is aware rationally of his distinction from God while he at the same time shares in the divine rationality. Conscience reminds man that his knowledge of God is not his own. Yet conscience also testifies to the unity between man and God. It constitutes a relationship of an "I" and a "not-I," not the absolutely self-identical ego in relation to itself alone, which Martensen ascribes to Fichte. Reason is involved in the concept of conscience, but in no way can conscience be deduced from the concept of reason.[13]

From the claim that conscience contains the concept of reason Martensen attempts to develop the theoretical significance of conscience. Since the human essense is conscience, the very attempt to reach autonomy is Faustian. Any epistemological investigation will arrive at the *datum* of conscience and will be forced to ask whether there is any limit (*hò hóros*) which must be observed in gaining a knowledge of knowledge. Such is for Martensen the knowledge of our basic relationship (fundamentalis nostrae relationis), for this, he claims, is just as much real as ideal. And the acknowledgement of this relationship compels us to refer all of our knowledge to God. Here the two moments of unity with God and separation from God hang together in what Eckhart called this "foreign essence" which is God's self-knowledge in man. For man, nevertheless, is qualitatively different:

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[13] *DA* 12, "*Conscientia vero rationem involvit, neque vero ex rationis notione notio conscientiae ... elici potest.*" Cf. *MBA*, p. 10f.

> Though man's knowledge of the divine is only a finite and created spirit's knowledge it does not thereby lose its absolute and infinite character. The idea of God is granted to religion by God's own revelation, so that we know through God; God is also present in our consciousness through scientific thinking, through the rational and conceptual development of the Idea; he who is thought of by us, thinks in us.[14]

Now Martensen turns to compare his view of the nature of speculative thought with subjective and objective idealism:

> And in this consists the true doctrine of the unity of subject and object in speculative thinking, that here we find not only a relation (relatio; et Forhold Sted) between the knowing subject and an object which is known without knowing itself, but between a subject and an object which is itself subject, one which not only is known but also knows. Speculative thought about God is therefore not a one-sided knowledge (scientia solitaria) but a co-knowing (conscientia - Samviden). The same law which establishes the unity of God and the creature in religious love (amore religiosa) pertains also to religious knowledge (cognitione religiosa; religiøse Erkjendelse) in the speculative view of God (contemplatione dei speculativa). Just as we, according to the Apostle, love God because he first loved us, we know Him because He first knew us. Just as God's love sinks down into the heart of man and leads man's love to raise itself to God, so is man's reason, which is his free knowledge of God, a reflection of God's absolute reason which illumines man. God and the creature see in the same eternal light; they look into the same

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[14] DA 15; MBA 13.

> mirror, the eternal Idea, yet their qualitative difference is not annuled (tollitur; ophæves).[15]

Martensen's language in this section of De Autonomia is very like Meister Eckhart's, and may have, for many readers, called the 14th century German mystic to mind. We should suspect some influence from Martensen's earlier work with Eckhart's writings in Heidelberg and Paris, and indeed we find frequent reference to Eckhart's writings in the dissertation. This is especially true of the Danish translation of De Autonomia, since Martensen had published a treatise on Eckhart in 1840.[16] The element in Eckhart's thought which draws Martensen's attention in the dissertation is precisely the effort of the "father of German speculation" at the same time to assert and to deny that man's knowledge of God is a divine knowledge. He quotes one of Eckhart's sermons: "The eye wherewith I see God is the very same eye with which he sees me. My eye and the eye of God are the same eye."[17] Yet, quoting Eckhart's words in another sermon, he qualifies this claim to a unity of divine and human knowledge: "God's essence may not become our essence, but ought to become our life; for we have emanated (ausgeflossen) from the Persons and have not remained in the divine essence. We are united with God in contemplation (Schauung) but not in essence (Wesung)."[18]

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[15] DA p. 15f.; MBA 13.

[16] cf. H. Martensen, Mester Eckart: et Bidrag til at oplyse Midderalderens Mystik (Kbh: C.A. Reitzel, 1840).

[17] cited in DA 14; MBA 12.

[18] DA 16, n. 3, MBA 13n. Martensen's quotations from Eckhart are taken from the Basel edition, 1521, of the sermons of Tauler, which

Martensen's Mester Eckart will not occupy us here any longer than is necessary to see the fermenta cognitionis (to use a phrase of Franz Baader often repeated in Martensen) which the young theologian found there. The whole can be brought to bear on the present question of the paradoxical unity and separation of God and man. A long section of Mester Eckart[19] is given to a collection of citations from Eckhart's sermons, translated into Danish, and the work itself is often referred to in the 1841 translation of De Autonomia. One such reference develops more clearly than Martensen does elsewhere the distinction between the human and the divine. Notably, Martensen has combined two separate passages from the Basel folio in a single note. The whole of the passage above, which begins "...for we have emanated from the Persons, etc.," reads, in Martensen's translation:

> Many learned people will not allow that one should place the soul so close to the divine essence and appropriate to it such a likeness to the divine. This arises because they do not know the basis of the soul's nobility, for if they knew this they would not know at many points where to posit a difference between it and God. On the other hand it is remarkable to me, and I have troubled over this wonder for a long time, that the soul is unable to utter as powerful a word as the Heavenly Father. Some Masters say that it is because what is in God is there essentially, but only figuratively (Billedligt) in the soul and that therefore the soul cannot liken itself to God in its deeds. I do not think that this is true. For if one discards everything which is there attributed to the soul, yet the soul essentially is formed by God. Other Masters say: what God is he has from Himself, but what the soul has it has received, therefore can it not liken itself to God in its deeds. I oppose this as well. For the Son too has received

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included a number of sermons of Eckhart. Cf. Folio §278 passim and 277.

[19] pp. 20-37.

> from the Father what he has, and yet works with the same power as the Father, for he and the Father pour out the Holy Spirit with the same power and fullness. This cannot thus be an hindrance to the soul. It is another thing which hinders the soul, and with this I express myself carefully. It is that the Son has emanated from the Father's Person and has remained one with him in essence and thus is capable personally and essentially of all that the Father is capable, but the soul has emanated from the Persons and has not remained one with them in essence. Indeed it has taken on a foreign, another essence, which has its source in the divine essence.[20]

That the quotation above beginning "God's essence cannot become our essence..." (Folio §277) is conflated with a second quotation is clear from the above. The whole of this Folio quotation, as cited in Mester Eckart, is:

> How must we be united essentially with God? It must occur in contemplation (Beskuelse) but not in essence itself. God's essence cannot become our essence but must become our life. Therefore Christ says: to know Thee, O Father, is eternal life. He does not say: it is eternal essence.

Eckhart is a convenient focus for Martensen's own reflections on the question of the unity of God and man in conscience. Both wonder that the soul cannot "utter so powerful a word" as God himself since it in fact shares God's knowing. Yet both find the human soul essentially other than God. For Martensen, as for Franz Baader, with whom he studied in Munich after his work on the German mystics in Heidelberg, conscience is the seal of the Creator upon man, just as it is the mark of man as a rational creature. Man's relationship to God in conscience is, for Martensen, fundamentally different from his relationship to the subrational creation which is known without knowing itself. Man can coerce it; he can know it as object alone.[21] But in knowing God, who is also subject, man is subjected to the free self-revelation of God. Here man must freely subject himself to God, must stand in a relationship of free acceptance to God. He must believe, in order to understand. The essential *modus existendi* of the human creature is dependence upon God. His essential *modus cognoscendi* must be a free recognition of this same dependence:

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[20] Basel folio, §278; Mester Eckart, p. 34f.

> God can convince man of the truth in no other manner than by binding it to his inmost nature. And man cannot receive any dogma in its truth unless it makes its entry in an inner unity with conscience. On this is based ... the indissoluble bond between the anthropological and the theological moments in dogmatics. The knowledge of every divine mystery and its relation to man is mediated through this truth, a truth which is most certain for man and which is the ground of his whole mode of being and thinking, gives the basis for all of his reflection, and forms the summit, so to speak, from which open out all speculative vistas on the divine realm (*specula* - *speculatio*).[22]

Here in the dissertation, in Martensen's review of Heiberg's lectures on the logic of Hegel, and in Martensen's own initial lectures at the University of Copenhagen in 1837-8, we repeatedly meet the theme already familiar from *Ueber Lenaus Faust*: modern philosophy has abandoned the medieval *credo* and begins instead with doubt. In notes on Martensen's "Lectures on Introduction to Speculative Dogmatics" either taken by Søren Kierkegaard and copied in another hand or, more likely, borrowed from another auditor, the young theological lecturer is reported to have described Descartes' cogito ergo sum and de omnibus dubitandum est as "the principal of modern Protestant subjectivity".[23] Universal doubt, not a doubt "about this or that, but about everything"[24] leads to the point where doubt is no longer possible, where the thinking spirit discovers that it has existence in itself and that this existence is nothing other than thought.[25] In principle Descartes has established the identity of thought and being, for the criterion of the true and certain is now to be sought in thinking alone.

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[21] cf. F. Baader, *Fragmente zu einer Theorie des Erkennens*, *Sämmtliche Werke*, I, 49-56; cf. also Baader's 1836 lectures on speculative dogmatics in *Sämmtliche Werke*, ed. F. Hoffmann (Leipzig, 1851), IX, 33ff.

[22] *DA* 19; *MBA* 16; cf. F. Baader, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

With Descartes, Martensen thinks, the direction of modern philosophy has been indicated, since the view that the self-consciousness (conscientia sui) is either the creative or the reflective source of all truth can be unfolded from the Cartesian position. Even if it is argued, as many philosophers in the modern period have done, that it is only the ideal self-consciousness, pure reason, and not finite and empirical self-consciousness, which is entirely autonomous, the ideal self-sufficiency of the thinking ego has its roots in Descartes and comes to play a more and more significant rôle in succeeding generations. Reason comes to be the human self-consciousness "considered under the category of universal validity and necessity [as in Kant], or self-consciousness which considers itself sub specie aeternitatis."[26]

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[23] "Forlæsninger over Indledning til speculative Dogmatik," Winter Semester 1837-38, in S. Kierkegaards Papirer, ed. Heiberg and Kuhr, Vol. II, Sect. C 18.

[24] cf. the Forlæsninger in Kierkegaard's Papirer, loc. cit.

[25] cf. DA 19: "Omnia ita neglecta auctoritate fontem certitudinis quaerens, meditando invenit, ipsum animum cogitantem existentiam involvere, existentiam animi esse ipsam cogitationem (cogito, ergo sum); MBA p. 16f.

There is a measure of validity in such a position, Martensen admits, since reason sub specie aeternitatis may indeed be the source of truth and certainty. But the question remains, whether human reason can follow Descartes and his successors, both empiricists and rationalists, in cutting the bonds of all external authority.[27] A philosophy which would cut reason free from tradition and authority must presuppose that whatever is metaphysically valid of the self-consciousness abstractly conceived can be transferred to the human self-consciousness. This, therefore, "veils the qualitative difference between God's primitive knowledge and the secondary knowledge of the creature, between the thinking nature that is not thought of, and the thinking nature which is also thought of."[28] Attacking the implicit or explicit claim to a presuppositionless beginning made by post-Cartesian idealism, Martensen charges that "this philosophy" assumes that man's basic relationship is entirely in knowledge, metaphysical, though he finds it to be, instead, a real and personal relationship (relatio realis et personalis). Man is not simply "a being endowed with reason" (ens ratione praeditum) but rather a being united with God in religion (ens deo religione coniunctum). This latter definition posits not only the abstract or generic nature of man but his *specific* character as well:

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[26] DA 20; MBA, p. 17f.

[27] cf. Kierkegaard, Papirer, Vol II, loc. cit., for Martensen's comment on John Locke.

[28] DA 21; MBA 18.

> It is not thought, but *religion* - which involves thought - which constitutes the created and self-conscious nature. Reason is only the universal *form* of self-consciousness without which no thinking essence could exist; it is the eternal formal aspect of all thought and being. It is as such the universal (*Universale*) of everything, both for God and for the creatures, but just because of the nature of this universality it is subordinate to the living and personal actuality (*realitas*; *Virkelighed*) which includes not only life's abstract *forms*, but life itself. The examination of the nature of self-consciousness must therefore not be purely *logical*, but also *theological* and *anthropological*; here it must be sought not only how it relates itself to being and existence (*de essentiae et existentiae*) but to life itself, not only how the finite is related to the infinite, but how *created* spirit is related to the uncreated. Without paying heed to this *positive* character of the human spirit, the greatest philosophers from Descartes to Hegel, with the sole exception of Leibniz, followed along in an entirely one-sided (*solivagam*) metaphysical manner of looking at things.[29]

Such a one-sided metaphysical viewpoint, thinks Martensen, is best to be seen in Kant and his German followers, both the adherents of subjective idealism and the adherents of objective idealism. As Hegel had noted in the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* the effect of the Kantian philosophy had been to raise to consciousness this absolute inwardness, the autonomy of self-comprehending thought, which refuses to grant final validity to anything external. "The principle of the independence of the reason, its absolute autonomy, is from now on regarded as a universal principle of philosophy and also as the presupposition of the period."[30] The consequences of this metaphysic for the concept of

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[29] *DA* 21f.; *MBA* 18f.

[30] *Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, 2nd ed., p. 71; cited in *DA* 23; *MBA* 49f.

God are disastrous to the Christian tradition. God becomes a name for the self-consciousness in its absolute development. There can be no distinction between the concept of an absolutely self-validating reason and absolute truth, or God. Either one will arrive at the Kantian theoretical reason, which _knows_ nothing of God, and at the practical reason which finally gives to itself its own law, or at the concept of reason itself as God, in Hegel, hence at a concept of a God who seeks himself in man.

But Martensen questions the possibility of a suspension of all extra-human authority: "If in principle one suspends every authority there is a tacit denial of the authority of the human self-consciousness as well. It would normally be a _non sequitur_ to cut off the human spirit from all authority in order to confer upon it absolute self-validation."[31] There is, then, in modern philosophy, tacit faith in the authority of reason, the character of which has yet to be made clear.

But there is more. Faith in God as creator and the acceptance of the absolute authority of reason are incompatible, though this too is seldom realized. Acceptance of the principle of autonomy makes impossible belief in a personal God, conceived as the source of human self-consciousness. In _religious_ knowledge there are always two knowers, God and the creature. Subjective idealism limits its claims to pure knowledge, making no claim to know the objective nature of existence; objective idealism realizes that the difference between _rationes cogno-_

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[31] _DA_ 24; _MBA_ 20f.

scendi and rationes essendi is only finite and transitory. It therefore reaches the ultimate unity of substance and subject and makes the subjective-objective self-consciousness the focus of the universe. In Kant's subjective idealism knowledge of God is a purely human postulation, though, nevertheless, the highest that is possible. In Hegel's objective idealism knowledge of God is God's own knowledge of himself. And the whole philosophy which is current, says Martensen, is peripheral to Hegel.

2. Hegel's philosophy as the end of an era.

In the licentiate dissertation Martensen, as we have seen, made little effort to explicate his judgments on the philosophy of Hegel. His more detailed criticism of Kant and Schleiermacher is of minor significance for the development of his own position. Of far greater importance is his attempt to come to terms with Hegel. The locus of this effort is the article on Heiberg's 1834-5 lectures on Hegel's logic which had appeared late in 1836, a few months before the publication of the dissertation.[32]

Martensen's article in the 1836 Maanedsskrift for Litteratur is by no means a review of Heiberg's "Introductory Lecture," though it is typical of the period in serving as the occasion for the author's expression of his own views. Martensen first notes that Heiberg has been trying to gain recognition and influence for Hegel's "System" in Denmark, then continues with his own brief characterization and criticism of Hegel's philosophy. Heiberg's effort to gain a Danish hearing for Hegel, who was virtually unexamined in Denmark before 1834, is to be applauded, Martensen tells the readers of the Monthly Journal. Until now the knowledge of Hegel in Denmark has been superficial, and Heiberg's effort to elicit a deeper understanding of it is commendable:

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[32] J.L. Heiberg, "Indledningsforedrag til det logiske Cursus," Prosäiske Skrifter I (Kbh: Reitzel, 1862); pp. 461-516.

> I do not say this as an Hegelian, or because I think that this system is the Messianic kingdom in philosophy (Videnskaben) but because it appears with utmost significance for our age, for it contains the most complete and comprehensive development of rational knowledge, with which it appears that a whole era in the history of philosophy, indeed an era which, independent of all tradition and given positivity, sought to untie the knot of existence, has come to an end. But the new era which we await in philosophy cannot come in before the old has expired, and the Hegelian philosophy is in this respect a *sine qua non* for everyone who has had a part in the philosophical reflection of the modem period.[33]

Nowhere does Martensen's attitude toward the Hegelian philosophy, an attitude which had been in formation since the winter of 1835-36 at the latest, come out more clearly than here. The Hegelian system is the ultimate development of the autonomous philosophy initiated in Descartes. This autonomous philosophical orientation has so penetrated the world of learning (Videnskab) that it is the unseen moving spirit in the practical realm as well as in the purely theoretical. But this has been seen only by a few, and will not be seen by many until the Hegelian philosophy, as the rational culmination of the philosophy of autonomy, has been appreciated and understood.

At the center of the Hegelian philosophy, Martensen continues, is the self's discovery that truth is the self's own essence. For any faith which wishes to maintain itself with reference to an object which is not itself, doubt with respect to the object remains possible. For the Hegelian, faith and religion pertain only to the realm of images (Vorstellungen) which are not understood so long as they remain merely objects for knowledge. But for the believer who maintains certainty about an object which he continues to perceive only as object:

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[33] Review of J.L. Heiberg's "Indledningsforedrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Cursus paa den konlige militaire Høiskole" in Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, Bd. 16, p. 515.

> ...certainty is not absolutely identical with the truth, for the truth (the object), though it appears in the believing consciousness, just for this reason continues to be something over-there (Hiinsidigt) and possesses an independence, an existence-for-itself beyond consciousness. Therefore doubt is still possible here. Only where the knowing subject knows and conceives the truth as its own essence, only there is there an absolute identity of truth and certainty, and there doubt is impossible. But in this case there can no longer be any talk of faith, but only of absolute, divine knowledge.[34]

Only in Hegel has this absolute necessity beyond any faith whatever been manifested. In Spinoza, Martensen continues, infinite substance is a presupposition. In Kant the actuality of the ego and the occasion of experience is assumed, never derived. But Hegel's comprehensive doubt has swallowed even the finite, empirical ego, and has left nothing but the abstract qualification of "being," which, failing all qualifications, is identical with "nothing". Only here is there a presuppositionless beginning. In this bare identity of being and nothing, an identity which nevertheless differentiates and produces becoming, there is the foundation of a philosophy which can indeed produce everything out of itself. This, says Martensen, is the titanic element in the Hegelian philosophy; it will take nothing as a given, but will produce everything from itself.[35]

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[34] ibid., p. 518.

This absolute rationalism in which the logic of constantly less abstract concepts is the only truth-creating force would appear to be able to include all earlier philosophical systems within itself as _momenta_, and the question must arise whether this System is Philosophy itself, philosophy _per se_. Martensen's answer is negative. Rather, the more the Hegelian system becomes known, the more will it be found to be inadequate. Both in the realm of nature and of spirit there is much which refuses to be reduced to the Hegelian "concept". The Hegelian claim that that which cannot be comprehended by thought is below thought and not above it is unacceptable. The Hegelian logic places all of the material which cannot be conceptualized under the heading of the spurious or "bad" infinite, but "this category is, so to speak, the drain through which the Hegelian philosophy rids itself of all that which is an offence (_til Anstød_) for pure thought, the so-called spurious (_Slette_)."[36] The Hegelian philosophy, with its reduction of reality to logical necessity, must sublate poetry, art and religion and establish the superior adequacy of the Absolute Idea. But there remains in these human activities something inexplicable, something which, Martensen claims, bears the mark of a freedom which can only be apprehended by _faith_. There is here a "gospel" which is present among men as a gift of free spirit to free spirits. In religion too is felt a stirring of an absolute power in the human consciousness, but if religion is to be reduced to a symbolic and "mythical" or imaginative form of Absolute Idea, then it must become, finally, no more than an object of speculative or aesthetic _interest_. In the Hegelian philosophy one can see clearly how the present age has lost faith, has relinquished the religious focus or middle-point in which all of the forces of the age might yet be united. There may remain a question whether Christianity is the highest form of religion, but the age must recover the centrality of religion if it is to recover creative power.

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[35] _ibid_. p. 522.

[36] _ibid_. p. 525.

Said in yet another way, the Hegelian philosophy lacks all sense of the _holy_. The _eternal_ is the highest concept this philosophy can reach. For it the _holy_ is no more than a rhetorical word. In contrast, a truly religious philosophy will maintain that man can know the truth only so far as it gives itself to be known, will take all knowledge as a gift from a free, personal God, will find answers to its deepest questions in His revelation. It will develop a true concept of the _logos_ of God. Hegel's greatness lies precisely in the effort he made to derive the divine _logos_ from human creative power, from human _thought_. Had he, instead of seeking the eternal _thought_, sought the eternal _Word_ which man has never spoken to himself, he would have gotten beyond the abstract category (_vilde være kommet ud over den abstracte categorie_).[37] A basic question, Martensen finds, can be focussed on the decision whether to posit _Word_ or _Thought_ as the prior category:

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[37] _ibid_. p. 527.

> It is the philosophical (videnskabelige) point of contention between rationalism and Christian philosophy whether speculatively it is true that the "Word" or "Thought" was in the beginning and was God; whether thus the Word, that light without which Thought itself is veiled in darkness, like a slumbering monad in the womb of possibility, must be thought to be underived and prior to all human consciousness, whether man originally invented it, or whether he discovered it? But if he discovered it, then it was indeed in the beginning, and God need not begin to reveal himself in history (Gud behøver da ikke at vorde sig aabenbar i historien), but is himself revealed from eternity.[38]

God's revelation begins with his constitution of himself as Word and not simply as Thought. It is not with history that his revelation begins, but with the Logos itself. Goethe, concludes Martensen, has shown a keen understanding of the basic problem of modern philosophy in his representation of the aged Faust, bent over his desk in his study, incessently troubling over the translation of the opening words of the Fourth Gospel: en arche en ho logos. Enter Mephistopheles with a pact.

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[38] ibid. p. 527f.

CHAPTER FIVE: AESTHETIC HEGELIANISM

1. The Hegelianism of Johann Ludvig Heiberg (1791-1860)

In one of the scenes of Goethe's Faust, the worldly Faust discusses with the innocent, young Gretchen the disturbing question of religious belief. Conscious of the gap between his demonic scepticism and her simple piety, he speaks to her of a feeling of infinitude, inwardness and fullness which moves through the life of nature and of man. To name it is impossible: "Feeling is all; to name it is only noise and smoke..." And Gretchen answers, "That's just about what the pastor said, but in slightly different words."[1]

This feeling for the infinite in the finite, which we first met in Henrik Steffens' lectures, given in the winter of 1802-03, had spread itself across Germany and Denmark in the first decades of the nineteenth century. Kantian, Fichtean, Schellingian, Hegelian, follower of Schleiermacher, German Romanticist alike proclaimed it. All were Faustian, had been through the harrowing doubts of the century of rational illumination. And to name this infinite expressing itself in the life of nature and of man was at least for many "noise and smoke". For such as Steffens the awareness had been what mattered, the sense of longing, a being stirred to life by something in life which life could not contain.

Just so indefinite had been the sense for the infinite and its manifestation in the world in the early writings of Johann Ludvig Heiberg.

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[1] Goethe, Faust, Part One, Scene 16.

During his lifetime Heiberg was to become known mainly as a poet, dramatist and literary critic. But he was as well an amateur in philosophy and a devotee of Hegel, in which rôles we meet him in Martensen and Kierkegaard. His crucial rôle in the development of Martensen's thought has never been analyzed adequately.

In his early work Heiberg was representative of no single or systematic philosophical viewpoint. His thought was dominated by the aesthetic of A.W. Schlegel, and his dissertation On the Origin of Dramatic Poetry in Spain: Calderon, 1817, manifests Schlegel's influence.[2] Already, though, in the early Heiberg, there is an attack upon the romanticism of Oehlenschläger, for whom the task of poetry was a creative, intuitive expression of the manifold of human life. For Heiberg, art was primarily a form of thought, a "clothing of thought in symbol".[3] In his early works it was largely a question whether Heiberg would find a definite and clear system of thought in which to arrive at an interpretation of art. And this he found in Hegel.

With great humor Kierkegaard likes to relate how it was that Professor Hartspring, an obvious caricature of Heiberg, had experienced a sudden conversion to the Hegelian philosophy at Easter while he was staying at Streit's Hotel in Hamburg. It was indeed remarkable, Kierkegaard thought, that one should be converted, and especially at Easter, to the thought of a thinker for whom revelation was lower than thought.[4] What we know from Heiberg's description of the event is that it was in the Spring of 1824 that earlier reading in Hegel, and Heiberg's conversations with Hegel in Berlin bore fruit for the thirty-three year old aesthetician.[5] From 1824 Heiberg was an ardent disciple of Hegel, though it is unfair to say that he merely reproduces Hegel.

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[2] cf. Paul Rubow, Heiberg og hans Skole i Kritiken (Kbh: Gyldendal, 1953), Ch. 1.

[3] cf. Rubow, op. cit. p. 1f.

The significance of Heiberg for Martensen is doubtless great. It has been too simple, however, to see both Heiberg and Martensen as the Danish advocates of Hegelianism, and much of Kierkegaard scholarship suffers from an uncritical joining of Heiberg-Martensen as Danish carbon copies of the Hegelian system.

It clarifies the situation greatly if we can understand the distinct approaches to the study of Hegel in Denmark made by Heiberg on the one hand and Martensen on the other. What Heiberg desired of Hegel was an intellectual basis for an aesthetic. As the Danish literary historian

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[4] cf. S. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, tr. D. Swenson and W. Lowrie (Princeton, 1944), p. 163f.

[5] Heiberg had studied Hegel, then had studied with Hegel in Berlin for a short time, but still failed to comprehend the Hegelian system. Then, one day in the spring of 1824, while he sat in a hotel in Hamburg, the whole system became clear to him: "...one day when I was sitting in my room in the "King of England," Hegel on the table and Hegel in my thoughts, and at the same time listening to the beautiful hymns which almost inaudibly sounded from the choir of St. Peter's Church, suddenly, in a way which I had never before experienced, nor since, I was gripped by a momentary inner vision, like a flash of lightning, which all at once illumined the whole region for me and awakened in me the until-then hidden central-thought [of Hegel's system]. From this moment the system in its main outline was clear to me....I can truthfully say that that remarkable moment was practically the most significant moment in my life, for it gave me a peace, a certainty, a self-conscious conviction (Selvbevisthed) which

Paul Rubow comments, in Heiberg the Hegelian thought-world takes on a practical and polemical form, "marked with the double purpose that it was to be a philosophy of life for an intellectualistic and formalistic poet, and that it should be made relatively simple and comprehensible as a vehicle for aesthetic and social criticism directed to the 'cultured circles' of the Copenhagen bourgeoisie." What Heiberg produced was not purely Hegel:

> It was inevitable that there should come to be differences between the grave, staunch, learned, somewhat pedantic and very barbaric Hegel with his love for the substantial and the massive, who stood with his feet firmly planted in the soil of history, the declared lover of antiquity in spite of all recognition of the Establishment, and the light, facile, adroit and "cultured" Heiberg who, with all his polemic against contemporary literature and the actual tendencies of the age, was still a decided representative of the "modern".[6]

It is most important to note that the chief difference between Heiberg and Hegel lies in the centrality which Heiberg gives to the aesthetic and to art. Art, for Heiberg, is not markedly different from philosophy. The highest form of art is poetry, and poetry in its highest development is speculative, concerns itself with the conditions of awareness beyond time and space, with what Kant had called the transcendental. For Heiberg philosophy is simply a great thought-poem which has an artistic style in its architectural trilogies. At many places in the writings of Heiberg's early Hegelian period one finds the claim that

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I never before had known." J.L. Heiberg, Prosaiske Skrifter XI (1862), p. 500f. The above is from an autobiographical fragment written in November-December 1839.

[6] Rubow, op. cit. p. 41.

speculative poetry is an "organ" for the world-spirit. We are familiar with this idea from the lectures of Steffens and the early enthusiasms of Martensen, but Heiberg works with the method which Steffens lacked, the Hegelian dialectic of the interrelation of concepts.[7]

Heiberg appeared for the first time in his new Hegelian clothing in a short book, Of Human Freedom,[8] which appeared in 1824, the same year as his "conversion". Here he attempted to mediate in a battle between Humean determinism and a Kantian defense of the freedom of the will, a battle which had taken the center of the stage in Danish philosophical and theological discussion. Already the battle had drawn J.P. Mynster and A.S. Ørsted to the defense of the freedom of the will against Franz Howitz (1789-1826), a Danish professor of medicine.[9]

In the controversy, which soon became known as the "Howitz fight," Franz Howitz attacked the Kantian defense of the freedom of the will as at best a kind of obscurantism which would deprive man of self-understanding. He saw in the Kantian limitation upon the understanding of human freedom a barrier as arbitrary as those earlier set up by Church and by scholastic philosophy. The Kantian dualism of freedom and necessity was finally unintelligible to Howitz. F.C. Sibbern had argued with Howitz that both human freedom and the claim that every event had its cause had the same force and reality in Kant.[10] Howitz replied that this was not the case: never was it possible to reason at all without assuming the universality of causation, "but what prevents me from reasoning while denying the Kantian freedom?"[11]

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[7] Heiberg's earliest poetry lacked this speculative conviction, and it is only rarely that it is found in his early work. Two versions (1833 and 1848) of two lines from a poem, "Pottemager Walter," well illustrate this. The lines are cited in Paul Rubow, op. cit. p. 43:

1833: "What more can a poet do than set forth
his own soul before the eyes of the world?"

1848: "Is it not the very spirit of the world and of nature
which moves on the lips of the poetic muse?"

[8] Om den menneskelige Frihed. I Anledning af de nyeste Stridigheder over denne Gjenstand (Kbh: 1824).

[9] The battle was initiated by Howitz' article "Om Afsindighed og Tilregnelse. Et Bidrag til Psychologien og Retslæren," Juridsk Tidsskrift, 1824.

In his response to Howitz' argument Heiberg tries to show that it is impossible to distinguish between the freedom of the will and the necessitation of the will. He first characterizes freedom as the *act* of *becoming free*, so that "freedom is a striving for freedom".[12] This is the same thing as saying that freedom is the ideal for which we strive, but which we do not possess. And this much is in agreement with Howitz. Nonetheless, Heiberg argues, we must possess freedom, if freedom is defined as a striving for freedom, since this very striving which Howitz grants existence, assumes freedom. With freedom we must make ourselves free, yet we are already in possession of what we are striving for. But then is this striving not just as empty and superfluous as the effort to see oneself in one's own eye? It would seem that the striving for freedom cannot be freedom, for then the goal for which we strive would have been attained already. But, argues Heiberg, if it is not with freedom that we strive to be free, it must be with necessity.

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[10] cf. Oluf Thomsen, *F.G. Howitz og hans Strid om "Villiens Frihed"* (Kbh: *Levin og Munksgaard*, 1924), p. 56.

[11] F.G. Howitz, *Determinismen eller Hume imod Kant*, p. 53; quoted in O. Thomsen, *ibid*.

[12] *Om den menneskelige Frihed*, p. 15; cited in O. Thomsen, *ibid*., p. 79.

If, though, it is the case that we strive with necessity to be free, we are compelled to try to be free. And then the necessity which rules us would be nothing more than a striving for freedom, a necessity which destroys itself by driving us out of its own boundaries. But just by doing this it dissolves itself and ceases to exist, as necessity. If this is true, our striving does not take place with necessity, but again with freedom. Yet the same chain of reasoning will ever and again occur with the same results, and drive us again toward necessity, again toward freedom, and so onward in an infinite procession. Heiberg concludes: "We find, then, alternatively, that our striving for freedom is itself both of freedom and of necessity. So both must be identical, at least in our striving."[13]

This argument of Heiberg demonstrating the identity of necessity and freedom is a paradigm of the manner of philosophical argument and the way of philosophic thinking which he brought to Denmark. Philosophy was no longer to remain satisfied with the "mere understanding," but it must now penetrate to the depth of the meaning of concepts, to discover the internal contradiction in their apparent self-identity. It is no longer to rest satisfied with the Wolffian effort to understand each single thing in itself, in its own isolated essence. Nor is it any longer to remain sceptical about the Kantian noumenon, the isolated thing-in-itself which cannot be understood, only apprehended morally. No, following Hegel, the task of philosophy is now to think all things together, to follow out every concept to its inevitable collapse into its opposite, and to follow out the logic of the opposite until it reunites with its own original and produces a rational synthesis.

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[13] ibid.

What we will find most notable, as Rubow has suggested, in Heiberg's Hegelianism is its intellectualism, his purely conceptual handling of every philosophical problem. Unlike Hegel, Heiberg never concerns himself with the historical or psychological adequacy of the categories of his logic. The categories are purely logical, and it is alone the logical interrelation of the categories with which Heiberg is occupied. His Hegelian sources are clearly in the "logics," the _Science of Logic_ and the "Logic" from the _Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences_, rather than in the more historical and psychological _Phenomenology of Mind_. In comparison with Heiberg, Hegel is a practical man, a man of affairs who wishes to make his philosophy accord with experience. Heiberg is fascinated with the interplay of concepts. His is an aesthetician's delight in form.

From Heiberg's writings until the 1830's it is clear that his attitude toward institutional religion was negative and that his interpretation of religion was closer to the Hegelians of the left wing than toward those of the right. Like the young Goethe, according to Heiberg's view, he was troubled by intellectual problems as many other persons are troubled by religious ones.[14] As late as 1833 he claims that "in our age" the practice of religion can be an affair only of the uncultured. Even so, speculative theology and philosophy are at root the same, since both are finally concerned with the knowledge of God, a knowledge of God as He is in himself and in relation to the world.[15]

As we can recall from the discussion of Martensen's studies in Berlin and of his own spiritual crisis at that time, the years after 1831 saw agitated discussion of Hegel's relation to the Christian faith, especially of his views on immortality. The affinity of Heiberg's views before the late 1830's to those of the Hegelian left is clear from his discussion of the immortality of the soul. In 1834 Heiberg began a series of lectures on Hegel's logic at the Royal Military High-School in Copenhagen, a series of popular lectures which we have met in Martensen's review of the first lecture, published in 1836. In the lecture series Heiberg was too cautious to offend his young auditors by openly attacking the Christian dogma of immortality, but he "so gently and carefully denies the immortality of the soul and eternal life that his innocent hearers needed not get a word of it ..."[16] He urges his hearers "... not to characterize eternal life as future, in which case it is brought under the conditions of time, but as present, as a condition wherein time is left behind

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[14] *Prosäiske Skrifter*, II, 262f.

[15] cf. "Om Philosophiens Betydning" in *Prosäiske Skrifter* I (1833), 381-436.

[16] Paul Rubow, *op. cit.* p. 40.

(ophævet) and which will be realized here in this life."[17] Heiberg admits, though, that "though the present position assures life its eternity, it presents the soul rather as mortal than as immortal."[18]

In this same period Heiberg's attitude toward the efforts of Grundtvig and Mynster, different as they were, to restore orthodoxy and to battle rationalism, is decidedly negative. He sees these efforts as no more than a new version of now antiquated ideas.[19]

2. Speculative Poetry

As we have seen, Heiberg gave a cognitive significance to art, and particularly to poetry, which Hegel could not allow.[20] Far from being mere Vorstellung poetry can cast aside its form as accidental and express as its essential character the conceptual grasp of the infinite in the finite. Philosophy can do no more.

It was this concept of the character of poetic art, coupled with a view of the comic drama in part derived from Hegel, which led Heiberg toward a notion of the "visionary" character of comic drama, a notion which was so attractive for Martensen that it was to lead him ever deeper into difficulties which will be noted in the following chapters. We need to see something of how this came about.

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[17] Prosäiske Skrifter, I, 351.

[18] ibid., 352.

[19] "Om Philosophiens Betydning," Prosäiske Skrifter, I, 395f.

[20] cf. Ch. 5, p. 107f.

Already in 1833, in "Om Philosophiens Betydning for den nuværende Tid," Heiberg had argued that poetic art, in contrast to religion, can be in essence philosophical. The form of religion, Heiberg claims, is necessarily finite, since each religion is what it is only by insisting upon the necessity, the essential character of its own form. By contrast, the poet can admit that with respect to the truth content of his poetic work, the form it has taken is accidental, unessential. "The idealistic or speculative poets are in fact philosophers and do philosophy as much as the philosophers themselves, only with the difference produced by the accidental form of poetry."[21] Such poetry has been written by Dante, Calderon and Goethe, poetry shot through with what Heiberg terms variously "Speculative Idea," "Truth" and, again the echo of Steffens' 1803 lectures, "the Infinite". Indeed the speculative poet's work, the didactic poem or Læredigt, must avoid the usual mundane preoccupation of the didactic poem and take the Infinite for its only object.

The object of speculative poetry remains, though, the Infinite in the finite and not the Infinite in itself. With Hegel, Heiberg insists that philosophy cannot predict the future. The philosopher operates with a given, the meaning of which he seeks. But until that given is posited, accomplished, in some sense brought to completion, the philosopher cannot proceed to interpret it. Heiberg takes it as his task in "Om Philosophiens Betydning" to convince his cultured readers that no philosophy current in Denmark, not that of Kant, nor of Fichte or Schelling has been capable of interpreting the changes in individual and social life which every cultured person in Denmark has felt. But an age which possesses no speculative interpretation of its immediate past is an age of crisis, and the cultured Dane who tries to act responsibly in Danish society is really like a soldier who fights to the death though he has no idea of the plan or purpose of the battle. He sacrifices himself for ideas of which he is not conscious.[22]

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[21] "Om Philosophiens Betydning for den nuværende Tid," Prosaiske Skrifter, I, 419; italics mine.

Religion cannot meet the crisis of contemporary society, Heiberg insists, since both its notion of the alienation of man from God and its purely abstract Infinite fail to allow any relevant and concrete human behaviour. The form of both speculative poetry and of philosophy as such is truth, though this truth is always the interpretation of the given past. The form of religion may be the interpretation of a given, but it is always the interpretation of a given past made once and for all normative. Hence its form cannot be truth. Truth must remain accidental for religion.[23] On the other hand, poetry is coming to play a rôle in contemporary society formerly played by religion. The cultured public has come to look to it for truth, and in a poet such as Goethe it has found an interpretation of its own past which unveils the Infinite in the finite, a poetry which exhibits truth and informs action. More than Dante or Calderon, in whose work there remained something of the abstract view of the Infinite, Goethe has concerned himself with the myriad details of daily life and precisely through these details given expression to the Infinite in concrete form; Goethe has been able to face daily life in the nineteenth century, with its new objects of knowledge still unassimilated to any interpretation of the meaning of human existence, and to give expression to the transcendent meaning of just such daily life. And this is what it means to find the Infinite in the finite, at the beginning of the nineteenth century. If the cultured are abandoning religion to find the meaning of life in poetic art, none should be surprised.[24]

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[22] ibid. pp. 383ff.

[23] ibid. p. 391f.

The cultured, Heiberg avers, have reached a level of self-consciousness, prompted by their own given past and led on by the poetry of earlier generations, Lessing, Novalis, the Schlegels, Tieck, now by Goethe and in Denmark by the earlier Oehlenschläger and Schack Staffeldt, which demands that the insights of a Goethe be given expression in purely philosophic form: "In a word, philosophy, developed in its own form, in the essential, unadorned form of truth, is the need of the present moment."[25] From what we now know of Heiberg we could expect to find that "Hegel's system is the same as Goethe's, only in philosophic form" and indeed it is possible to see the partial justice of this claim when Goethe is understood as Heiberg interprets him. What Goethe lacks is the dialectical form of Hegel, and it is this which is understood here, clearly, as "the essential, unadorned, form of truth".

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[24] ibid. p. 427f.

[25] ibid. p. 431. I have little doubt that Heiberg's notion of the need of the present moment (Øieblikkets Fornødenhed) influenced Kierkegaard's satirical choice of terms when he gave to the term Øieblikket such a central rôle in his interpretation of the key categories of the Christian faith.

Rather than turning aside to examine the difficulties implicit in this reciprocal assimilation of Hegel and Goethe, let us see what such an assimilation means for Heiberg's aesthetic of literature, since what Heiberg does here is of basic significance for Martensen's thought between 1837 and 1842.

As early as 1828 Heiberg had attempted a system of aesthetics built upon a dialectical logic. Under Hegel's influence, though far more rigid than Hegel in his regimentation of categories, Heiberg had divided poetry into an immediate - lyric, a reflective - romantic, and a synthetic - dramatic trilogy. It is characteristic of Heiberg's penchant for system that he insisted upon the "second immediacy" of the third stage of the trilogy so fiercely that he was forced to emend the discussion of the categories of " being " in the Hegelian logic. Hegel's famous discussion had derived "becoming" as the third stage, from "being" and "nothing". But for Heiberg "becoming" with its constant alternation, transition from one thing to the next, could never represent a new stage of immediacy. Rather, it was permeated by negation, could not allow rest. Were the first triad of the dialectic to result in only "becoming", the movement of the dialectic, with its ever recurring negation, could never be brought to a close. The third stage must be brought to a synthetic immediacy which could indeed be "sublimated" at a later stage of the dialectic, but it must be a form of immediacy which could qualify as an element in a true description of that which is finally "the case," "the Speculative

Idea". From such reasoning Heiberg arrived at a new formulation of the beginning of the dialectical logic. The immediate stage was described as being-in-general (absolut Væren), and this is in turn divided into three stages:

1. Being-in-general
    a. being and nothing
    b. alternation or becoming (Vorden)
    c. being-in-particular (Tilværen)

2. Being-in-particular (Tilværen or, after 1838, Tilværelse)
    a. something
    b. other
    c. "a ______" (Et)

3. The unity of being
    a. "one" (Eet)
    b. many
    c. quantity

Heiberg was quite conscious of this departure from the first triad of Hegel's dialectical logic, and he pointed it out to his readers in an exposition of "The Logical System" in 1838.[26] After observing that the Hegelian trilogy moved from 1) being and 2) nothing, to 3) becoming, Heiberg comments:

> But these words must be seen as somewhat careless, for they are at odds with the entire architecture of the rest of the system. Certainly becoming (Vorden) is the unity of being and nothing, but merely the dialectical unity of both, their - as Hegel himself calls it - restless unity, hence not the resolving or speculative unity. Becoming is in the Hegelian system obviously the foundation-category for everything finite; but just for this reason it must, according to the method of the entire system, be kept in the finite's

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[26] "Det logiske System," originally printed in Perseus, No. 2, in J.L. Heiberg, Prosaiske Skrifter II, pp. 111-166; the manuscript of the work is dated by the editors as about 1835.

place.[27]

For Heiberg this means that "restless" becoming, with all other "finite" stages in the dialectic, must fall into the _second_ stage in any dialectical triad. Hence _Vorden_, translated above as alternation, in line with Heiberg's description of _Vorden_ as alternate passing from being into nothing and from nothing into being, is the _second stage_ of the initial triad. And alternation is already brought to rest within the first triad by the placing of _Tilværen_ (being-in-particular) as the third stage, the synthetic infinite-finite stage of the dialectical movement. Here too Heiberg finds it necessary to indicate his improvement on Hegel. What Hegel calls _Dasein_ always means finite existence (_Tilværelse_): "Infinite _Tilværen_ has not yet found its place, and here language may have been misleading [to Hegel] since one cannot distinguish in German between _Tilværen_ and _Tilværelse_."[28] The distinction was difficult enough to make in Danish, and Heiberg is largely responsible for his own not entirely consistent division between the terms.[29] If Heiberg proceeded to find a distinction between these terms, one largely of his own making, it tells us much about his philosophical predispositions when we see the kind of distinction he makes. In a manuscript drawn up in 1831-32 for lectures at the Royal Military High School[30] no distinction is made between Tilværen and Tilværelse, and Tilværen serves both to describe the third division of being-in-general (absolut Væren) and to indicate being-in-particular as the second stage:

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[27] _ibid_. p. 165.

[28] _ibid_. p. 166.

[29] In daily speech _Tilværelse_ meant "existence," as defined by C. Molbech, _Dansk Ordbog_, 2 Vol. (Kbh: Gyldendal, 1833), though it might carry the theological overtone of the older _Værelse_ (cf. Molbech, II, 685), which referred to God's incarnation in Christ and to the "existence" of flesh and blood in the transubstantiation of the elements of the Eucharist. _Tilværen_ was not used in common speech, and thus far its philosophical connotation was little different from that of _Tilværelse_. Molbech defines it as "the being of a thing, not only in thought, but in the real, in actuality." [_ibid_., II, 513.]

1. Væren
    a. Væren og Intet
    b. Vorden
    c. Tilværen
2. Tilværen (1838, Tilværelse)

In "Det logiske System" of 1838, the change from Tilværen to Tilværelse as the second stage serves to underline the finite character of the second stage in contrast to the "infinite" character of the first and third stages in the dialectical triad. Now Heiberg urges[31] that the finite second stage be termed Tilværelse, since the term expresses "more concrete Tilværen". The "infinite" character of Tilværen, in contrast to the "finite" character of Tilværelse indicates its relative freedom from change. Were the susceptibility to change of Tilværelse to infect the first triad of the logic as its final stage, there would be no way of preventing the endless prolongation of the logic into the "bad infinity" already deplored by Hegel.[32]

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[30] "Ledetraad ved Forlæsningeres over Philosophiens Philosophie eller den speculative Logic," Prosaiske Skrifter, I, 111-380.

[31] ibid. p. 152.

[32] ibid. p. 152f.

What we see here in Heiberg is not only a more marked concern for the consistent architectonic of the system than is to be found in Hegel. There is a marked anxiety to ensure the stability, the poise, the aesthetic balance, the ultimate closure of the system. If this is in contrast to his insistence upon the character of philosophy as a sober interpretation of the given past, then the contrast deserves to be noted. In Heiberg's view there is no discrepancy here: what one expects of philosophy is a stable interpretation of the significance of the past, an interpretation which will not lose its significance and become spurious or trivial, i.e., be lost in the "bad infinite" in the future. Thus whatever the system posits as stable, from the lowest stages of the dialectic of logical categories to the highest stages of the dialectic of poetic art and speculative idea must be capable of inclusion in an ultimate proposition, a final vision. We have now to see where this leads Heiberg in his aesthetic of dramatic poetry.

Dramatic poetry, as noted earlier, forms the synthetic or immediate-reflective, third stage of the triad: 1) lyric poetry 2) romantic poetry 3) dramatic poetry. It is the further division of the third stage which must interest us now, especially as it claims Martensen's attention. The outline of Heiberg's treatment of dramatic poetry is already clear from Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind. There Hegel treats the epic poetry of the Greeks as the immediate, unreflective manner of understanding the relation between gods and men in what he terms "the religion of art". The conflicts latent in this unreflective way of handling the will of gods and the destinies of men are raised to the conscious level in the

Greek tragedy, in which the gods remain transcendent to men and in which the conflicts latent in the very concepts of the gods as hidden and revealed, e.g. the "darkness" of the oracles of Apollo, god of light (Sophocles' Oedipus), lead to the Aristophanic comedy in which the distinctionsbetween gods and men are levelled and the soil is prepared for man's self-conscious realization of his own godhood, typified by the incarnation of God in Jesus of Nazareth.[33] No doubt there is material for an aesthetic of poetry here, and the evidence of Hegel's influence upon Heiberg is abundant. Yet Heiberg's is no copy of Hegel's scheme. This is especially clear from the internal divisions of the dialectical stages:

I. Lyric poetry

II. Romantic poetry
  A. romance
  B. epos
    1. the romance-cycle
    2. epope
      a. lyric epope (Odyssey)
      b. epic as such (Iliad)
      c. novelistic epope (Hermann und Dorothea)
    3. romance epos
  C. the novel
    1. the tale
    2. the novel proper
    3. the short story

III. Dramatic poetry
  A. the "immediate" drama (Goethe's Faust here in 1828)
  B. tragedy
  C. comedy
    1. the lower comedy
    2. the higher comedy
    3. universal comedy
      a. comedy such as that of Aristophanes or

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[33] G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, tr. J. Baillie (London, 1910), pp. 731-749.

Calderon
- b. musical comedy
    - i. opera
    - ii. melodrama
    - iii. musical play
        - a. musical play
        - b. operetta
        - c. vaudeville
- c. speculative comedy (1828 Calderon was placed here and the heading was "lyric comedy"; in 1841 Goethe's *Faust* was placed here, and the present heading given to it.[34]

The epic is not, as in Hegel, seen as immediate, either in relation to lyric poetry or within its own division of romantic poetry. In both instances, compared to lyric poetry, it is reflective-finite in character. No doubt one reason for Heiberg's placing of the epic was his conviction that its material and form belonged to the spurious infinite, that it was essentially without beginning or end. In the case of dramatic poetry Heiberg's analysis is more detailed than Hegel's, and it becomes clear that his is quite another purpose than Hegel's. As is suggested by the above account, it was not Hegel's aim in the *Phenomenology* to develop an aesthetic. Rather, he attempts an account of the religion of art, suggesting how, through art, man came to self-consciousness about his own godhood. Hegel's examples are exclusively from the classical Greek world and represent stages of consciousness which must be passed through on the way to the identification of human *Geist* with the *Geist* at work in the world at large.

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[34] cf. Paul Rubow, *Heiberg og hans Skole i Kritiken*, pp. 43-59; cf. J.L. Heiberg, "Svar paa Hr. Prof. Oehlenschlägers Skrift," *Prosaiske Skrifter*, III, pp. 194ff.

On the other hand it is clear that Heiberg had found in Hegel's work, especially in the Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Right, the guide-lines for an aesthetic. His own preference for the "ironic" and urbane stage works of Calderon had led him to consider this "lyric comedy" as the highest form of poetic art. But his preference for "the light form" was reinforced by Hegel's ranking of comedy in the Phenomenology. Comedy was indeed the highest artistic form, and the conceptual dialectic of Hegel could be used to establish it. That this was not Hegel's own intention in the Phenomenology may have mattered little to Heiberg. He was not led by the publication of Hegel's lectures on aesthetics in 1835[35] to change, for example, his evaluation of the epic, though Hegel there attacks specifically the view that because epic is without beginning or end it cannot belong to the immediate, first stage of the dialectical triad.[36] Much more important for our purposes, however, is the contrast between the aesthetics of Heiberg and Hegel in the placing of tragedy and comedy within the dialectical scheme. That Hegel's giving to comedy the coveted "third" in the triad had little aesthetic significance for him in the Phenomenology is shown by his contrasting discussion in the lectures on aesthetics. Here we have 1) tragedy, 2) comedy, 3) tragicomedy, a ranking which places comedy in the "finite" second stage reserved by Heiberg for that which passes but does not abide.[37] For

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[35] Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik., ed. H.G. Hotho, 3 Vol.(Berlin, 1835).

[36] cf. op. cit. Vol. III, Ch. III, section IIIA.

[37] op. cit. pp. 537ff. Hegel suggests that perhaps Aeschylus' Eumenides is an example of the latter, tragicomedy. Perhaps also in some ways, he thinks, modern tragedy may blend the tragic with the comic.

Heiberg comedy serves a function which Hegel never granted to it. As the completion of a dialectical triad it offers "rest"; it offers an overview, a "speculative" comprehension of the past which might well be described as the "comic vision". With Hegel, by contrast, there is no stable comic vision. If we read Hegel's aesthetics with Heiberg's eyes we will see that by placing tragedy first in the triad, Hegel assured that the result of the triad would have a basically tragic character. All of the moral conflict of the tragic would reappear in tragicomedy to produce at best a restless _existence_ but clearly no comic _vision_. That Hegel could suggest as his sole examples _The Eumenides_ and perhaps "some" modern tragedies only underlines this, for the obscurity of the oracles of the lucent Apollo is not illumined in the _Oresteia_ nor is the conflict between the god of light and the "dark sisters" obviated. It is difficult to avoid considering Athena herself, in her rôle as arbiter in the _Oresteia_, as _deus ex machina_, and yet this is the highest reach of art. There would be no more incisive way of saying that the clarity of philosophy is required to cut the symbolic knots of art. And this is precisely Hegel's position, a position which Heiberg had little predisposition to share..

Nevertheless, Hegel's position in aesthetics was clear for all to see after 1835, and it appears not to have been without some influence upon Heiberg. Hegel's aesthetics may have at least called to Heiberg's attention the likelihood that Hegel saw more in the "ideal" background of history than the logic of Heiberg, with its monistic architectonic, could suggest. The world might indeed, as Heiberg had argued, be an "appearance," but it might be an inevitable appearance, inescapable through any retreat into the purity of a logical monism. Heiberg's poetry had found the Infinite in the finite, in a manner which the poet had believed, emulated Hegel. Now Heiberg must have begun to wonder how Hegel could find any essential truth in history. The very stability of the Hegelian thought world, which he had thought to assure by correcting the logic in its foundations, seemed denied by Hegel, the speculative power of poetry curtailed, the comic vision annulled.

3. The Problem of Presuppositions

It was with these questions in mind that Heiberg turned in 1837 to Martensen's criticism of his introductory lecture on the Hegelian logic. It would be too much to argue that Heiberg had taken these specific questions for investigation, since there are no sources to demonstrate it from the years 1835-37. Yet the conversation between Heiberg and Martensen which began in 1837 with Martensen's first lectures at the University of Copenhagen suggests that he was by no means unaware of the problems raised by Hegel himself.

We have seen Martensen's unwillingness to remain within the confines of the Hegelian philosophy in his interpretation of the Christian faith.[38] There remains for him something in human awareness which cannot be reduced to the concept, and the more moderns reflect upon this, the more inadequate he believes the Hegelian view will appear. He finds the fundamental error of the Hegelian philosophy in the effort to make a presuppositionless beginning. For when the human self does not find itself related, through Word, to that other which is its creator, its knowledge becomes empty, its destiny Faustian. It would appear from what Martensen said in this review of Heiberg's lecture that whereas the Hegelian philosophy, now seen as inadequate, culminates an era in which philosophy began with doubt, the new era will be one in which philosophy begins with faith. But this is not made at all clear.

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[38] cf. supra, Ch. 4, pp. 99ff.

No new clarity was brought to the issue by Heiberg's remarks in response to Martensen's analysis of the theological significance of Hegelianism in the first volume of his new "Journal for the Speculative Idea," Perseus. Here, in a "review" of W.H. Rothe's book on the Doctrine of the Trinity and Reconciliation[39] Heiberg acknowledges Martensen's claim that true philosophy must begin with a recognition of the sovereignty of God. But there is for Heiberg typically no quarrel between the two mottos: "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom" and "Doubt is the beginning of wisdom". The whole antithesis between the Faustian spirit of modern thought and the spirit of human acceptance of God common to medieval thought is here undermined. There is for Heiberg no conflict between the attempt to begin philosophy in faith and to begin philosophy in doubt.

If we try to see more closely what Heiberg means, he will tell us that philosophy as such begins with the fear of God. The act of philosophizing, it would seem, must begin with the fear of God, since the immediate awareness of God common to all men is the beginning of all wisdom and the mother of wisdom. So it could be said that philosophizing begins with faith. But the beginning of a specific philosophical system in which it will be possible to interrelate all knowledge must be doubt.[40] Actually, says Heiberg, the Hegelian system begins with God, for it begins with the notion of being. But whence comes this notion? Not from the world, for there is nothing in the world which is stable. Everything in the world is in a state of becoming. Nothing, unless it is ripped out of the flux arbitrarily by the understanding, simply is. "God, on the other hand, is the be-ing (Væren) in all becoming (Vorden); it is thus from God, and only from Him, that we get this concept:

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[39] J. L. Heiberg, "Recension over Hr. Dr. Rothe's Treenigheds og Forsoningslære," Perseus, I (June, 1837), 1-89.

> Indeed, the being with which logic begins, is in itself God's own existence (Tilværelse), but [an existence] which the System makes unknowable by reducing it to the fundamental-abstract definition of being in universality, for otherwise it could not be identical with the presuppositionless beginning: nothing. Thus being and nothing are posited expressly as the first and most abstract logical definition of God; but this positum (Angivelse) does not belong to the System, which at this point still is unable to speak of God. It is an exoteric remark. It nevertheless shows that philosophy has a presupposition which the System ignores. I mean that the Hegelian philosophy admits that the origin of philosophy is the immediate knowledge (Erkjendelse) of God, or of the divine revelation.[41]

Heiberg wishes to limit the activity of doubt to the analysis of all concepts, leading back finally to the bare unity of being and nothing, where doubt is no longer possible. Philosophy has utilized doubt, and this method has been a revolution in philosophy, but it does not follow from this, argues Heiberg, that philosophy has been a doubter.[42] Heiberg's argument appears to be that no philosophy is possible without the immediate awareness of being, which awareness springs from God. So "faith" in this quite narrowed sense is the beginning of philosophy. Yet no philosophical system comes to be until the dialectical analysis of concepts begins, and this analysis finds that conceptually, on the lowest level, being and nothing are identical. Being so general that it is nothing in particular, is simply nothing. That this being is also God is extrinsic to the beginning of the System, since the nature of this being will be brought into thought, and not simply given in immediacy, only at the conclusion of the System, where God is understood as Absolute Idea. But "faith," then, is little more than a form of immediate awareness. It is not an act, but a state of being, and a state of being which could not be otherwise.[43]

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[40] J. L. Heiberg, op. cit. p. 35.

[41] ibid.

Heiberg's answer to Martensen, then, is that philosophy is not presuppositionless. But, in contrast to Martensen's claim that faith must be in some way a free acceptance of God's revelation of himself, Heiberg, in agreement with Hegel, defines faith as a form of immediate awareness to be sublated in knowledge.[44] Yet Heiberg's claim points up precisely the major difficulty remaining in Martensen's own understanding of faith. We have seen that the central claim of Martensen's theological work from Ueber Lenau's Faust through De Autonomia has been for the priority of faith as man's awareness of himself as a creature of God. But the explication of this claim has left unanswered a basic question concerning the nature of faith. In what sense is faith to be understood as a human act? It would appear that Martensen requires both that faith be conceived as a natural capacity, as the creature's awareness of itself as a creature, and as a gift of God. Conscience, as we have seen, is the universal and indelible mark of the Creator upon the creature. It is conscience in the rational creature which testifies to the absolute character of God and to the finitude of man. Only by making this claim can Martensen insist that the search for cognitive certainty observe the horos, the limit, which stands in the way of grounding certainty in the autonomous self. Yet at the same time Martensen must insist that God's presence in conscience is God's own free revelation of himself, a revelation which must be accepted freely by "faith". The credo ut intellegam, with its presupposition of faith, must supplant the cogito ergo sum, with its basis in radical doubt. But what is the credo, and what is its relation to the universal and indelible presence of God in the conscience? How is it to be established that knowledge must begin in faith? It would appear that no point of contact between knowledge and faith was in fact established in De Autonomia. Man, in his search for autonomous knowledge, has been asked to observe a limit the nature of which he cannot ascertain. The limit is heteronomously imposed upon the self-consciousness if the limiting factor, creaturehood, is capable of being recognized only in faith. At least this is true if faith is anything more than the kind of natural and inevitable human awareness of "being" of which Heiberg has spoken. Martensen appears caught in an impasse: if creaturehood is to represent a genuine cognitive horos which must be observed in epistemology, then the limit must be cognizable for rational self-consciousness; but if the limit can be recognized, the beginning of philosophy in the credo is unnecessary and God himself is drawn into the autonomous self-grounding of the human self-consciousness. In his writings thus far Martensen appears neither to have been fully aware of this impasse nor to have offered any means of overcoming it. His opposition to Hegel is evident. Hopefully it will be possible to gain some clarity about his fundamental views by examining his further responses to the work of Heiberg.

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[42] ibid. p. 39.

[43] This analysis of the nature of faith and doubt is one of the major targets of Kierkegaard's unpublished manuscript on the problem of doubt, Johannes Climacus, or De Omnibus Dubitandum Est. Cf. Søren Kierkegaard's Papirer, ed. P.A. Heiberg and V. Kuhr, Vol. IV, B1-17.

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[44] cf. G.W.F. Hegel, Logic, from The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, tr. W. Wallace (London: Oxford University Press, 1892), Chapter V.

What is already abundantly clear is that Heiberg answers far more closely than Hegel himself the usual caricature of the philosophy of Hegel: "ballet of bloodless categories," dialectical analysis without genuine development, reduction of the movement and conflict of existence to a static "absolute," assignment to the philosopher of a "visionary" rôle. As we have seen Martensen had been one of the first to object to the tendency of the Hegelian logic to pour all of the conceptually irreconcilable elements of human existence down the "drain" of the spurious infinite.[45] Heiberg was sensitive to this criticism, and already in his reply to Martensen in the first volume of Perseus, in June, 1837, we have seen his attempt to maintain as much as possible of his old position and to reconcile himself with Hegel and with Martensen. What indeed is striking here is that Martensen's attack upon Hegelianism had hit home with Heiberg and missed the master himself. Heiberg had not only Martensen to contend with, but the Hegel of the lectures on aesthetics as well.

In Heiberg's answer to Martensen, which we have examined in part, there is a remarkable attempt to pass between Hegel and Martensen and to receive the plaudits of each. As we have seen here and earlier, the three could agree that philosophy must begin with the positive, the given. But here they part. Hegel had argued that philosophy had to begin with the positive, but could not allow to the positive any particular character. It was precisely the task of philosophy, by dialectical analysis, to determine the nature of the given, to make the given, so to speak, the taken, the grasped, the comprehended. That something might remain of the given which was not comprehended is already suggested by Hegel's placing of "becoming" as the last stage in the first dialectical triad. Heiberg's aesthetic concern for the static had spotted this quickly. Yet for Hegel there was little question of holding to any *given* by *faith*, at least in the sense in which Martensen wished to understand the word. Martensen's claim that philosophy must begin with the *positive* is concerned primarily with the attitude of the knower toward that positive: it is to be held as something which is what it is apart from comprehension. It cannot *come to be* in thought. It cannot suffer reduction to the spurious merely because it fails of comprehension. Instead it must be *believed*. Now Heiberg accepts something from Hegel and something from Martensen. Earlier he had argued that since the object of philosophy is not exhausted by *analysis*, as is a geometrical figure, philosophy must approach its object *synthetically*. The object of philosophy, unlike the geometrical figure is never given *as such*. Thus philosophy must proceed synthetically, beginning from nothing and developing its objects via a construction of the subjective capacity for knowledge. Here his viewpoint parallels Hegel's in the *Phenomenology*.[46] Now, prodded by Martensen, by Hegel's aesthetics, and by Hegel's defense of the ontological argument in his lectures on the philosophy of religion, first published in 1832, Heiberg turns to *God* as a presupposition toward which an *attitude* is appropriate.[47] Philosophy, as we have seen, begins with *faith*, though the philosophical system continues to abstract from everything positive, and begins with doubt.[48] Heiberg's new position in the first volume of Perseus is at best unclear. All of the ambiguity with which Hegel's examination of "absolute knowledge" in the Phenomenology is permeated, comes to rest here, and it is from this ambiguity that the later work of both Heiberg and Martensen proceeds.

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[45] cf. Ch. 4, p. 101; Martensen's use of this expression was suggested by Heiberg's example (Prosaiske Skrifter, I, 468). That "stuff" which remains beyond conceptualization simply does not exist for thought. It must be regarded as accidental and to that extent, unreal. It is like the "accidental" remains of food which has been assimilated by the body and has served its nutritional purpose. So, observes Martensen, it goes down the drain.

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[46] "Ledetraad ved Forlæsningere over Philosophiens Philosophie" (1831-32) in *Prosäiske Skrifter*, I, 116f.

[47] cf. "Om Philosophiens Betydning...", *Prosäiske Skrifter*, I, 449. Already here, in 1833 Heiberg had acknowledged the ontological argument

4. Perseus

If we try to understand Heiberg's philosophical position when he launched the new journal, Perseus, in mid-1837 it will be worthwhile to examine the circumstances of its publication and Heiberg's introduction to the first volume, as its editor. Though only two issues of the journal were to appear, it represents better than anything else the philosophical, theological and aesthetic collaboration of Martensen and Heiberg which is the focus of our attention in this chapter.

Early in 1837 Heiberg had sent to F.C. Petersen, the editorial secretary of the Maanedsskrift for Litteratur the review of the Rothe volume discussed above.[49] The article attempts to further the cause of the Hegelian logic in Denmark much in the fashion of "Om Philosophiens

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as "the profound thought that the consciousness of God is the subjective moment in God's own existence." Now it would appear that the notion of God as sheer be-ing (Væren) is the prius of philosophy.

[48] "Recension over Hr. Dr. Rothes Treenigheds og Forsoningslære," Perseus, I, 32f.

[49] supra, Ch. V, p. 127.

Betydning" and the introductory lecture on logic at the Royal Military High School. But Heiberg, in the Rothe review, was more strident than ever in his insistence upon the Hegelian logic as the requirement of the age. Rothe's rather feeble effort at a speculative examination of the doctrines of the Trinity and reconciliation offered Heiberg the opportunity to damn current Danish philosophy with faint praise of Rothe. The Danes have, Heiberg argues, lacked philosophical interest, and philosophy in Denmark lags far behind the cultural interests of the time. It is not as if there were no knowledge of philosophy in Denmark, but Danish thinkers have remained with the fragmentary positions of Kant, Fichte or Schelling as if there were a barrier in the way of any advance. Some of the cultured have gone so far as to abandon philosophy in an effort to keep up with the movements of a culture which has left these philosophies behind. But here Rothe is to be admired. His attempt at a speculative understanding of the Trinity and the doctrine of reconciliation lacks method, but there is a desire for speculative comprehension in Rothe which the Danes have shown all too little. With a better understanding of the Hegelian dialectic, Rothe could have succeeded at his task.[50]

On March 15, 1837 Heiberg received a letter from Petersen, expressing the editorial board's willingness to print his Rothe review, but only on the condition that it be prefaced by the following note:

> The editorial board requests that the printing of this contribution may be interpreted as a sign that the Maanedsskrift is open to "scientific" (Videnskabelig)

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[50] ibid., pp. 1-9.

> work without respect to the school from which it comes. Even so, the editorial board ought to remind the reader, especially with respect to the judgments which the present treatise contains about the current condition of philosophy in Denmark, that the printing of a contribution does not signify agreement with the views held therein, but only that it is considered to be acceptable for publication in this journal. In the present case the editorial board thinks it hardly necessary to insist upon its difference of opinion here since this contribution bears a name so famous in our literature as that of Professor Heiberg.[51]

A testy correspondence ensued. Heiberg was unwilling to allow the prefatory note to be added to his review on two grounds: the note represents an indirect attack by the editors upon the philosophy of Hegel, and the editors are trying to register a veiled objection to some of his judgments about the situation of philosophy in Denmark. In the first instance, to attack the whole Hegelian philosophy indirectly and in a prefatory note, to suppose that in this way a significant objection can be raised is "inconsistent, unnecessary, uncertain, and inappropriate". Insofar as it attempts to attack the philosophy of Hegel the note should be dropped entirely. If the editors are objecting to specific judgments on Danish philosophy made by Heiberg, let them add specific footnotes to his essay at the relevant points.[52] Reasonable as this request may seem it was rejected by the editorial board, with the result that Heiberg gave the essay the prominence of being the lead article in the first volume of Perseus, which appeared some three months later. Throughout the correspondence with Petersen, as representative of the editors, Heiberg had insisted upon the view that the only philosophical position open to the cultured Dane was the Hegelian, since it alone could unite the fragmentary and contradictory tendencies of modern philosophy. Petersen had replied that Heiberg surely realized that his judgments about Danish philosophy were true only if the sole philosophical viewpoint was the Hegelian. To this Heiberg claimed that he only wished to argue, as Martensen had clearly said already and as P. L. Møller had said in the Maanedsskrift itself, that the Hegelian philosophy was the fullest development of what in earlier thought lay in seminal fragments: "To this extent is it true that there is no other philosophy - for the present age. To remain at one of the stages subordinate to this, instead of going further, is like beginning a development which one has neither the capacity nor the will to complete, but this proves the lack of true speculative interest, for this cannot rest satisfied with a half-baked knowledge (paa Halvveien blivende Erkjendelse)."[53]

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[51] Breve og Aktstykker vedrørende J.L. Heiberg, ed. Morten Borup (Kbh: 1948), II, 273f.

[52] ibid. p. 277f. (March 20, 1837), J.L. Heiberg to F.C. Petersen.

Doubtless the background for the publication of Perseus, a Journal for the Speculative Idea is this quarrel with the editorial board of the only general and wide-ranging literary journal in Denmark. The inflexibility of the editors of the Maanedsskrift had convinced him that he was fighting a battle for the comprehension of the significance of his age against the crass empiricism of his contemporaries. In fact, as Heiberg was well aware, the editorial board was united in little except its opposition to Hegelianism. He expresses surprise that the editors should treat their opposition to Hegel as if it were a confession of faith.[54] But if the opponents of speculation, different as they may be in their own viewpoints,[55] can unite in their opposition there will be little amiss in attacking them with the same weapons.

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[53] ibid. p. 278; as we have seen, Martensen had argued this viewpoint in his review of Heiberg's introductory lectures on logic the previous year. P.L. Møller's essay "Om Udødeligheden" had appeared in the Maanedsskrift early in 1837, in Vol. XVII.

The first volume of Perseus, which included among its subscribers half of the editorial board of Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, the leading theologians and philosophers of Denmark, and Cand. Phil. S. Kierkegaard, was entirely the work of Heiberg and Martensen. Heiberg's general preface, his Rothe review, the new Danish version of Martensen's essay on Faust, and an examination of the novel Svend Dyrings Huus, of Henrik Herz, by Heiberg, are the sole contents of the volume. Martensen and Heiberg are in the vanguard in the battle for the speculative idea. We will see in a moment what new armor the Faust essay of Martensen required to be able to serve in this unexpected rôle.

When the circumstances of publication of Heiberg's new journal are made clear, the choice of title appears obvious, but Heiberg did not want his readers to miss the point. He has chosen the name Perseus as a symbol, he avers, since Perseus, as son of Jupiter, armed with the shield of Minerva and the wings of Mercury, slew the idea-less Medusa of empiricism. By nature Medusa was beautiful but Minerva, angered by her desecration of the Temple of Wisdom through her affairs there with Neptune, the crude power of nature, turned her hair to snakes. From the blood of the Gorgon, the lifeblood of the conquered empiricism, sprang Pegasus. And, Heiberg points out, it was this poetic steed who bore the hero to the rescue of Andromeda, who had been given in sacrifice to the raw powers of nature: "In Danish Perseus means 'the one who lays waste' (Ødelæggeren), but his laying waste was not the absolute negative of the age, but the heroic act, out of which a new and better condition comes."[56]

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[54] ibid. p. 275, J.L. Heiberg to F.C. Petersen, March 18, 1837.

[55] This difference can be seen in the list of editors of the Maanedsskrift: H.N. Clausen, L. Engelstoft, J.A. Fibiger, G. Forschhammer, M.H. Hohlenberg, J.W. Hornemann, J.N. Madvig, F.V. Mansa, Christian Molbech, C.F.R. Olufsen, F.C. Petersen, J. Reinhardt, J.L.A. Kolderup-Rosensvinge, H.M. Velschow, and H.C. Ørsted.

So we are to see Perseus as an heroic, critical battle against the raw empiricism of Danish philosophy, against the unspeculative systems of the age. But more than this. The name "Perseus" is also a symbol for the imaginative guise in which Heiberg hopes to be able to present the "speculative Idea". Never a professional philosopher, now rejected as a philosopher by some of the leading thinkers of Denmark, Heiberg more urgently than before tries to carry the spirit of the Hegelian philosophy to the "cultured reader". One can readily see, Heiberg admits, that the aim of such a journal as Perseus is to popularize speculative knowledge. One will hope that it will not be necessary to sacrifice speculative thinking to popularization. But the aim of the journal is to make speculative thought and the speculative manner of working with ideas so accessible to the imagination that it has, so far as possible, "the intuitive immediacy (*Anskuelighed*) of a work of art."[57]

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[56] Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee, ed. J.L. Heiberg, No. 1 (June, 1837), p. XIV.

Heiberg leaves fundamentally difficult questions unanswered here. How is the conceptual comprehension which is the aim of the Hegelian dialectic to be appropriated in intuitive immediacy? Would not the discrepancy between the form of appropriation and the content make such an awareness impossible? We can think that Heiberg had some understanding of what would be involved in making speculation intuitively immediate only if he understood speculation to be something which would have been foreign to Hegel.

There is, in fact, good evidence that Heiberg's concept of the nature of speculation was changing at this time. The effort to link the Hegelian concept of speculation, with its toilsome dialectic, to the quasi-intuitive vision of the poet showed no promise of success. As we have seen, the *synthetic* and *analytic* methods had never come to agreement in Heiberg's logic. The former promised to construct its object, yet now was acknowledged to have its own presupposition - God. The latter had no definite object to take for its analysis. If the philosophical poet would be a visionary, would give a true interpretation of the events of his own age, some *pou stō*, some *point d'appui*, was required. If one could not call history to a halt in order to interpret it conclusively, and if one could not construct history by the synthetic method[58] was there perhaps a speculative crystal ball, a speculum, in which the Urphänomenon could be seen? And if one beheld there the Urzeit could he perhaps see something of the Endzeit as well?

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[57] *ibid*. p. XII.

It is not unlikely that Heiberg was uncertain about the answers to these questions. What we have seen of his interpretation of Hegel shows, on the one hand, a predeliction for a view which would stress the impossibility of predicting the next stage at which the human-divine spirit must arrive. One could well suspect, on this view, that a knowledge of the point of beginning, the Urphänomenon, even if it could be attained, would tell little about the future. On the other hand we have seen Heiberg's fondness for the dialectical logic which, for him, does nothing more than develop the implicit content of the initial thesis. For the former view history must be open ended, moving toward consequences only more or less probable. For the latter view there might be some possibility of knowing the goal of history, but only if the content of the prius could be apprehended clearly and distinctly. But we have already seen Heiberg's recognition of the impossibility of both analytic and synthetic method in philosophy as a substitute for "vision" or "intuitive immediacy". What Perseus calls for was not thus far made available in Heiberg's thought. It was to be supplied by Martensen.

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[58] Heiberg condemns Rothe for attempting to deduce the events of the life of Jesus a priori. Here, he says, Rothe has entirely misunderstood the task of philosophy. Cf. ibid. p. 87.

CHAPTER SIX: POETRY AS METAPHYSICAL VISION

1. Apocalyptic Poetry

In the Danish revision of his essay Ueber Lenaus Faust, prepared by Martensen for the first volume of Perseus, Martensen exhibited the speculative crystal ball which Heiberg's efforts to make speculative philosophy popular seemed to require.

Already in the Kolthoff essay, written in 1834,[1] Martensen had argued that although the Seer of the Apocalypse could look into the future no further than was possible for human eyes he could see reflected "in the mirror of the Christian Idea" the fundamental spiritual forces which, in their opposition, constitute "the eternal world crisis". He can see the whole historical manifold, though not in linear fashion but in "an immediate ideal presence". Were any severe strictures placed upon this claim by the original Faust essay or De Autonomia? What we have seen in the work of 1835-36 has been an effort to maintain the possibility of man's co-knowledge with God and at the same time to deny that this knowledge is merely a human self-knowledge which is constitutive of the divine: "God and the creature see in the same eternal light; they look into the same mirror, the eternal Idea, yet their qualitative difference is not annuled."[2] This insistence is maintained in the new preface to the revised Faust essay, but the emphasis now is upon the co-knowledge with God rather than upon the qualitative difference. In the writings of 1835-36 Martensen was concerned to stress the dependent and derivative character of human knowledge in opposition to the "autonomy systems" of the modern period. What he failed to stress, however, was the nature and content of human co-knowledge with God. We have seen as well that he had remained uncertain about the nature of the faith through which this co-knowledge was held fast. As if to avoid the difficulties inherent in clarifying the understanding of faith in the writings of 1835-36 Martensen now focuses upon the speculative or visionary character of participation in God's knowledge. The continuity of this theme with the writings of the years 1833-34 is clear, and we will find that this theme predominates in Martensen during the period 1837-41. What is less clear is the connection of the work of the period 1837-41, with its emphasis upon speculative vision, with the period 1835-36, with its manifest concern to deny to Faustian man the capacity, even the necessity, to make God in his own image. To anticipate a conclusion which is possible only from a later perspective on Martensen's work than we have yet taken, the "anti-Hegelianism" of 1835-36 is to be seen not so much as an attack upon the claim that man has "divine" knowledge as upon the claim that man qua man brings God to self-knowledge through the historical process. For Martensen, at least until 1841, the eternal constituents of the historical process antedate human history.[3] There is an eternal prius for history, a prius which can be known. In the revision of the Faust essay speculative poetry in a new specific form, apocalyptic poetry, becomes the vehicle of that knowledge.

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[1] cf. supra, Ch. II, pp.

[2] DA, p. 15; cf. supra, Ch. IV, p. 89f.

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[3] The modification of this claim in the period after 1841 will be examined in Chapter VII.

The claim that poetry can be visionary is necessarily bound up in Martensen with the arguments that the "end of history" is in some way anticipated in the "beginning" and that the "beginning" can be known. Martensen's acceptance of both of these claims, already implicit in his earliest work in his concept of the "primitive religious consciousness"[4] allows him to isolate the new genre of speculative poetry and to point our for Heiberg a solution to his difficulties. The apocalyptic vision, which "views heaven and earth with their whole infinite content in its magic looking glass" is the point d'appui which Heiberg lacked.[5]

Only if some intuitive access to the moving power behind the historical process is possible can poetry be made into a vehicle of knowledge. We have seen already that Heiberg, from the first, had equated poetry and philosophy in an un-Hegelian way. But when Heiberg discovered that philosophy had an unacknowledged prius outside the System the way was left open to Martensen to argue that access to this prius 1) is through faith, and 2) opens to the believer an apocalyptic vision of the forces truly operative within history. Though Martensen remained opaque regarding the concept of faith involved here, he offered to Heiberg a way of supporting his claim to the essential identity of poetry and philosophy. And, what is more important, he at one and the same time confirmed Heiberg in his

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[4] cf. supra, Ch. II, p.

[5] cf. "Betragtninger over Ideen af Faust" in Perseus, I, 98.

"Hegelianism" and brought Heiberg toward a theological Hegelianism which, as we have seen, he previously had shunned. The point is this, that if Heiberg were to offer the readers of Perseus speculative thought with "the intuitive immediacy of a work of art"[6] some concrete prius for intuition was required. Martensen, opposing Hegel by claiming such a prius in God's preexistent logos, provided the point d'appui which was called for. The result was that Heiberg's characteristic differences from Hegel were brought to the fore. He continued to apply the dialectical method in aesthetic criticism, but now he was forthright in his recognition that "the System" had presuppositions which were explicated in their content in the Christian revelation. Heiberg's Hegelian affinities moved from "left" to "right" largely, as we will see, for an aesthetician's reasons.[7]

Yet, if Heiberg's shift toward the "right" in his interpretation of Hegel is occasioned by Martensen, Martensen now begins to show a new rapprochement to Hegel. Heiberg had learned that Christian theology allowed him a prius which might offer a privileged intuition of timeless truths. Martensen learned anew from Heiberg that the Christian prius could be coupled with dialectical analysis to offer a speculative interpretation of history. If, as Paul Rubow has claimed, Martensen is a central figure in Heiberg's shift toward an Hegelianism of the "right," Heiberg is as central in this period for an understanding of Martensen's rapprochement with Hegel.

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[6] Perseus, I, p. xii; cf. supra, Ch. 5, p. 140.

[7] cf. Paul Rubow, Heiberg og hans Skole i Kritiken, "Tredie Periode," pp. 72-100.

Two works of Martensen are significant in their influence upon Heiberg during the period 1837-38, the revision of the Faust essay, mentioned above, and a review of Heiberg's comedy Fata Morgana.[8] The first is concerned primarily with the analysis of the new genre, apocalyptic poetry. The second lauds Heiberg as the creator, in Fata Morgana, of a new literary form in which the contrast between the ideal world, as such suprahistorical and supernatural, archetype of the actual, comes into conflict with an actual world which wishes to maintain its own independence. The comic form which results is fantasy, another sub-form of the genus we have already examined, speculative poetry.

Both the Faust-essay revision and the review of Fata Morgana are studies of dramatic poems. Both concentrate upon the "ideal," the metaphysical background of the poems, the presuppositions about the "real" which serve as the driving forces of Lenau's Faust tragedy and the comedy of illusion, Fata Morgana. It is consistent with Heiberg's aesthetic that poetry should be concerned with the ideal rather than with the phenomenal as such. As we have seen his tendency in his early work was to regard historical events as mere "appearance". But the publication of Hegel's aesthetics seems to lead Heiberg in a direction which we have seen Martensen confirm. For Hegel, the contradictory elements to be found in phenomena were not merely due to the blending of trivial or accidental elements with the ideal background. The meaning of historical occurence could not be articulated in terms of a monistic logic. Heiberg's search for aesthetic repose in speculative poetry was not aided by the publication of the Hegelian aesthetics.

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[8] Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, Vol. XIX (1838), pp. 361-397; Martensen's article reviews two recent comedies of Heiberg, Alferne and Fata Morgana.

Now, Heiberg, still insisting upon the speculative and poetic vision, begins to argue that the "unity of existence" is to be found in a Logos which as "primal form" (Urform) "engenders all of the individual things and marks them with its stamp...". It is this primal form which abides in the flux of phenomena.[9] It is the manifestation of this primal form in phenomena, with the consequent collisions between Urform and phenomenon, which draws Martensen's attention both in the new Faust essay and in the Fata Morgana review. The fundamental problem of the access which the poet or philosopher has to this primal form, whether in cognition or intuition, is from this point on inescapable for both Heiberg and Martensen.

In the new preface for the Danish edition of his Faust-essay Martensen describes the Faust drama as belonging to the new genre of speculative poetry. But, more specifically, it is apocalyptic poetry, a poetry which represents in its symbolism the whole of life in the world (Verdensliv) in relation to religion's absolute idea:

> It portrays the finite which will not subordinate itself to the eternal truth and must be defeated in the conflict, a finite which has the seeds of destruction within itself. As it represents religion as the absolute power within world history..., as it reveals the nothingness and the vanity of the world, it is an anticipation of the Day of Judgment. Though this first appears at the end of time, its powers

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[9] Paul Rubow, op. cit., p. 73.

> are stirring in all historical development, and though these may not be said to have manifested themselves fully, yet they are always at hand in actual and eternal presence (*Nærværelse*), wherefore every great historical period (*Tidsrum*) is a particular representation of that which will one day appear in totality.[10]

Apocalyptic poetry differs from speculative poetry only in being concerned specifically with the disclosure of the end of time in the beginning of history. But it is, accordingly, the *acme* of speculative poetry, the form implicit in every speculative work. Through Martensen's discussion of speculative and apocalyptic poetry in the revised Faust essay there runs an emphasis which contrasts sharply with Heiberg's discussion of speculation prior to the summer of 1837. For Heiberg speculative poetry is concerned with the Infinite *in* the finite, not with the Infinite in itself. Not until the preface to the volume of *Perseus* in which the revised Faust-essay appeared did Heiberg offer a concept of philosophy which could be said to require a human capacity to know the Infinite as it is *in itself*. But when Heiberg sought to make speculative philosophy (*den speculative Fremstilling*) accessible to intuition and imagination he, perhaps unwittingly, called for the style of speculation heralded by Martensen.

For Martensen, apocalyptic poetry has passed through a three-stage development to reach its culmination in Faust, "Protestantism's divine tragedy". The Apocalypse of John represents the first stage, in which poetry is the immediate manifestation of the spirit of religion. Poetry takes the form of religion. All the poetic forms are in the service of religion and one cannot speak of an independent "art". At the second stage the fundamental themes displayed in the apocalypse are given a reflective, "artistic" representation in Dante's Divine Comedy. Religion has become an object of contemplation and an artistic self-consciousness can arise. In this contemplative poetry speculation has turned toward the Absolute Idea, says Martensen, but still has failed to abandon the manifest external, historical phenomena seen in its light. Imagination is not penetrated by thought. The acme of speculative poetry can be reached only at a third stage, when the image world of poetry turns from the external to the internal, from history to thought. The thinking spirit per se becomes the subject of the final apocalyptic, and the setting of Faust is "not astronomical time...but time in the world of the spirit, and not natural space, but the spiritual sphere and region in which self-consciousness moves." The sphere is posited only by the freedom of the spirit and has no existence outside it.

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[10] "Betragtninger over Ideen af Faust. Med Hensyn paa Lenaus Faust." *Perseus*, I, 99.

In apocalyptic poetry elevated to the level of the Faust story, history no longer is the object of poetry. Rather its object is the "magic key" with which the whole realm of history is to be unlocked. The extensive manifold of historical incidents and personages is cast aside and now appears as at most background or subordinate moment in the development of the speculative idea.

> This poem is the last judgment delivered by poetry, its final word in this theatre of the absolute, after which only that great and actual judgment day is to be expected

on which the absolute truth will reveal itself.[11]

2. Speculative Poetry and Fantasy

Although Martensen announced the new genre of apocalyptic poetry in June, 1837, it was not until late 1839 that Heiberg attempted a poem "A Soul After Death" ("En Sjæl efter Døden") in this vein. However his poems "Alferne" and "Fata Morgana," published in early 1838, offered Martensen another new poetic genre, one calculated by both Heiberg and Martensen to meet in part *Perseus*' requirement that speculative philosophy be made intuitively accessible.

In a review of "Fata Morgana" prepared for the *Maanedsskrift for Litteratur*, a review shared at least in part with Heiberg before it was published, Martensen speaks confidently about the development of Heiberg's philosophical position. "Fata Morgana" is said to represent a breakthrough in the author's philosophical career. The poet, says Martensen, has returned to the poetic ideals of his youth but, in good dialectical fashion, these are now raised to the level of a higher truth. The early works, such as "Pottemager Walter," used fantasy to depict daily human life, while the later work was more idealistic, focusing increasingly upon poetic form. Heiberg became the poetic idealist of Danish literature. In his poetry the soul was seen free of the limits of the finite. In the works of this period, such as "Elverhøj," the historical was merely the stuff out of which poetry could be made. But in "Alferne" and "Fata

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[11] *ibid*. p. 105.

Morgana" there is further development. "Fata Morgana" tells a story about the queen of Faerie and her power over mankind. But in the poem Heiberg shows that he has learned that the adage "appearances deceive" is valid only when balanced by a recognition that appearance is trustworthy as well. Heiberg has seen that "Fata Morgana" has her hold upon mankind only because men are creatures of spirit and strive for the ideal. "Fata Morgana" is no objective fate, but human freedom's own artifact. The sole escape from the illusions of the fairy queen is in human freedom's capacity to make itself a "phenomenon of the Idea". All this development in Heiberg's work as a poet, Martensen claims, is linked to the author's philosophical development which is "not yet ended or completed".[12]

Heiberg was so pleased with Martensen's review of "Fata Morgana" that it will be worthwhile to examine the review more closely. Two of Heiberg's letters to Martensen express enthusiastic praise of the review. On March 5, 1838 he wrote:

> ...for my part I must repeat my thanks for the great pleasure which you gave me the other day on sharing a significant part of it with me. Not only has it pleased me to see many points of my own aesthetic position set forth with such considerable talent that I hope that in this way they will find access to the public, but also your characterisation of my work as a poet has, so to speak, elevated me in my own eyes and, in truth, is to me the fondest gift I have ever received from you. Basically one writes for a very small number of readers, however great may be the mass of those who in rain or shine call themselves one's public. You are the first of those few from whom I have received an acknowledgment which I can be proud of and genuinely glad about; I foresee that after this when I write anything new you will, even more than before, appear to me as representative

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[12] "Fata Morgana," Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, XIX (1838), p. 385.

> of the few I especially seek to please.[13]

By May 1, 1838, Heiberg had read the whole of Martensen's review carefully, and his praise continued:

> ...it is without doubt the best essay on aesthetics which has appeared here. This is not too much to say, and I hope to be able to show it.[14]

It is clear that Martensen's review of "Fata Morgana" does develop an aesthetic of dramatic poetry along Heiberg's lines. Heiberg is lauded as the author of a speculative poetry which is a synthesis of the striving of the romantic poets for the Infinite and the concern of Goethe for form. Martensen argues, generally, that there is a necessary historical development in any ideal human task and that the role of speculation is to uncover this necessity. The thesis here, like that of Heiberg's "Om Philosophiens Betydning," is that speculation has the actual consciousness of the age for its basis and presupposition and hence must proceed from there. To know the ideal one must penetrate the "actual". Again like Heiberg, Martensen argues that the actual consciousness of the present age is idealistic, self-conscious, reflective. The cultured man seeks to know the world as the product of ideas in conflict. He searches, consciously or unconsciously, for the central idea in historical change, the "speculative Idea". And, as Heiberg had argued in Perseus I, the task of speculative poetry is to make this manifest

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[13] Breve og Aktstykker vedrørende J.L. Heiberg, ed. M. Borup (Kbh. Gyldendal, 1948), Vol. II, p. 298.

[14] ibid. p. 304.

"insofar as it is at all possible for art".[15]

The widespread Danish apathy about the Theatre, Martensen argues, is not to be explained by merely claiming that the present age has no sense for poetry. Rather dramatic poetry has not met the real concern of the public. Something new is at work in the public, and its nature is not yet clear. But "let the poet represent for the age its own poetic ideal and the public will be stirred".[16] Here the public is not to be understood as the inorganic mass, but rather as the "cultured". Since poetry, according to Heiberg and Martensen, directs reality back to its ideal source, a poetry which has lost touch with present reality will not stir the public. If the "actual" consciousness is more highly developed, at a later stage, than the poetry offered it, then one can expect the cultured public to have no interest in poetry. And such is the case in Denmark. The consciousness of the cultured man has outreached the current theatre.

Poetry, like other aspects of human culture, has an inevitable development in which later viewpoints rise above the earlier:

> What gives the individual masterpiece its value is that it is a perfect representation of the poetic ideal. Now this poetic ideal is eternal, but nonetheless it is subjected to temporal development, and as long as the human race finds itself in history ... the ideal at every historical point of development will take on a new form which is qualitatively different from the foregoing. So long as the ideal which dominates the artistic strivings of an age as the eternal archetype working to be realised in the entire manifold

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[15] ibid. p. 367.

[16] ibid. p. 361.

> of different forms, is acknowledged as the Absolute, so long also will the works which are its perfect representation be absolutely satisfying. But, if there enters into consciousness a higher principle, then this goes beyond the earlier ideal, which is relativized, a fate which the works in which it is realised also suffer, for they can stand no higher than their own ideal. What was before the object of a total enthusiasm must now let itself be satisfied with a relative recognition; what before was totally present now belongs to what has passed.[17]

Human ideals develop, and since the truth of the Protagorean "man is the measure of all things" is that all human strivings, poetic, moral, religious, receive their value from the particular ideal governing the human consciousness, a "speculative aesthetics" must uncover the inner course of development of the poetic ideal. The current demand for something new in poetry must be taken to mean that poetry must strive for an ideal qualitatively higher than before. Hence the poetic subject rather than the object of poetry must change. The poet requires a new eye.

The new poetry of self-consciousness typified in Heiberg concerns itself with the speculative idea in a way which is new. In contrast to "peripheral poetry" speculative poetry can illuminate the human spirit: "...it kindles an infinity of sparks in the soul" which illumine the darkness of daily life. "It is according to its nature contemplative, and the inspiration (Begeistring) which it awakens is not exxentially psychological, but substantial, for it most closely has to do with not this or that aspect of man, but with man himself, the universal, ideal man."[18] Earlier periods have possessed this "highest revelation of poetry" only in a transitory way, a way in which form and content were not reconciled. But it seems to be the case today, Martensen argues, that it will be possible to hold fast the revelation and to make the speculative into the principle of poetry, thus raising the poetic ideal to the height of the speculative Idea. Poetry will then be speculative poetry. The poetry of Goethe is a pure, poetic idealism, but still largely an idealism of form. He has made the poetic activity itself, poetic freedom, the main content of his work. But the poet must be more than a creator looking at his own activity. He must become a seer who looks into the mysteries hidden from the eyes of other men: "All true poetic vision proceeds from an original vision of a higher realm."[19] The Romantic school has developed the visionary element in poetry, but this inspired poetry often was formless, drunken with the immediacy of its enjoyment of the Infinite, drowning the actual world in the absolute instead of gaining rebirth for the actual through the absolute:

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[17] ibid. p. 365.

[18] ibid. p. 368.

> Poetry was without the concept, it lacked the invisible bond which on the one hand ties together all forms in one infinite unity but just as much ties itself to every individual form and holds it fast specifaclly and determinately.[20]

There is no reason to think speculative poetry impossible only because poetry has had no successes in that genre:

> On the contrary - no one in his right mind will think it a fantastic or superficial notion when we argue that the new evolution of poetry which is at hand will present it clear, organic forms which portray the life of our own conscious-

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[19] ibid. p. 370.

[20] ibid. p. 370f.

> ness _sub_ _specie_ _aeterni_. This position is not pulled out of the air, because poetry cannot be an exception to the rule which characterizes the whole spiritual life, at every point to develop itself in continuity with the foregoing. But all the preconditions, all the moments, through which speculative poetry can mediate itself are given; namely, they represent the two universal artistic tendencies which our age has seen - Romanticism with its striving for the Infinite, and Goethe's plastic principle - the basic elements which it behooves poetry to mediate. The poetic genius needs only to draw together again the divergent strands into a higher form.[21]

Martensen anticipates the criticism made by those who regard speculative poetry as allegorical and fear that the individual will be lost in its abstractions. Speculative poetry is not allegory. Rather, it is "symbolic". Every poetic form is the image of an idea, but the idea has concentrated itself into an individual, has so come into the life of man that it is both image and actuality:

> Therefore when we require that poetry shall elevate itself to the extent that it becomes symbolic poetry, we are requiring that it must raise itself to such a height that it can be for us what mythology was for earlier peoples.

"Naturally," says Martensen, he does not intend that poetry should become the religion of the Danes[22] but it must take up the same world-content which has been the eternal essence of mythology. As a form of religion mythology is extinct, but its gods are not dead. They have only taken on new forms. They are themselves eternal essences which give to concrete life its complexity as a fabric woven of many strands. The gods are the almighty (sic) powers of the world's life. In their very collisions with one another they complicate man's fate. At the same time in their own conflict they serve a higher, hidden power greater than men and the gods.

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[21] _ibid_. p. 371.

[22] This is a result which Heiberg has recommended already in "Om Philosophiens Betydning". Cf. _supra_, Ch. 5, p. 114.

For Martensen the gods of mythology are eternal world-spirits which play a substantial rôle in the life of human consciousness. The world of antiquity was realistic and its gods were worldly powers. Just in this lies their transience as objects of religion, however. Myth does represent the eternal, though, and, by implication, so does the speculative poetry which is to take its place in the modern world. Myth does not represent the heaven of pure thought, but it sees that heaven reflected in worldly life, in man's consciousness of the world. Even though in mythology the absolute is trapped in a worldly form, it does appear there as absolute, as idea, as a supernatural and suprahistorical principle with power over the world. And it is this sphere with which poetry must deal: "...the leading back of this actuality to the intelligible world as its eternal truth is what we mean when we ask that poetry, along with our religion and philosophy, should give us our mythology."[23]

The view of the world taken in speculative poetry can be compared with myth in origin and form as well as in content. For both, the approach to the world is a priori. The world of myth and speculative poetry is a fantasy world which has its origin in the depths of the spirit. It is an appearance. Yet it is neither merely arbitrary nor wholly illusory. "This illusion-world is on the contrary the eternal seed, which actuality hides in its shell and to which it relates itself as the essential to the inessential. It is the spirit of actuality which here lets itself appear, not in an alien light, but in its own."[24]

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[23] ibid. p. 373.

In "Fata Morgana," Martensen says, Heiberg has built a fantasy poem upon the realization that man is by nature a builder of fantasies. To live in a world of appearance is inescapable for man, since the world always appears to man in the light of the symbols through which he views actuality. Either man lives in "true appearance" or in "false appearance" but in any case his only real activity lies in appearance.

3. Tragedy and Comedy

Any reader of *Ueber Lenau's Faust* or "Betragtninger over Ideen af Faust" will expect to hear Martensen describe the Faust-poem, "Protestantism's divine tragedy" as the highest form of poetry. Poetry's judgment day is held in this poem, as we have seen, and only the veritable last judgment itself remains. It is a surprise to discover in the present review of "Fata Morgana" that comedy is a poetic form "speculatively higher" than tragedy. The evaluation is, however, entirely in agreement with Heiberg's aesthetics.[25] What is more notable is that this placing of the significance of comedy above tragedy is more nearly consistent with Martensen's theological views than the evident preference for tragedy in the Faust essays.

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[24] *ibid.*

[25] cf. *supra*, Ch. 5, pp. 117ff.

Martensen develops his argument in the "Fata Morgana" review by contrasting the *historical* character of modern tragedy with the conflict between eternal essence and passing phenomenon upon which comedy rests. Tragedy is based upon the battle between good and evil, views the good as ideal and finds its drama in the struggle of human freedom for or against it. But because modern drama is historical it cannot, at least outside the religious, show the tragic in its absolute significance. In the modern world moral freedom moves within the relativities of world-history and its cultural conflicts. The highest point tragedy can now reach is to show the struggle of the individual as a battle between differing world-historical standpoints, but since freedom in the moral realm is only dealing with relativities in such a discussion, it cannot be represented in its absolute, supra-historical and ideal significance.

In contrast to tragedy, comedy can be purely idealistic in its elevation above the world. It rests upon the assumption that the worldly is insignificant, *is* not. Its view is, in Hegel's language, *acosmic*:

> While tragedy moves within the moral-historical distinction of good and evil, comedy rests upon the essence-*phenomenon*, reality-illusion distinction and has in this metaphysical opposition an absolute basis, while tragedy in its moral-historical opposition has only a relative basis.[26]

Moral freedom is central in tragedy, but in comedy it is metaphysical freedom, the pure freedom of spirit itself, as such free of any concrete expression of freedom, which is central. Comedy is freedom void of all relationships (*Hensynløs*). Its priority in the modern period is closely connected with the priority of free intelligence as the spirit of the age. Holberg's comedy was idealistic, yet it was captured by a prosaic realism. The comedy of Aristophanes passed over into an absolute irony which knew no god but itself. But such ironic comedy is "unpoetic" in that it has taken some spurious worldly interest as its own. True comedy must go beyond irony and beyond the witty negation of particulars. It comes into its own only when it tries to develop its own essentially free ideality into a comprehensive world view, into an ideal world. In this case one has a comic contrast not between a false world and the idiosyncratic ideas of a peculiar individual but between the actual world and the intelligible world. Then, since the intelligible world, as such above nature and history, is yet the truth and the archetype of the actual world, and since the actual world, itself only a reflection, wishes to maintain its independence, comic collisions occur in abundance. And fantasy can make this apparent on the stage. This is Heiberg's accomplishment in "Alferne" and "Fata Morgana," and this is the form in which the present age will bring its mythology to the stage.

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[26] *ibid*. p. 378.

Both in comedy and tragedy there is an element of the religious. With respect to the religious idea, Martensen argues, tragedy is a reflection of mankind's religious dependence, while in the comic one finds a reflection of "the infinity and absoluteness which has stamped itself upon the human spirit as an image of the absolute spirit."[27]

If we now return to Martensen's judgment that "Fata Morgana" is a breakthrough for Heiberg, that it shows his philosophical development "not yet ended or completed," what is it that Martensen detects in the work that should lead to these conclusions? As we have seen, the viewpoint of the work marks a step toward fulfilling the promise of Perseus to make speculative philosophy available for intuition. Most significantly, it echoes the conviction of Heiberg's mediating claims in the Perseus review of Rothe's Læren om Treenighed og Forsoning. Here Heiberg has argued that the "extrinsic presupposition" of the Hegelian philosophy was the existence of God. Now credence is added to this claim by the aesthetic argument that the comic form embodies this conviction of the a priori character of essential truth. This is more than the Kantian claim that the categories of understanding are a priori. What is suggested here more closely resembles the Platonic notion of reminiscence later attacked by Kierkegaard. The comic contrast consists in the felt cleavage between an absolute, essential truth and the ignorance and consequent blind passion of phenomenal human existence. Comedy is higher than tragedy because it embodies this sense of the basic contrast between essence and phenomenon. It is no mistake to see in Martensen's enthusiasm for "Fata Morgana" his pleasure in having drawn Heiberg closer to his own conviction that the truth about the world is to be known only in God. What we will now see is that Heiberg's approximation to Martensen's view was accompanied by Martensen's further rapprochement with the autonomy of the Hegelian philosophy. Martensen's application of aesthetics to theology will be examined in the following chapter.

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[27] ibid. p. 379.

CHAPTER SEVEN: AESTHETIC VISION AND THEOLOGY

1. The New Era in Theology

The collaboration of Martensen with Heiberg in the publication of Perseus and the close friendship which grew between Martensen and the Heiberg family had brought Martensen to the point where his earlier strictures on the Hegelian philosophy seemed less important than the remarkable comprehension of the present age which the Hegelian analysis of the history of "Spirit" seemed to offer. If anything he grew more sanguine than Heiberg about the possibilities of a poetry which could reveal the essential structure of the future if not its concrete detail. Both in the university lectures in speculative dogmatics and in ethics during this period, and in the works published between 1837 and 1842, there is again in Martensen the kind of fascination with Hegelian thought that we saw in the Priisopgave and the Kolthoff essay. The positive becomes, in this period, less something outside self-consciousness, whether "object" or "divine knowledge" or "Word," and more clearly the content of self-consciousness itself in its immanental-transcendental development. What now becomes a puzzle is how the new direction in Martensen's theological efforts will be reconciled with the attack upon autonomy in the Faust-essay and the dissertation. The possible shortcomings of Martensen's theological position were missed, however, by most of his contemporaries in the wave of enthusiasm for the "new theology" which was stirred by his lectures in "Speculative Theology" at the University of Copenhagen. Heiberg's battle for the popularisation of Hegelian thought seemed won overnight.[1] Arildsen speaks of the "philosophical glossolalia" which this undisciplined Hegelianism produced from pulpit to courtroom, and, if we are to believe Kierkegaard, to the barbershop as well.[2]

In January of 1840 and again in February Martensen inserted brief articles in the newspaper Fædrelandet in reply to an anonymous critic who complained that the university students were being drawn away from Christianity by Hegelianism and that it was impossible to talk with them because they spoke only "Hegelian".[3]

Though this widespread "Hegelian shower bath" (Kierkegaard) lasted for a very short time indeed, and though it had lasting influence only for Heiberg and Martensen, the literary production of Martensen between the beginning of his university lectureship in 1837 and the publication in April, 1842, of "Nutidens Religiøse Crisis," falls into a period when it seemed that the philosophy of Hegel would sweep away everything in its path. Few saw, or remarked upon the radical revision of Hegel which the efforts of Heiberg and Martensen required. At first it was only in the direct attacks of Mynster and Sibbern that opposition to the new Hegelianism was registered. And only Sibbern succeeded in isolating the central difficulties with the analysis of faith and knowledge which troubled both Heiberg and Martensen. Even so, Sibbern's attack seems to have made no immediate impression upon either of the heralds of the new eras in poetry, philosophy and theology.

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[1] cf. S. Arildsen, H.L. Martensen, pp. 162ff.

[2] cf. S. Kierkegaard, Papirer, IIIB, 192.

[3] cf. Fædrelandet, No. 50 (Jan. 29, 1840), Col. 259-261 and No. 56 (Feb. 4, 1840), Col. 315; Martensen replies that Hegel is "inescapeably necessary" for philosophical education "if one would not lack continuity in the entire development of thought of the human race and reject the possibility of every actual breakthrough" to something beyond Hegel. Thus far no position beyond Hegel's epoch-making philosophy has emerged.

The occasion of Sibbern's attack was the appearance of the first volume of Perseus. In the pages of the Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, the journal which had given Heiberg's Rothe review a qualified rejection, Sibbern brought out a review of the Perseus volume. The review led Heiberg to write to Martensen: "It occurs to me that in many places he battles with a windmill, that he agrees with me, whom he opposes, and disagrees with you, whom he acknowledges."[4] In any case, Sibbern had seen that for Martensen the fundamental problem with the captivating Hegelian dialectic was whether the positive was accepted by faith and could be given any essential independence. He compares Martensen's desire to turn to faith, as expressed in the revised Faust-essay, to the desire of an Hegelian natural philosopher to remain an empirical scientist. At best this will lead to a fides historica, and Martensen is unwilling to remain there. The Hegelian philosophy demands that faith as something positive give way to a philosophical justification. Martensen is nevertheless right in demanding that there be something not produced by philosophy which philosophy is about. Here Heiberg, with his insistence that philosophic activity begins with pure doubt, is in error. Any philosophical system begins with debate and discussion about what is able to justify itself but it never doubts that something can do so. Pure doubt, far from being the beginning of a philosophical system, would lead nowhere, for no beginning could be made.[5]

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[4] Breve og Akstykker vedrørende J.L. Heiberg, ed. M. Borup, Vol. II (May 1, 1838), §394; Sibbern's article appeared in the Maanedsskrift, Vol. XIX-XX (1839), pp. 283-360.

It is not entirely clear from Sibbern's article why Heiberg concludes that he attacks Martensen while seeming to defend him and is one with Heiberg, while seeming to attack. The remark makes sense, though, if Heiberg is construed as saying that he desires to pose no given which has any particular, inviolate character as a presupposition for philosophy. Hence he can agree with the natural scientist's demand that there be some given while making no stipulations about its character. Martensen, on the other hand, by requiring "faith" as a presupposition for philosophy actually gives a content to the word "God" which is lacking for Heiberg. Martensen still desires a specific presupposition for philosophy, not merely the admission, which Heiberg is willing to grant Sibbern, that philosophy does not begin with a pure doubt, but takes something debatable as a given, for the time being. If this reconstruction of Heiberg's comment is correct it gives us some insight into his view of his relation to Martensen's thought in mid-1838. Martensen lauds "Fata Morgana" for seeing the comic contrast between an absolute, essential truth which is intuited and man's phenomenal existence which necessarily falls short of this absolute. His poet is to be an apocalyptic Seer. Heiberg, caught between the demands of speculative poetry for a truth which can be intuited as such and the sobering influence of Hegel's "toilsome labor of the dialectic" falls back upon Hegel when Sibbern attacks. But he is no more able to hold this position than is Martensen. The Heibergian revision of Hegel is so thoroughgoing already in its modification of the first triad of the "Logic" that the only subsequent quarrel between Martensen's theological conservatism and Heiberg's aesthetic intuitionism will concern the extent of the Seer's vision. That the Seer must be able to see something in particular, however, is central to Heiberg's whole poetic program.

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[5] Maanedsskrift for Litteratur XIX-XX, p. 347.

The first signs that Martensen would make a new attempt to deal with the theological problem of the positive come after Martensen was already acclaimed as the theologian of a new era. The immediate occasion of the attempt was Mynster's appearance in print with an attack upon any effort to find a mediating position in theology.

Already in 1825, Martensen had complained of the quarrel between Clausen and Grundtvig: "heterodoxy and orthodoxy were the only categories we had". In 1839 Martensen's own dissertation was acclaimed as the work which provided a way beyond the alternatives of Clausen and Grundtvig, a way beyond the alternative of either rationalist or orthodox interpretation of the Christian faith. It would seem that the enthusiasm of the claim, and the bitterness of Mynster's rejection of any "third" position led Martensen to try yet another way of reconciling positive and speculative, the appropriation of the historical tradition and the immanental development of the self and its world.

In the spring of 1837, as we saw earlier, Martensen's De Autonomia had been published. The work was not to be widely known in Denmark before 1841, when it was translated into Danish, but in 1839 a long review of the dissertation by J.A. Bornemann, Martensen's travel companion in Germany, brought attention to the work. Bornemann's article was the lead article in a new review, Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, and the review gave both a thorough analysis of Martensen's theses in De Autonomia and high praise of the work as pointing toward the future. The influence of Franz Baader is seen in the work, but Martensen is credited with developing a new theological position. It is said to be a position like Baader's. Yet, Bornemann claims, Baader has nowhere set forth the epistemology which is systematically developed by Martensen in any more than a fragmentary fashion. Martensen's service, Bornemann argues, is to have used his materials masterfully and to have developed an internally connected theory, so that what with others had the character of a postulation, is now grounded.[6] One might still want to call Martensen's work a fragment, Bornemann admits, but this would be true only insofar as "a foundation is not a completed system".[7]

The claim by Bornemann which was to awaken widespread discussion in Denmark was the insistence that with De Autonomia a "new era" in Danish theology had begun and that "in theology both rationalism and supernaturalism are antiquated standpoints, belonging to a time now past.[8] We have met this latter claim previously in Heiberg, but until now it had called forth no fire. This time Bishop J.P. Mynster appeared in print in the same journal to argue that the claims of Heiberg, Martensen and Bornemann were ridiculous.[9] There is, claims Mynster, ample room for continued discussion of both rationalism and supernaturalism, for neither is antiquated. It would seem in fact, said Mynster, that a religion must rest either upon one of these viewpoints or the other, and that insofar as one became dominant the other would become antiquated. In any case they could not both become antiquated at once, for the very reason that they were contradictories.[10]

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[6] J.A. Bornemann, in Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, I (1839), p. 40; that this claim is excessive has already been suggested above.

[7] ibid.

[8] ibid. p. 3.

Mynster attacks Hegel and his followers for fostering the viewpoint that the principle of contradiction is not universally valid, for it is only if the principle of contradiction does not hold in this case that contradictories could either be "mediated" or become antiquated at once. Hegel has chosen arbitrary examples to demonstrate his thesis, e.g. "thought is either dark blue or not dark blue," "an elephant is either a cube root or not a cube root". But now Mynster charges that it is also possible to present propositions in which the principles of contradiction and excluded middle must hold:

> So, if we say the revelation on which the Christian religion rests is neither supernatural nor not supernatural

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[9] "Rationalisme. Supernaturalisme" in Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, 249ff.

[10] J.P. Mynster, op. cit., p. 266; cf. V. Kuhr, Modsigelsens Grundsætning (Kbh: Gyldendal, 1915), p. 8.

> then it immediately appears here that all mediation is impossible....Either-Or; one can mediate between opposing propositions (*Modsætninger*) but not between contradictory propositions (*Modsigelser*). Every sound scientific (*videnskabelig*) theory must choose for one or the other of contradictorily opposed viewpoints.[11]

As Victor Kuhr points out it is clearly the principle of excluded middle (that only one of two contradictory predicates can be assigned to the same subject) with which Mynster is here concerned.[12] Either the Christian revelation rests upon a supernatural revelation of God to man, or it does not. There is no third possibility.[13]

Both Heiberg and Martensen soon entered the lists against Mynster. In his response to Mynster's article Heiberg notes that the principle of contradiction has not been rejected by the Hegelians, but that it has indeed been given a more limited significance than Mynster would claim for it.[14] No longer does the principle have universal validity. Heiberg argues that in the new philosophy it has been shown that neither in immediate awareness of the given in experience nor at the highest level of conceptualization does the principle hold. It holds only in the middle region, the region of reflection, the logical region represented by our knowledge of finite things in the world. As for Mynster's claim that although merely opposing statements can be reconciled contradictories cannot, it is not true. There are many merely opposing statements which cannot be reconciled - all of those on the level of reflection. And there are many contradictories which can be mediated - such as "A is -A".[15] The whole question of the possibility of mediation is a question of the standpoint from which one speaks: "Mediation - the task of the speculative spirit - is *impossible so long as one remains at the standpoint of the finite*....Reduced to this the principles of contradiction and exclusion are correct."[16]

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[11] *ibid*. p. 267.

[12] V. Kuhr, *op. cit*., p. 9.

[13] The 26-year-old Kierkegaard does not appear in print in the ensuing controversy at this time, but it is clear that he was following the discussion in the journal and that he sided with Mynster. In June 1839 one finds Kierkegaard denying that an absolute contradiction such as "to be or not to be" can be mediated (S. Kierkegaard, *Papirer*, II A 454). As Kuhr notes: "We meet here the principle claim of the principal of contradiction which afterwards so often appears in Kierkegaard's work and which surely should be called its innermost nerve - the constant presence of the relation of exclusion, an unmediated either-or in every respect (and it was this alone which interested him) where every *view of life* was concerned. It was "personality" which protested against the mediating laying-aside of contradiction, against the constant talk of a "higher unity" which Kierkegaard in a much later journal entry (V A 90, autumn, 1844) attacked as a "metaphysical assassination attempt (*Attentat*) in ethics." (*ibid*. p. 6.)

[14] cf. *Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik*, I, 441f.

Late in 1839 Martensen joined the controversy with "Rationalism, Supernaturalism and the Principle of Excluded Middle," a reply to Mynster which appeared in *Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik*.[17] Martensen points to his great esteem for Mynster and records his surprise that this man "who we have to thank for some of the best in our spiritual life" would set an absolute gulf between rationalism and supernaturalism and go so far as to argue that they cannot be reconciled. "We had believed that there was a third position, had also found this third position in this author's own religious view of life, which so often solved contradictions for us."[18] Martensen had not hitherto understood Mynster to be a supernaturalist, nor did he think that Mynster held to an exclusive "Either-Or" which disavowed continuity and reconcilability with other positions. Mynster had described the current scene in theology as a battle between supernaturalism and rationalism and had established his proof for the impossibility of mediation upon the principle of excluded middle. But Martensen fails to see how such a principle can be employed in theology where the task is at every point to establish the identity of what is contradictory to the understanding.[19]

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[15] *ibid*. p. 446.

[16] *ibid*. p. 448; italics mine.

[17] *Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik*, I, pp. 456-473.

For Martensen, the principle of excluded middle will hold only as long as contradictions are held fast in their abstraction and consequent untruth. But it is impossible that the principle of excluded middle should have the last word in theology: "The midpoint of Christianity, the doctrine of the Incarnation, the doctrine of the God-man, clearly shows that the Christian metaphysic cannot rest in an Either-Or, but that it only finds truth in a third position (i det Tredie) which this principle excludes."[20] Martensen goes on to argue that supernaturalism is the viewpoint of Judaism, and that the principle of supernaturalism is the Jewish insistence that there can be no third thing between God and man, no incarnate son of God. For the principle of excluded middle, he claims, the Jews had to stone Jesus! From the standpoint of a narrow insistence upon the principle of excluded middle every fundamental dogma of the Christian faith can be attacked, for if one believes that the contradictory predicates, God and man, cannot be united in the same subject, then all the basic Christian dogmas fall: Trinity, reconciliation, grace, and justification.

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[18] ibid. p. 457.

[19] Note the contrast between this claim and the insistence of Kierkegaard upon the centrality of "paradox" in theological language.

[20] ibid. p. 458.

Mynster, says Martensen, would escape such a disastrous result by setting up a distinction between opposing theses which can be mediated and contradictories which cannot. But such a distinction is of no avail when it comes to the fundamental dogmas of Christianity, since the principle of excluded middle, consistently followed through, will exclude them as well. Only a position which allows that there is a fundamental and intelligible relation between the supernatural and the natural, only a position which allows the supernatural to become real for man through the natural alone, only a position which allows the supernatural to contain the natural as an element within itself[21] is acceptable. Only such a position can avoid the inevitable destruction of the Christian faith to which the irreconcilable separation of rationalism and supernaturalism has led: "The important logical recognition that every concept contains its own other, its negation, which has already shown itself fruitful in philosophy (Videnskab), appears also here to demand its rights."

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[21] som sit eget Moment; p. 459.

Contemporary theology has in fact, says Martensen, made very little of the supernatural-natural split. Neither Schleiermacher nor Hegel gives any significance to it. When Schleiermacher can write in his Dogmatics that "the appearance of the Redeemer in history is, as divine revelation, neither an absolutely supernatural, nor an absolutely supra-rational thing,"[22] it is clear that for Schleiermacher the revelation upon which the Christian faith rests is both natural and supernatural. The problem, however, in Schleiermacher, is that the position he represents is only a half-way house. There is in his work no genuine third position, no mediation of supernatural and natural, but only an uncomfortable mixture, a rationalistic supernaturalism, or perhaps a supernaturalistic rationalism. But Schleiermacher does not work out from the central Christian insight that in Christ the Word became flesh, so that here the supernatural became nature.

What is now required in theology is a frontal attack upon this problem of the nature of Christian concepts. Schleiermacher was well enough aware that the supernaturalist-rationalist split was antiquated in his own day. Most current theologies assume this, yet the way in which this split can in fact be overcome has not been made clear. Even Mynster himself has often written as if natural-supernatural were an unsatisfactory dichotomy for an adequate Christian theology. In his own work on dogmatics, Om Begrebet Dogmatik, Mynster has written that God would have become incarnate even if man had never sinned, that the incarnation is not only for the redemption of sinful man, but also necessary in the very nature of things.[23] Here Mynster seems to be speaking of the metaphysical necessity of the Christian viewpoint. How will he demonstrate such a proposition if he is really to insist that between reason and revelation, nature and supernature, there is a split which cannot be overcome by reason? To show such a metaphysical necessity as that which Mynster suggests would require that all of the contradictions between supernaturalism and rationalism, revelation and reason, faith and human rationality, be overcome. But this is just what Mynster, with his attack upon Heiberg and Martensen, would make impossible.

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[22] The Christian Faith, ed. H.R. Mackintosh and J.S. Stewart (Edinburgh, 1928), §13.

It is clear that Mynster and those, like Sibbern, who would agree with him, have failed to see the great value of the Hegelian philosophy for Christian theology. Christian theology is in an impasse, and the new philosophy, far from being inimical to Christianity, provides a way through to the third position which is required. No one concerned with the real problems of current theology, says Martensen, can fail to find in the Hegelian philosophy, and especially in its understanding of the dialectic of ideas, _fermenta cognitionis_, intellectual leaven. There is much, for example, in the Hegelian philosophy which illuminates the problem of the Trinity. Yet at the same time, Mynster is right in denying that the appearance of Christ in history is an immanent product of human reason. The appearance of Christ in history is not the result of the process of human development, yet, says Martensen, it was mediate with it. On the one side Christ must be understood as the root, the divine root, which bears up the whole human race, which without Him would fall back into nothingness. At the same time, though, he is the purest and most worthy flower of human development. Just as one must on the one side hold fast the fact of the Incarnation, so too must he remember that this fact has as its presupposition the original, eternal unity of the divine and human nature. "Just as one must teach the historical Christ, one must hold fast the thought of the ideal, universal God-man who in the historical Christ has concentrated himself in a punctual existence."[24]

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[23] cf. J.P. Mynster, _Om Begrebet Dogmatik_, p. 44; cited in Martensen, _loc. cit._

Mynster, like Jacobi, wishes to escape the pantheistic consequences of a consistent rationalism by jumping to a supernaturalism which places a gap between God and man which cannot be bridged from man's side. But again, this is the viewpoint of Judaism, allowing no way of conceiving or understanding what has happened in Christ. Such a viewpoint really excludes any thought of the unity of the divine and the human nature, as well as excluding the doctrine of the Trinity and its component element, the doctrine of creation.[25] But, "it is a Christian, and not a pantheistic, thought that our Saviour exists not by a divine or by a human act, but by a divine-human (*gudmenneskelig*) act."[26]

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[24] ibid. p. 464.

[25] It is to be noted that in including the concept of the creation within the doctrine of the Trinity, Martensen must assume a cognition of God through faith which allows such a "knowledge". He appears to shift in this direction in his theology, moving away from the emphasis of Ueber Lenaus Faust and De Autonomia upon the primitive character of the self's awareness of itself as created. Both in the German original of the Faust essay, and in the new preface which Martensen wrote for the Danish translation of the Faust-essay in 1837 Martensen had insisted upon the doctrine

The problem, Martensen argues, with both supernaturalism and rationalism is that in neither is theological knowledge possible. In supernaturalism there is a supra-natural, supra-rational theology, but there is no *knowledge* strictly so-called. Such a viewpoint, Martensen had argued in *De Autonomia*, could easily take refuge in the critical philosophy of Kant.[27] On the other hand, there is knowledge in rationalism, but it cannot truly be called "theological". What theology requires is a unity of concepts in a science (*Videnskab*). And a scientific viewpoint cannot reconcile itself with any theological dogma which is not seen as having its rational and dialectical necessity within a system. It is precisely this immanence of the whole of Christian dogma within any element of theological knowledge that was missing in the old rationalism. Though in the abstract it well portrayed the relation of the human and the divine, the

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of the creation as "the central dogma of revealed religion". (Cf. *Ueber Lenaus Faust*, p. 3, and "Betragtninger over Ideen af Faust. Med Hensyn paa Lenaus Faust" in *Perseus*, I, 121ff; see above Chapter III, Sec. 2.) In *Ueber Lenaus Faust*, as a footnote to the claim that the dogma of the creation is the central dogma of all revealed religion, Martensen adds that in order to avoid misunderstanding he will point out that he is well aware that the idea of the creator has its higher ground in the idea of the Trinity. Knowledge of the Trinity is mediated through the idea of the Creator, however, as is all knowledge of divine things, since through it the creaturely consciousness is given an immovable object. This explanatory footnote is omitted in the Danish preface to the Faust-essay, and here in the reply to Mynster Martensen appears to have forgotten his earlier insistence upon the centrality of the doctrine of creation.

[26] *ibid*. p. 464.

[27] cf. *De Autonomia*..., pp. 48ff.

divine element was given such a predominance that Christianity appeared as something foreign to the human consciousness, as a foreign power and an impenetrable mystery which could not be grasped in knowledge but only clung to in faith. As an example Martensen cites the doctrine of the Trinity as it was treated in Protestant scholasticism. The doctrine there might be said to contain the whole truth, yet the truth remained unrevealed in this hard, scholastic form, which lacked "the living copula of the dialectic". "The thinking human spirit stands over against the great mystery and instead of thinking it as revelation, it thinks only of its own creaturehood and of the incomprehensibility of the divine."[28]

Against this "dead" view Martensen would set his own speculative concept of the Trinity, built upon the Hegelian dialectic:

> If the Trinity is genuinely to have significance for thought, as the absolute truth, then it must have this significance by becoming the key to the whole world-system; all reality in heaven and earth must be taken into its orbit (Kreds) and it must be acknowledged as the concept by which it itself and all else is comprehended. But just as the one-sided relationship of consciousness to dogma vanishes, abstract supernaturalism vanishes as well, and as the self-consciousness relinquishes its false autonomy and thereby finds itself taken up into revelation's sphere, there can be no talk of a one-sided rationalism.[29]

The problem in the older supernaturalism was, e.g., that it was difficult to give sufficient weight to the humanity of Christ. And one could say that the creeds of the Church have performed only a regulative function. In the doctrine of the unity of the divine substance, the homoousias of

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[28] ibid. p. 465.

[29] ibid.

God the father and God the son, the humanity of Christ is expressed, but it is not strictly _thought_. "First in the _realm of self-consciousness_ (_Selvbevisthedens Rige_) which is begun with Kant and Fichte and which since has been further elaborated, could a deeper and genuinely immanent development of Christology be prepared and introduced, though I am far from claiming that we already have such completed."[30]

The Hegelian theology, Martensen avers, has given a new joy and confidence to man; man now finds himself capable of understanding himself in a higher sense than before, and now takes a polemical stance toward supernaturalism as toward an enemy who would set arbitrary limits for him. Man wishes to bring everything into the sphere of his own competence. And so the old claim that "man is the measure of all things" has gained new currency. Today in Christology all of the Christological interpretations, from the naive moral parallels between Christ and Socrates to the profound interpretation of Christ in Schleiermacher, are to be characterized as "mediating moments in the dogma of the _homoousias_ of the nature of Christ with human nature, as stages which must be gone through in order that the thesis that man is the goal of all things (_Tingenes Maal_) can be placed in its Christian, and therewith in its true, significance."[31] All of the modern Christologies are one in arriving at the divine nature only through the investigation of the human. This is their virtue, that they relate the Christian faith firmly to human nature, but this is also their weakness, that in these Christologies the human tends to become the sole measure of the divine.

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[30] _ibid_. p. 465f.

[31] _ibid_.

One cannot remain, Martensen argues, either with the Christology of Schleiermacher or with that of Hegel. Neither has overcome the one-sidedness of rationalism, nor the insistence upon the autonomy of the human self-consciousness which, so long as it is maintained, is irreconcilable with Christian revelation. Yet there is no sound Christology which will not contain relative views as moments or elements within itself. Thus even the abstract, left-wing Hegelian Christology of D.F. Strauss is significant. Strauss is valuable not only because he said fully and clearly what others had only half said. He also laid a basis in principle for the widespread secular attack upon orthodoxy which had already appeared. Strauss, says Martensen, will have a purifying influence in theology, especially since he gives a mortal wound to "a certain kind of theological empiricism" [that of Schleiermacher and his school?] and has forced the theologians to deal with basic issues.[32]

Martensen now argues, and suggests that he believes Mynster will agree with him, that the major alternative world-views which offer themselves to the present age are pantheism and theism, or what Martensen calls "the system of personality". Yet can pantheism and theism be set apart with an exclusive "Either-Or"? Is it not rather the task of the age to set aside Jacobi's "Either-Or" of which Mynster is so fond? Neither Jacobi nor Mynster has found any solution for this dichotomy. Yet the whole of modern theology finds the older distinctions, rationalism-supernaturalism, etc., outmoded: Schleiermacher, Daub, Baader, Marheinecke, the younger Fichte. And there will be no contemporary theology which does not pass through Hegel. Martensen recalls that twenty years earlier Baader, though he made no effort to mediate his own view with that of Hegel, had said that everyone thereafter would have to pass through the dialectical fire of Hegel in order to be "saved" (salig). More and more has this confirmed itself, for this fire continues to burn, and day by day it becomes more difficult to avoid it. More and more, too, is another claim of Baader justified: that Hegel's dialectical fire was appointed by destiny as the purge which was to burn away the unspeculative systems of the day.

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[32] *ibid*. p. 467.

What is epoch-making in the efforts of the science of religion since Hegel, Martensen claims, is that they are speculative-dialectical. One cannot finally maintain that there is no "Either-Or," but this speculative-dialectical effort would neither be possible nor plausible if it were true that there exist objective and universal contradictories which cannot be reconciled. Certainly all contradictions are not overcome from the same human viewpoint, nor in any single human ego, but there is a single, universal, thinking ego, and all of the contradictions of life and knowledge are posited in the same, the self-same, thinking act: "It is therefore the self-same ego which is supernaturalistic and rationalistic, and reflects itself in these and in all other contradictions. But as thought is the identical, flowing copula in all contradictions, they cannot be firm and incapable of being overcome."[33]

At the basis of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, which is a study of the dialectical relationship among the forms of human consciousness, Martensen finds the speculative richness of the self-consciousness, continuous with itself and capable of investigating and understanding its own content. In theology this thought of continuity, of the continuity of the self-consciousness in all its forms, and the idea of their absolute penetrability for each other must be freed from one-sided pantheism or from auto-theism, but this insight cannot any longer be excluded from the way men will think in theology. The basic insight of the Hegelian philosophy is the unity of the subjective and the objective, of thought and object, the unity of thought with being. And, says Martensen, it is just this identity of subject and object, self-consciousness and revelation, which is the presupposition of all speculative theology. It is not a pantheistic thought, but a genuine Christian thought, that God would not be Spirit unless He who is the object of our knowledge were also the true knowledge within us. That is to say, as we have seen Martensen argue in De Autonomia and in Mester Eckart, that when we know God truly, it is God who knows himself within us. Here lies, says Martensen, the delusion of the Kantian limitation of reason to its human limits. The purely human reason of Kantian theology is a ratio sibi relicta, a reason left to itself. But with the recognition that knowledge of God is God knowing himself in man, there is laid ground for a new ontological proof, and for the overcoming of the Kantian limitations upon the human reason. Supernaturalist theology, like Kantian rationalism, has given to reason only a formal use. Reason remains outside its object without assimilating it in any way. But the "way out" offered by many supernaturalists and rationalists, that revelation is "above reason" (Locke, Leibniz), is not satisfactory either. Here the human self-consciousness and the revelation meet, as it were, on neutral ground, but they remain quite outside each other. There is no reconciliation: "So that which is exclusively above reason without being for reason - and for thought nothing can be which does not lie within it - becomes reduced in a theoretical respect to an indifferent "X" which at the most can be given a practical significance."[34] This is precisely what has happened in supernaturalism, entirely in analogy with Kantianism. The metaphysical side of the Christian dogma has been made into a thing-in-itself, and theology treats only the anthropological and practical. What Jacobi, for example, has said, that reason stands in the same relation to revelation as the eyes to the light, manifests this error. For Martensen, as we have seen already, the eye which sees is itself the light.[35]

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[33] ibid. p. 470.

What speculative theology seeks, then, is a knowledge of God in the power of the divine thought itself. It is precisely, Martensen argues, when the immanence of the divine thought in the human is taken into account that rationalism is overcome. To call the Hegelian viewpoint rationalism is mistaken. Were one to speak of a true rationalism, in contrast to the rationalistic subjectivity-systems, one would see that it would have to get an adequate foundation in a human reason which contained the seeds of revelation within itself. Only here does the notion of truth get adequate treatment:

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[34] *ibid*. p. 471.

[35] cf. H. Martensen, *Den menneskelige Selvbevistheds Autonomie*, p. 14, and F. Baader, *Ueber die Vernünftigkeit der drei Fundamentaldoctrinen des Christenthums*, p. 29, cited in Martensen, *loc. cit*.

> Immanence which is thought through is transcendence, because the divine thought, which is the immanent principle in the human, cannot be non-personal (subjectløs) or unspiritual (aandløs). Man's knowledge thus can, as Baader especially has enjoined, only be characterized as drawn into a higher knowledge, his vision into a higher vision, as the region in which all thought moves, just as also the object and the content of human knowledge exist only in knowledge.[36]

Since it is not an impersonal "divine" which is thought, but rather the immanence (Inexistents) or the real presence of divine knowledge in human thought, both rationalism and supernaturalism in religious knowledge are overcome. Such a view would be mystical, says Martensen, if this identity were conceived as immediate, if it deprived itself of all continuity and mediation with the whole realm of objective consciousness or if it cut itself off from positive, factual revelation. But such is not the case. With respect to the problem of the relation between reason and history:

> If the theologian would not be without results he can by no means operate without presuppositions, as little *ab exteriori* as *ab interiori*. Certainly with respect to historical revelation, where the opposition between rationalism and super-

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[36] *ibid*. p. 473.

> naturalism appears as the contradiction between fact and idea it cannot be asserted "either idea or fact". Here too thought will mediate, and will find no rest until it discovers the invisible copula which binds together fact and idea.[37]

Mynster, on reading this essay, must have been left wondering, as must many of Martensen's readers, how, exactly, Martensen expected to make his own position distinct from Hegel's tendencies toward "pantheism" or "auto-theism". If it had seemed clear in the writings from the period 1834-1838 that Martensen would attack Hegel upon the groun that to begin philosophy with radical doubt was immoral, that a presuppositionless system was Faustian in its results, the approach to Hegel here does not manifest this. Rather, in the conversation with Heiberg which we have studied, Martensen has moved in the direction of Hegel's "auto-theism". Though he insists upon improving the "System" it has become far less clear in his discussion with Mynster what must be done to confirm the Hegelian philosophy in the Christian faith. Martensen's demand for theology would now seem to require a reconciliation of Baader's fideist epistemology with the purely immanental Hegelian dialectic. On the one hand, we are told that the theologian cannot operate without Christian presuppositions. On the other, we are to seek a continuity of human consciousness with the whole of reality such as that which Hegel had grounded in the Phenomenology of Mind. As so often in Martensen's work, it is never made clear how this is to be done. We have to look elsewhere for clues about the basic character of Martensen's position in the period under discussion.[38]

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[37] ibid.

2. The New Ethic: Outline of a System of Moral Philosophy

> The recognition of the relative autonomy and independence of the ethical from religion arose in Protestantism and manifests itself in practice today in the emancipation of the State from the Church. Philosophy (Videnskab) makes this recognition more or less clearly a basis for cutting off the moral as independent from dogmatics....The autonomy of the moral culminated in Kant and Fichte, who claimed that moral concepts had unconditional validity in themselves and demanded that they should be presented in their own pure light and not in the tinted light of religion. Now if it is on the other hand the interest of theology that religion be acknowledged as the ground and principle of the ethical, this central significance of religion can only be recognized philosophically if the relative secular forms of the ethical are developed with philosophical necessity into a religious ethic (Sædelighed) as their highest truth, just as it must be shown conversely how this must seek its full actuality in the finite secular life (Verdensliv). The System progresses through this dialectical reciprocity of the religious moments of the ethical with its secular moments; and to the same extent as the presentation has philosophical universality will it develop its theological individuality.[39]

Martensen's next major appearance in print bears on its surface the impression which Mynster took from a conversation with Martensen concerning the dispute over mediation, that Martensen was not nearly so ardent an Hegelian as Heiberg. But at the heart of the work there is the same indecision between points of view which are only apparently reconciled.

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[38] Arildsen relates that Martensen pursued his discussion with Mynster beyond the present article and that Mynster came away from a personal conversation with the conclusion that "Martensen was not nearly so ardent an Hegelian as was Heiberg." Cf. Nogle Blade af J.P. Mynster's Liv og Tid, p. 404, cited in Arildsen, H.L. Martensen, p. 149.

[39] H. Martensen, Grundrids til en Moralphilosophiens System (Kbh: C.A. Reitzel, 1841), p. xiiif.

On the one hand, Martensen insists that there can be no a priori philosophy. Philosophy must begin with the given, and in ethics this is the existing ethical reality, in Denmark an ethic determined in its character by the Christian tradition.[40] On the other hand the theological dogma of Providence is interpreted as equivalent to the Hegelian "absolute" as unity of inner and outer, subjective and objective in a self-consciousness which is in complete harmony with its "object".[41] Even a cursory criticism shows that these points of view are capable of being reconciled only if there is no "given," nothing historically "positive" which remains impervious to the incessant negation of the dialectic. Anything short of "knowledge," the genuine unity of subject and object, would at best be provisional. From this follows Hegel's treatment of intuition and faith as superceded by knowledge. It will be important to see how Martensen treats the questions of positivity and faith in his outline for a moral philosophy.

Regrettably, no new light is shed on the perplexing question of faith. The introduction to the work concludes with the observation that on its religious points ethics comes into internal connection with religion. Yet in order that the domains of dogmatics and ethics not be "unduly" blended, the meaning of dogma has to be limited to its significance ad extra, to its relation to the sphere of practice.

> In the moral sphere dogma must be recognized in its deeds, in its being-for-other, rather than in its metaphysical

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[40] ibid. p. xi.

[41] ibid. p. 5.

> being-in-itself. The highest metaphysical archetypal truth (Grundsandhed) which supports the ethical system cannot therefore be justified in the domain of ethics, though it does supply an indirect proof for its validity.

As if anticipating the criticism suggested above, Martensen concludes his introduction: "This is the essential thing which I intended should be presumed in order to meet the most obvious objections."[42] The justification of metaphysics as such is outside the domain of ethical theory. Hence Martensen intends to skirt the question of how the positive claims of dogmatics can be shown to be archetypal metaphysical truths. The relation of faith and knowledge to such claims can, then, also be ignored in ethical theory. We are thrown back upon Martensen's earlier work for a solution of the problem, and we have seen that there is no solution there. Martensen promises a more ambitious treatise directed toward the theological elements in morality, but for the present, he hopes that this work, intended primarily for his university students in philosophy, will be useful to the theologians in his audience.[43]

Though we look in vain for any fundamental examination of the problems of positivity and faith in the Grundrids, the indications are clear that neither positivity nor the dialectic will be abandoned. As earlier, Hegel is made the basis for a new departure, now in moral philosophy. It is only a superficial criticism of current philosophy, Martensen claims, to say that it makes everything into metaphysics, is so sunk into "the labyrinth of theoretical thought" that it has lost all practical moral interest. Actually, an adequate philosophical ethics is only possible since the thorough reformation of metaphysics accomplished in the philosophy of Hegel.

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[42] ibid. p. xiv.

[43] ibid. p. iii.

> Nothing could be more groundless than to argue that a metaphysic which makes it its highest task to penetrate the living actuality and which characterises the true actuality as the unity of the theoretical and practical Idea should relate itself indifferently to ethics, or lack practical impulses. If Hegel's ethical enthusiasm is less apparent than Kant's or Fichte's it is not for that reason less fundamental.

Though Hegel produced no systematic ethic, and the Philosophy of Right, which many assume to take the place of an ethic in his system, cannot serve that purpose:

> It contains a classical development of the relative stages of the ethical, but it does not exhibit the ethical in its absolute significance. The ethical consciousness has its goal (Formaal) in the absolute; it is in its essence just as ideal and infinite as the aesthetic, the speculative and the religious consciousness, and hence has the same right as these to be referred to the realm of the absolute idea, though it is true that unlike these it does not have its home exclusively in the absolute, but lives just as much in empirical finitude.[44]

The ethical is not concluded in the concept of the State. Even Hegel's own works show this, Martensen argues. Any who studies the philosophy of religion and the aesthetics of Hegel will convince himself that Hegel knew a higher form of the ethical than that which finds its sole end in the State. These works contain "the clearest suggestions of a higher ethical comprehension" (Erkjendelse) and the aesthetics specifically contain a "significant contribution to the comprehension of the purely ideal significance of the ethical personality."[45]

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[44] ibid. pp. v, vi.

That Hegel has developed no systematic ethic is merely due to the fact that it was his task to displace the one-sided subjectivity-system of Kant, with its associated contentless morality. This was possible only through the theoretical comprehension of the objective, of the historically conditioned forms of state, religion, science (Videnskab) and art. Hegel necessarily placed the emphasis upon the thesis "the actual is the rational" and gave less attention to its complement, that we have to produce the rational actuality.

> Necessarily, he had to give a stronger emphasis to the moment of substantiality than to that of individuality and personality, for the empty, formal personality has first to be annihilated before it can be posited truly.[46]

But now that the Hegelian philosophy has accomplished this disintegration of the formal personality and has shown its development through the relative, objective forms the new ethic can be written.

It is clear from what has been presented that Martensen's sketch of the new ethic will not be a carbon of the Hegelian philosophy of right. Yet the influence of Hegel is admitted at a point which shows a closer connection with the dialectical center of Hegel's philosophy than we have yet seen in Martensen. This is to be found in the discussion of the rôle of conscience (Samvittighed) in an analysis of the ethical. The new development shows up in contrast to the lengthy analysis of conscience which we have studied in the Faust-essay and De Autonomia. The definition of conscience given in *De Autonomia* should be reiterated:

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[45] ibid. p. vii.

[46] ibid. p. vii.

> ...it is a universal and religious concept which with immediate clarity and certainty defines man's absolute condition, his place in the entire universe, his position in relation to God, and illumines his entire situation in life. This innermost recess of the soul is far from being an obscure feeling, but is clear knowledge, and is not merely human but equally human and divine. The human spirit does not here move in the world of thing and thought, all of which stands below it, since it is itself the subject of all those things and ideas which lack subject in themselves.[47]

Against this background the novelty of the discussion of conscience in the new ethic emerges:

> Man's immediate *certainty* of the good, of duty and right, as the absolute reality for the will, is conscience (*Samvittigheden*). Conscience is not merely the individual's subjective conviction (*Samviden med sig selv*) about the good; it is also the individual's common conviction with the ethical consciousness of the community and his common conviction with God in religion (*den er tillige dets Samviden med den sædelige Samfundsbevisthed og dets Samviden med Gud in Religionen*). Only the complete unity of these moments is the true conscience or the concept of the true conscience.[48]

It is difficult to see how a conscience which is only ratified by the agreement of self, ethical community, and God is to be equated with the "positive" conscience of the Faust-essay and the dissertation. Here the dialectic would seem to have the upper hand. Only the process of the dialectic toward the always proleptic agreement of self, ethical community, and God can justify the conscience as "true". And yet truth is precisely the interest of philosophical ethics. By contrast speculative theology is said to possess a fundamental truth of conscience, the creaturehood of man, if we follow the claims of the Faust-essay and the dissertation. The new ethic in no wise shows how these views can be reconciled. Instead it makes all the more evident the gap which continued to open in Martensen's thought between a dialectically oriented speculative theology and a positivistic theology in which the dialectic was merely a formal arrangement of material.

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[47] *De Autonomia Conscientiae Humanae*..., p. 11; cf. Ch. IV, p. 86f., *supra*.

[48] *Grundlinien til en Moralphilosophiens System*, p. 32; the translation of *Samviden* as "common conviction" rather than the more literal "co-knowledge" seems called for in this passage by the peculiar expression *Samviden med sig selv*, uncommon in the Danish language.

The quarrel between these claims is clear in the modifications of Hegel's analysis of the ethical which are required in Martensen's outlines for the new ethic. Martensen's dialectic reaches its point of rest in the invisible Church as a holy community, a believing community.

> The personal unity of God and man, which is revealed in Christ, is unfolded in the community of believers. (Troendes Samfund) From the second Adam as the birthplace of the holy will in history the kingdom of God spreads out. Its primary aim is not the culture of the human race, its development and enlightenment, but its salvation and blessedness. In that the race is reborn as God's congregation (Menighed), as the Lord's mystical body, it is not only raised to a higher level of comprehension, but to a higher level of existence and life....The Lord's congregation is the holy of holies of creation, the point where the development of the world nears its conclusion, since life is first found here in its fullness.[49]

For Hegel no community of believers could be the resting point of the dialectic, in which the unfolding of the dialectic might reach its conclusion. On the contrary, only as knowledge as such, "absolute knowledge," could the dialectic reach a conclusion. The Christian revelation was at best a presentiment of such knowledge, more satisfactory than the intimations provided by religion as art, but still obscure and fanatical if it claimed for itself the capacity to bring unity to mankind. From Hegel's perspective Martensen's identification of the community of believers with the conclusion of the dialectic rings as false as Heiberg's effort to equate speculative poetry with philosophical knowledge. Both are poor shortcuts to knowledge, the one subject to all the errors of enthusiasm and fantasy, the other to the extremes of fanaticism.

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[49] ibid. p. 103.

But more significant than the disagreement of Martensen's new ethic with the actual views of Hegel is the gap now wide open in Martensen's own theological position. The conclusion of the dialectic in the community of believers only exacerbates questions about the real place of the immanental dialectic in Martensen's thought. If the dialectic is to be a genuine development of the secular forms of the ethical "with philosophical necessity into a religious ethic as their highest truth" from what is the philosophical necessity of the analysis derived? If, as Hegel thought, culture is merely the self alienated from itself and knowledge is the self's discovery of itself in its environing world, then it can make sense to find a certain "philosophical necessity" in the development of the secular forms of the ethical. This is what Hegel purports to do in the Phenomenology of Mind. But what if culture is only incidentally the product of historical selves, really the product of a God whose intention in the world is capable of being ascertained only by a willed affirmation which is never made good in knowledge, an affirmation called faith? Then what has faith to do with dialectic? We have seen

Martensen try to mitigate this problem by insisting that religion be demonstrated to be the highest form of the ethical. But he has left it entirely unclear how the demonstration is to be accomplished. In fact it would seem that by his modification of Hegel's dialectic he has made the demonstration impossible. Yet the "Hegelian" tone of the outline for a new ethical philosophy is more marked than any work of Martensen's since the Kolthoff essay in 1834. Martensen lets it appear that Hegel's philosophy is the "beginning point" for this "new departure," though it becomes increasingly difficult to see how this could be the case. Our response to the attempt at a new ethic might be like Mynster's response to the conversations following the dispute over the principle of excluded middle. Perhaps Martensen is not an ardent Hegelian, but our perplexity is only increased. What is this viewpoint which uses Hegelian language and purports to build upon a Hegel a theological and ethical structure which, abandoning Hegel, seems entirely to lack a foundation?

3. Aesthetic Theology: The Comic as a Theological Category

> When the romantic consciousness loses itself in *contemplative joy* over the essential victory of the ideal, or what amounts to the same thing, over the essential reconciliation of the eternal with time, there appears the *humoristic* world view which *anticipates* the goal toward which the whole of life strives, as already reached. What romantic longing has only in hope, humoristic joy takes as already present....The humoristic is the essential background (*inderste Baggrund*) in every Christian account of the world.[50]

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[50] *ibid*. p. 60.

"The humoristic is the essential background in every Christian account of the world." Martensen's estimate of comedy as a higher form of art than tragedy, which we have met in the review of Heiberg's "Fata Morgana," is confirmed both in Grundrids til en Moralphilosophiens System and in a review of Heiberg's Nye Digte published in Fædrelandet beginning January 10, 1841. There can be no question, after examining both the outline for the new ethic, and the review of Heiberg's "New Poems" that this estimate of comedy represents Martensen's own position and not merely an effort to interpret and publicize the views of Heiberg. In fact, both the Grundrids and the Nye Digte review take a precarious step beyond the position of the "Fata Morgana" review.

We have seen that in reviewing "Fata Morgana" Martensen compared the new genre of "fantasy" offered by Heiberg to mythology. The value of Heiberg's fantasy was that he succeeded in showing that man has no choice but to live in a world of appearance, whether this appearance be false or true. Heiberg's fantasy plays upon the contrast between the essential background of the phenomenal world and its appearance in distorted finite forms. As for the content of the fantasy, it is no more required that its content have eternal validity than that the myths of the Greek or Norse world should forever remain true as such.

Now, in the outline for the new ethic we are told that the humoristic is the essential background of every Christian account of the world. Christianity too rests upon the essence-phenomenon contrast. Christian humor is contrasted both with the irony of the Hellenistic period over the simple optimism of antiquity and the pessimism of Judaism expressed in Ecclesiastes' judgment that all is vanity:

> Christian humor is neither irony nor melancholy (Hypochondrie), but genuine speculative optimism, because it contains the whole reflective sphere (Livets hele Reflexionen) as conquered, and through the experience of illusion's Fata Morgana, through pain in the whole spiritual and natural suffering (Nød) of existence, has secured itself in the unshakeable joy that the absolute good is the substance of this world.[51]

In fact, no distinction need be made between this humoristic world view and speculation itself:

> The humoristic is as immediate practical life-view the same as speculation as a conceptualizing (begribende) theory. Speculation views the movement of the world in the repose of eternity and possesses in thought as present everything which is still to come in experience.[52]

Though Martensen argues that this is only the essential side of speculation, that it must also require that the finite be actually reconciled with the ideal, the "equation" which has now been set up in effect reads: 1) the humoristic world view is central for the Christian faith; 2) the humoristic world view and speculation are equivalent. It only remains to complete the syllogism: 3) speculation is central for the Christian faith, or to paraphrase Martensen's words: 'Speculation is the essential background of every Christian account of the world.'

Lest this seem a forced construction, the explicit metaphysical foundation for such a claim, in Grundrids and the Nye Digte review, should be examined. We have already seen Martensen's disclaimer to any effort to relate metaphysics and dogmatics in Grundrids, but he does give some clues to his metaphysical position, especially in his discussion of the Fichtean view that history is only capable of being conceived paradoxically as a teleological development which has its telos outside itself. The movement of history is driven by a dialectic which requires new negative moments at every point. Martensen admits that a "certain division" of Hegel's school agrees with this view of a history which forever destroys what it has built, which "purchases its existence with this contradiction".

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[51] ibid. p. 61.

[52] ibid. p. 62.

> This view of world history as a restless becoming, where fulfillment is only something to come, but never present in its actuality, rests, like Fichte's restless activity, upon a presupposed insoluble dualism of the infinite and the finite, a covert Manicheeism. The infinite only demands unity with the finite, without being able to satisfy this demand. But the fear that with the achievement of the goal life and movement would stand still and transform themselves to a dead result is pointless. We are to think not only of a life of fighting and striving, of suffering and dying, but also of a life eternally reborn and rejuvenated in an inner harmonic fullness (Fylde).

Martensen clearly affirms the view which is the metaphysical background of Heiberg's aesthetics, that the dialectic of the historical process is the development of a particular essence, in phenomenal manifestation. Although he nowhere modifies the actual outline of the Hegelian dialectic, as we have seen Heiberg do, both his interpretation of Hegel and, as we now see, his interpretation of the Christian faith, find their basis in what we may see as Heiberg's interpretation of Hegel.

The influence of this aspect of Heiberg's view of Hegelian "speculation" reaches its acme, and is nowhere more clear, than in the review of one of Heiberg's Nye Digte, "En Sjael efter Døden" (A Soul after Death).

With this poem Heiberg produced the "apocalyptic comedy" foreseen by Martensen in his earlier reviews of Lenau and Heiberg. The poem is called the spirit of the age made manifest. What philosophy has whispered poetry now preaches from the housetops.[53]

> It is the spirit of the new age which has inspired the composition of these poems ["En Sjæl efter Døden," "De Nygifte," "Gudstjeneste," and "Protestantismen i Naturen"]. It is this spirit with its enlivening view of existence which has here arrived at a poetic breakthrough and holds judgment-day over its detractors.[54]

Martensen's statement about judgment-day might be taken literally, since "En Sjæl efter Døden" sends to a poetic hell a resident of Copenhagen who lacks the view of history shared by Heiberg and Martensen. The "Soul" in Heiberg's poem is an unspeculative, bourgeoise citizen whose simple life of family and civic virtue will, the pastor assures him, find him a place in heaven. But when the "Soul" arrives at St. Peter's gate and wishes to begin eternity there, it is referred back to finite life and told that eternity begins there. St. Peter points to the hills of Palestine and recommends the imitation of Christ. But the gaze of the soul turns toward America instead. The "Soul" is told that there are other places in "eternity" than the actual heaven of the Christian life in God. So the "Soul" presents itself at the gates of the phenomenal eternity, the pagan image-world of art and nature:

The phenomenal eternity is appearance, the heavenly Maya

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[53] H. L. Martensen, "Nye Digte af J.L. Heiberg," Fædrelandet, No. 398 (Sunday, Jan. 10, 1841), p. 3205.

[54] ibid.

> which swings dialectically between temporality and actual eternity. Many who cannot enter St. Peter's gate sit at table with the Greeks, and insofar as they demand nothing more they are satisfied. All this exists too in the actual heaven, but only as the hangings on the wall, so to speak.[55]

But in the pagan eternity it suffers the same experience as before St. Peter. This heaven too must be entered in time. Aristophanes directs the "Soul" to Hellas, though in Copenhagen and in the life of the gods of the north the soul can find the same phenomenal eternity. But the soul is too "cultured" to take any idealistic or phenomenalistic view of Copenhagen. It knows only the "real" Copenhagen where it reads its newspaper and stuffs itself. Its view of antiquity is geographical and historical, in no sense illusionistic.

The soul wanders away from the pagan eternity and finds itself in a region where, as it had hoped, eternity begins after death. In fact in that realm eternity has nothing but a beginning, since time is split into moments lacking connection. Here the soul, in a region which is at once hell and the Copenhagen of the "Soul's" desire, it settles. And everything is as before. The "realistic" soul is happy in hell as it had been in Copenhagen, and finds no difference between them.[56]

Martensen is quick to point out that the "Soul" of Heiberg's poem does not go to "hell" as a sinner. Rather, it is the triviality of its life and its view of the world which determines its fate. This soul and its deeds belonged already to the "trivial" (det Slette), to the Hegelian

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[55] ibid., No. 399 (Monday, Jan. 11, 1841), p. 3216.

[56] ibid. p. 3217.

"bad" infinite, while living. No change is made at death. "Bad" and "trivial" are the same, though Martensen takes the former to refer more readily to essence and the latter to phenomenon. In fact, "En Sjæl efter Døden" may be seen as a study in "the metaphysics of the trivial," an analysis of the category of the "bad" as the background of the phenomenon of triviality.

In Martensen's depiction of the "bad" as a category, the opponents of the speculative philosophy of history come more directly into view. The "bad" is shown to be a more immediate and lower category than evil. The evil is the spiritual antithesis of the good, but the bad is a spiritual null point, no spiritual opposition to the good, but lack of interest and indifference with respect to spirit. It is only when Martensen relates these claims to speculative philosophy that we can begin to see what he means. "Spirit" refers to the unity of finite and infinite. In a spiritless attitude these fall outside each other. "The trivial can therefore be characterized as the absolutely undialectical, the tautological, that which is only itself, but which has lost transition to its other." By contrast, "True science and poetry, like faith, see all objects doubled, see them at once in the form of eternity and time."[57] The "bad" lacks any copula between finite and infinite, supernatural and natural, thought and experience, _a priori_ and _a posteriori_. Such an attitude has manifested itself both in religion and in art. In religion it leads to the representation of mystery as "an incomprehensible tautology" or "a tautological incomprehensibility". In art it demands that the ideal must imitate the actual to the last hair. In philosophy it manifests itself as a demand for nothing but clear and univocal concepts. In such religion, art and philosophy one finds himself standing before an undialectical prime matter, an impenetrable material, a point where both thought and feeling come to a standstill.

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[57] _ibid_., No. 398, p. 3208.

The metaphysical importance of Heiberg's handling of the "trivial" in "En Sjæl efter Døden" is best seen, Martensen thinks, by contrasting this "apocalyptic comedy" with Dante's Divine Comedy. Dante does differentiate between bad and evil, but his hell is depicted with attention to evil. The bad or indifferent in Dante's hell are seen partly with indignation, sometimes seen as merely unfortunate. Dante's failure to find a distinctive way of treating them rests on his sole use of religious and moral categories in his work. Hence the tone of Dante's hell is high tragedy. The Catholic inferno expresses the contrast between the highest forms of the actual (good and evil), but it lacks a pure concept of spirit. "For as the tragic belongs to the ethical contrast between good and evil, the comic belongs to the metaphysical contrast between the empirical existence of the spirit and its essence, between appearance and essence."[58] There is no place for the comic in the Catholic inferno, but a Protestant apocalypse must find a place for it. In accord with its own philosophical nature Protestantism is unable to rest with the concrete, actual forms of the spirit, but must display the pure, metaphysical freedom of the spirit. The aesthetic expression of this freedom is the comic.

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[58] ibid. p. 3210.

Admittedly, says Martensen, Heiberg has not written a complete "divine comedy" from a Protestant perspective, since such would have to deal with evil. But Dante's work is in the fullest sense neither a comedy nor divine. A paradise which lacks Christian humor has a tautological character. The blessed eternity of Dante is abstract, since it fails to contain all of the moments of the finite. Man cannot be genuinely blessed in its paradise, since he cannot take the world in its finitude into heaven. It is just with the humorous that this becomes possible. Now the limited, the trivial even, can become an aspect of the actual heaven, since it can become a part of the poetic play of the humoristic world-view. Man's only hope that he can retain much which he would otherwise have to resign in another world is based upon the validity of the comic as a category in heaven as on earth.

In thinking about the concept of immortality, theologians have done little more than bring forth abstract concepts, and they will do no more unless, as in apocalyptic comedy, they are willing to mediate their theological categories with aesthetic ones. "The paradise drawn by most theologians and by most poets, where one only sings tautological songs to the honor of God, is so contentless because the blessed spirits can find only God there, but not the world...."[59] It is Christian doctrine that this world will pass away, but, argues Martensen, this does not prevent us from giving it a phenomenal eternity. Rather, as surely as the comic is real, the world is phenomenally eternal. It lies just in the concept of the comic that this world is changed into an appearance with the advent of the next, and that it is also maintained as such. If this is true, the tragic has significance only so long as this world remains. On the other hand, the comic survives the passing of the world and takes its stand "not in actuality nor in abstract remembrance, but in appearance (_Skin_)". In this sense, Swedenborg is right in saying that we will again see London and Paris in heaven.

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[59] Ibid. p. 3211.

Martensen claims that the fundamental question at issue in this discussion, a discussion which might seem to be exclusively aesthetic, is a theological question. If, like Dante, the poet accepts eternal damnation in its old, strong sense, then the tragic will finally win out over the comic. On the other hand "if one adopts the viewpoint of the recent theological metaphysic on the _apokatastasis_ of all things, then the comic will win out over the tragic, like the simplest comedy on the stage."[60] Everything will come to a good end, as required also in the recent aesthetic, and the comic will have a higher dignity than the tragic:

> Or better said, the dialectic between the comic and the tragic will come to rest in the humoristic, the not merely negative, but positive comic, which relates itself to irony as does profundity to cleverness. The humoristic, which exclusively belongs to Christianity, contains the whole of irony, poetic justice over the fallen world, but at the same time the fullness of love and reconciliation. It contains the whole of the world's pain overcome in a kingdom's depth of joy. Precisely because the humoristic

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[60] _ibid_. p. 3212.

> viewpoint sees the whole world not simply through a moral medium, but also through a metaphysical one, it sees all opposed positions as dialectical..."[61]

In a divine comedy which has the humoristic principle in it, God will not be solely righteous judge but also absolute spirit, viewing man not merely through ethical categories but also through metaphysical categories. The comic will be as important a category for God as the ethical. From such a metaphysical perspective God will see the same principle of sinfulness (Syndighed) in the good and pious as in the evil, the same stamp of finitude upon the great and the insignificant. And God will finally give grace to all, since they are "not merely sinful, but finite, not merely evil, but bad, not only damnable but laughable, not only fallen but belong to a fallen world."[62]

Martensen concludes his analysis of "En Sjæl efter Døden" with the opinion that however one judges this "inexhaustible" question in aesthetics or theology he should admit that the comic should have a major role in a Protestant apocalypse. Heiberg's apocalypse seems to contain a deeper aesthetic principle than many may find at first glance.

We now have enough before us to make a judgment on Martensen's own views in relation to his representation of Heiberg's position in the Nye Digte review. "Speculation is the essential background of every Christian account of the world." It would seem that this construction is not unfair to Martensen's position early in 1841 when the outlines of moral philosophy and the review of Heiberg's "New Poems" appeared. For an understanding of the meaning of "speculation" in this context we have no choice but to refer back to the dialogue about presuppositions which passed between Heiberg and Martensen in the years 1837-41. And it is the examination of this dialogue which has been the work of this and the preceding chapters. Martensen has made no headway in meeting the problem of the relation between positivity and the dialectic. For the sake of the comic vision, and impressed by evident congruence between "the recent theological metaphysic" with its view on the restoration of all things (Schleiermacher) and "the recent aesthetic" (Heiberg) Martensen affirms the "Hegelian" dialectic as modified in Heiberg's logic. But it is precisely this affirmation which continues to run afoul of the notion of the positivity of the Christian religion. Contrary to Hegel, dialectic is made to serve the explication of a viewpoint intuited in faith. But the task of indicating how dialectical analysis and faith are related fundamentally has not been taken up by Martensen. In fact, the review of "New Poems" sidesteps the problem in favor of dwelling upon the importance for Christian theology of the notion of the metaphysical contrast between the essential background of history and its phenomenal manifestation. It does not help us to be told that both philosophy and faith see double, see both finite and infinite in every concrete object of analysis. The problem which Martensen's work exhibits always more sharply in the period 1837-41 is that of the _relation_ between faith and philosophical analysis. The _Nye Digte_ review and the _Grundrids til en Moralphilosophiens System_ serve only to make the problem more evident.

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[61] ibid.

[62] ibid.

It might be objected that we are asking too much of Martensen in demanding that he answer the questions we have posed, since most of the works we have studied from the years 1839-41 were Leilighedsskrifter, occasional writings called forth by the work of others. There is a measure of justification for such a criticism, since the reviews of Heiberg and the response to Mynster's attack upon mediation were such occasional writings. Yet we have seen that Martensen's position shifted substantially between the publication of De Autonomia and Grundrids. No explicit recognition of the shift is offered in Martensen's writings, and no account is given of the new problems which the shift occasions. We are in a position to require from Martensen some analysis of the fundamental problems which his blending of theology, metaphysics and aesthetics raises. This analysis was bypassed in the Grundrids, as we have seen, with the promise to supply the theological foundations at a later time. We are right in expecting such an account from Martensen and in requiring that it should deal with the questions about the relation between metaphysics and theology so often apparent in the works of the period 1837-41.

CHAPTER EIGHT: POSITIVITY AND SPECULATION

1. The Problem of Positivity Reopened

> The humoristic [Speculation] is the essential background of every Christian account of the world. (January, 1841)
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> If we cast our view back over the period when the Lord himself was on earth we find that the faith of the disciples in him did not arise in their own hearts, did not proceed from a rational consideration of his teaching, which they as is known did not comprehend, but from the divine-human power of the personality through which Christ made them his own and prepared them as his instruments. It was the authority of the only-begotten which assured for them the truth of his teaching, and their confidence in Christ, their assurance that nothing could tear them from his hand, did not arise from the relation which they, weak and without authority, had taken to Christ, but from the relation which he, personal grace and truth, took to them....The faith of the disciples was therefore in the deepest and purest sense of the word a faith in authority, since Christ himself was the founder of it. (May, 1843)[1]

As we have seen in the previous chapters, the context of the first quotation above is Martensen's cursory discussion of the essential metaphysical background of the Christian faith. We have only been able to give substance to Martensen's scattered comments by examining the relation between his own thought and that of J.L. Heiberg, but there is sufficient reason to believe that the sketch of Martensen's thinking which we have been able to draw is accurate, even if lacking in detail. If we now look at the second quotation, with its central emphasis upon the felt but incomprehensible authority of Christ, the relation between the metaphysical speculation of the first and the faith in authority of the second is at best puzzling. It will be the task of this chapter to make the puzzle more explicit and to set forth and evaluate Martensen's efforts to deal with this puzzle in his mature theological system, Den christelige Dogmatik (1849).

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[1] Den christelige Daab, betragtet med Hensyn paa det baptistiske Spørgsmaal, af Dr. H. Martensen (Kbh. C.A. Reitzel, 1843), pp. 10-11.

In some respects the difficulty of giving an adequate account of the development of Martensen's thought between 1841 and 1849 matches the difficulty of accounting for his early development, in the school and university years. The autobiography is both sketchy and simplistic regarding these years. From the perspective of the 1880's Martensen discounts the notion that there were any significant changes in his theological position after the publication of the dissertation in 1836. The writings of the years 1841-49 are few, and these too are chiefly occasional writings, comprising attacks upon Straussianism and the rising Baptist movement in Denmark, a theological study of baptism, aimed at the "Baptist question," a study of the Church year as witness to the contrast between nature and revelation, and a reply to a critical attack upon the Baptism essay, four works in all.[2] Some light is shed upon the development of Martensen's thought in these years by the correspondence between Martensen and the Kiel theologian, I.A. Dorner. Though the correspondence is more extensive after 1849, there are letters from the years

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[2] "Nutidens Religiøse Crisis," Intelligensblade Nr. 3 (April 15, 1842), pp. 53-73; Den christelige Daab; "Kirke-Aaret," Urania, Aarbog for 1844 (Kbh. H.L. Bing og Søns), pp. 161-188; "Litterairt Uvæsen," Berlingske Tidende, Nr. 115 (April 29, 1844).

1841-49 which are illuminating.[3] A single letter from Martensen to pastor L. Gude, concerning the publication of the Christian Dogmatics in 1849 completes the survey of relevant first-hand materials. There are few estimates of Martensen's work in this period from his contemporaries, but these will be cited when pertinent. The extent to which the pseudonymous writings of Kierkegaard bear on this question is itself a problem to which the present study can make a contribution. But this can only be done by first constructing an independent characterization of Martensen's development against which the Kierkegaardian polemics can be measured. Once this is done the pseudonymous materials can be used with some means of testing the intention and aim of their polemical thrusts.

The judgment on the relation of the faith of the disciples to the authority of Christ, which appears in 1843 in Martensen's essay on Christian baptism, is only one of many which point to a renewed interest in positivity which becomes evident in his work after 1841. If it is notable on the one hand that Martensen ceases to publish on Hegel, Heiberg and aesthetics after 1841, it is just as notable on the other that the works which follow are exclusively theological and political.[4] Published collections of sermons from the years 1846 and 1848 testify to the new interest in preaching and in homiletics and scriptural interpretation which accompanied Martensen's appointment as preacher for the court of King Christian VIII in 1845.[5] A rapid survey of the material from 1841 through 1849 indicates that whatever solution to the problem of the relation between positivity and speculation is reached, the concentration is now upon giving due attention to the positive element in theology.

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[3] Briefwechsel zwischen H.L. Martensen und J.A. Dorner, 1839-1881, 2 Vol. (Berlin: H. Reuter, 1888).

[4] cf. Julius Martensen, "Chronologisk Fortegnelse" in Mindre Skrifter og Taler af Biskop Martensen (Kbh: Gyldendal, 1885) pp. 1-24.

It is only possible to conjecture what it was that brought about the shift in interest and emphasis in Martensen's thought which seems to have begun in 1841. What evidence there is comes mainly from what we can discover about the situation of theology in Denmark at the beginning of the 1840's and from Martensen's correspondence with Dorner. We have seen already the remarkable acclaim which welcomed Martensen's early lectures on Hegel at the University of Copenhagen. For a time Martensen seemed not only to have won a battle for the recognition of Hegel in Denmark. He seemed to have placed Hegel upon the throne of philosophy and Martensen appeared to many to be Hegel's vice-regent in Denmark. This was an identification which Martensen was never to escape entirely. As late as 1882 he was still trying to refute it. In his autobiography he explains that he ended the series of his lectures on modern philosophy with Hegel because Schelling's positive philosophy was not yet published and because Baader's work was too fragmentary for the students to use it as a corrective to Hegel. But Hegel was never considered independent, only as a necessary preface to dogmatics:

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[5] H.L. Martensen, Prædikener, Første Samling (Kbh: C.A. Reitzel, 1847); Prædikener, Anden Samling (Kbh: C.A. Reitzel, 1849).

> Since I presented Dogmatics as presupposing acquaintance with modern philosophy and its influence upon theology, I came into particular relation to Hegel, the great and famous philosopher of the period who had been introduced to us by J.L. Heiberg and who was in many respects the object of my admiration and love. I had to lead my auditors through Hegel. We could not stand fast with him but had, as it is said, to go beyond him. I had to make them enthusiastic for Hegel if possible and yet I had to attack him and bring them into opposition with him. Whether I always succeeded in this to the same extent I leave undecided. But I can claim with certainty that I always maintained my theonomistic standpoint in opposition to Hegel's autonomistic position, that the intuition of faith and revelation (*Troes-og Aabenbaringsanskuelsen*) was my basic principle in opposition to the autonomy principle of Hegel. I could not agree with a kind of thinking which desired to produce its own content. I sought only a rethinking (*Eftertænkning*) of what was given in the revelation. When it is often said that in my first period at the University I was the representative of Hegelianism, such is a highly uncritical judgment which ignores explicit, grounded statements in my dissertation and which has been refuted in every one of my literary works.[6]

One of the consequences of Martensen's lectures, one which he did not desire, whether he had expected it or not, was that some of the students "went beyond" his own halfway Hegelianism to an Hegelianism of the Straussian left wing. Although both Martensen and Heiberg had been able to welcome the influence of Strauss in Germany as a purification for the Church, Martensen's own experience of the Straussian version of Hegel applied to the Danish Church brought out another side of his estimate of Hegel, one which was suppressed between 1837 and 1841. The occasion for Martensen's new reflections on Strauss-Hegel was the return of Hans Brøchner, then a young theological candidate, from his study tour in Germany. Brøchner, who confessed himself to be an ardent disciple of Strauss, had already issued one volume of a Danish translation of Strauss' *Glaubenslehre*. Through the work Danish students, hitherto nearly ignorant of Strauss, were becoming interested in left-wing Hegelianism.[7] Now Brøchner made the customary formal request, in Latin, to the theological faculty of the University of Copenhagen for permission to take the *Amtsexam*, or pastoral candidacy examination. In the request he pointed out that 1) he was in agreement with all the major points of Strauss' dogmatics, 2) he would place himself under no ecclesiastical authority, 3) that he particularly regarded the doctrines of the divine persons, the son of God, and the immortality of the soul as "*imaginationes*" and "*nebulas*". All of the efforts of theological orthodoxy to unite faith and knowledge, he claimed, were no better than gluing two boards together. The members of the theological faculty agreed that if they understood Brøchner rightly they could not let him take the examination, but they took the precaution of asking for a clarification in Danish. The result was that Brøchner relegated the doctrines at issue to the status of *Vorstellungen* in the terminology of Hegel. Hence to reject the doctrines named would not require that he reject God, God-manhood, and the eternity of the spirit. With such views he had been led away from positive Christianity, though, and to take a church position would be against his conscience. Yet, Brøchner argued, it was the wish of his father that he take the examination, and in any case since it tested only knowledge and not faith, he could see no reason why he should not be allowed to sit for it.

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[6] H.L. Martensen, *Af Mit Levnet* II, 4-5.

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[7] cf. *Briefwechsel zwischen Martensen und Dorner*, I, 45.

In his description of these events in a letter to Dorner dated December, 1841, Martensen says that the theological faculty finally rejected the petition on the basis that it would not accord with its position as a theological faculty, certified by the State Church to test candidates for positions in the State Church, to allow a declared opponent of Christianity to take the candidacy exam. It is clear from the letter, and from letters which follow, that Martensen was not entirely at ease in agreeing with this decision. He would have been happier if the right of "science" had not been hindered and if it had been unnecessary to employ church authority. Yet if science leads to a conscious turning away from the ecclesiastical principle and expresses itself in a decidedly anti-Christian way, the intervention of the State is in place. The sharpest possible criticism of the faith of the Church can be expressed so long as it remains in a "dialectical" relation to faith. But it cannot be permitted if it holds to a purely negative result and works on behalf of such a result. Unfortunate as the Brøchner affair has been, writes Martensen to Dorner, good may yet come of it in that many students should be now made aware that their theological knowledge is a knowledge in faith and within the Church and only has significance "insofar as it holds fast its positive object." Further they may be led to see that the Straussian theology as a science without an object is a nonentity.[8]

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[8] ibid. p. 48.

The Brøchner affair could have only called to Martensen's attention problems with the immanental Hegelian dialectic with which he was already acquainted. But it is fair to ask, in the light of the material from 1837-41, how aware he was of these problems. There is little doubt, as we will see, that the Brøchner affair brought them to awareness again.

There is much in the Dorner correspondence itself which suggests a new interest in "Christian objectivity". Within a month after the December letter to Dorner, dated "Sylvester's Eve," Martensen is trying out ways to get at the specific character of the objective element in the Christian faith. What is the place of Scripture in a speculative theology? Martensen now finds problematic the place of Scripture in a dogmatics which finds its point of departure in the self-consciousness or in the Idea. If one begins in this way how does he get to Scripture and its objectivity? Has not Scripture the right to appear in a dogmatics, as it does in Dorner's, in its own right, as gramma and not simply as pneuma? These questions are not answered in the letter, and for the most part Martensen appears to prefer a manner of treating Scripture in dogmatics so that it appears as authoritative via the analysis of self-consciousness (here reminiscent of De Autonomia). But the question has been opened, and it is clear that Martensen is uneasy about the means of securing for speculative dogmatics the objectivity which he sees missing in the "nonentity" of the dogmatics of Strauss. It is noteworthy that in concluding this letter, written January 6, 1842, Martensen returns to the Brøchner affair momentarily, expressing his relief at the silence of the liberal press on the faculty's decision, and the general agreement of public opinion. Then he comments that although this "Straussian Unwesen" will no doubt become increasingly prevalent he has no desire to enter into polemics with it. One must use his powers to build, to create something positive, "a scientific positivity" which can stand over against it.[9]

In this decision we quite probably see the beginnings of Martensen's work toward the publication of a dogmatic system. In any case it is clear that by July of 1843 Martensen was revising his lectures on dogmatics with the intention of incorporating ideas which had come out of summer conversations with Dorner in Kiel.[10] That these revisions were done with an aim toward publication is shown in a letter of December 22, 1843 in which Martensen tells Dorner that he is using his hours free from working on lectures to prepare his dogmatics, that he hopes to complete it within two years and to be able to show that although Christian faith is sophia en mysterio, there is nevertheless a good coherence (Zusammenhang) in it.[11] Subsequent letters manifest progress and disappointment as lecturing and duties as court preacher interfere with writing, but a letter of January 5, 1849, announces that the work is almost ready for the printer.[12]

It is clear that Dorner's influence upon Martensen during the formative years of Martensen's theological system was considerable.[13] It is also clear that in the case of the Brøchner affair and the rise of Straussian theology Dorner put his weight on the side of positivity. In the letter which replied to Martensen's decision to build a bulwark of "scientific positivity" against Strauss and Brøchner rather than enter into polemics, Dorner urges that the right direction to take against the rise of the Straussian movement is to maintain the relative independence of religion, and of the Christian religion, over against all knowledge and all science. It must be made clear that religion is not knowledge, that for knowledge it must appear as another form of being. Like ethics, religion must be seen to have an essence independent from knowledge even though some fitness between these foreign essences may be established. But, says Dorner, the home of theology is in the Christian personality freed by God. Science can as little create this domain as it can art or the beautiful, however well it may comprehend them.[14] In any case, says Dorner, the activity of the theologian is not a private affair. His work differs from a philosophical system in that it must have in itself a consciousness of unity with Christian objectivity. Christian dogmatics must be set forth as objective, Christian and as belonging to the Church and not merely as subjective. It must present the truth, yet not simply as the truth but as that truth which is actual in the Church.[15]

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[9] ibid. p. 54.

[10] ibid. p. 119.

[11] ibid. p. 140.

[12] cf. ibid. p. 167 (June 17, 1845), p. 201 (Jan. 5, 1849).

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[13] cf. S. Arildsen, H.L. Martensen, pp. 231ff.

[14] ibid., p. 57; the letter is undated, but falls between Jan. 6 and Jan. 30, 1842.

[15] ibid. p. 60.

Martensen's reply to this letter of Dorner indicates that he shares Dorner's sense of the problem of objectivity, particularly with respect to Scripture. He admits that until now justification by faith has been more prominent in his theological method than Scripture: "What concerns me is that in my dogmatics the material principle has greater weight than the formal, that the latter as such must be strengthened."[16] Yet Martensen is still concerned that this be done in such a manner that Scripture does not appear merely as external control, legal letter. In this respect he does not intend to adopt Dorner's method of beginning with Scripture and then establishing the truth of Scripture through a dialectical examination of the development of Christian consciousness. This does not get beyond a speculative examination of the historically given to a speculative study of the "religious idea" itself. But for Martensen, as he proceeds to admit, the central problem is how Scripture is to gain the capacity to speak as such, as canonical authority, in a speculative dogmatics which tries to move from the "religious idea" outward to ecclesiastical tradition and historical revelation. Martensen suggests that dogma has its primitive and "urtypical" expression in Scripture. If this is true then Scripture is not merely the first step in the history of dogma, but it also deserves to stand as objective canon. The "dogmatic consciousness" will be able to find and authenticate itself in Scripture and to "complete its highest self-criticism" through Scripture.[17]

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[16] ibid. p. 62 (Jan. 30, 1842).

There is little doubt that both the Brøchner affair and the correspondence with Dorner made the problem of Christian objectivity or positivity more urgent for Martensen than it had been since his struggles with pantheism in the years 1834-36. To this influence must be added the inner logic of the theological position which Martensen was more or less self-consciously evolving during his early years at the University, the years of his closest association with Heiberg. We have seen the impasse on the problem of the given into which he was driven by his enthusiasm for Heiberg's version of the Hegelian dialectic. He could not have begun to lecture in dogmatics, as he did at the University from 1838 on, without being brought face to face with this question in every series of lectures. The battle with Mynster in 1839 over the problem of rationalism and supranaturalism, as we recall, ended with Mynster's conclusion that Martensen was not nearly so ardent an Hegelian as Heiberg.[18] Mynster got this impression from a personal conversation with Martensen, not from the article "Rationalism, Supernaturalism and the Principle of Excluded Middle" which Martensen published in _Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik_ late in 1839. We have seen the curious indecision about the relation between dialectic and faith which both the subsequent outline of moral philosophy and the aesthetics essays manifest. Yet Mynster was convinced that in some respects Martensen was no ardent Hegelian.

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[17] _ibid_. p. 63.

[18] _supra_, Ch. 7, pp. 184-85.

How much weight can we give to Mynster's attack upon mediation in making Martensen uneasy about his own theological evolution? There is no way to be sure, but it is striking to hear Martensen claim in 1850 that Mynster's "powerfully uttered Either-Or" was "not without influence on us".[19] Yet this admission occurs in the context of a denial that he had altered his viewpoint since publishing his dissertation. Rasmus Nielsen, then professor of philosophy at the University of Copenhagen and a recent convert from Hegel's views to those of Kierkegaard, had argued in an attack upon Martensen's Den christelige Dogmatik that Martensen had a different view of speculation in the 1849 dogmatics than in the 1837 dissertation on autonomy. Martensen replies:

> I do not believe that anyone will be in a position to convince me that there is a fundamental contradiction between my recently published dogmatics and my first dogmatic work on the autonomy of the human self-consciousness (1837), or to convince me that in my later writings I have abandoned the concept of theonomy and the consequent opposition to autonomous speculation which is manifested in that work as well as in the treatise on "The Idea of Faust" which I published about the same time and which is to be found in print in Heiberg's "Perseus". The controversy which arose a couple of years later over rationalism and supernaturalism--a controversy which unfortunately never reached the completion which was desirable, but which certainly has not been without influence (Eftervirkninger) upon us, through the "Either-Or" so powerfully uttered by Mynster--concerned from my side only the concept of mediation which I by no means challenged but only demanded that mediation should be pursued from the standpoint of the believing understanding. But it would be lamentable if, in the more than ten years which elapsed after this period, I had not brought myself to greater clarity and, with a continuous study of the philosophical systems of the period, especially the

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[19] H.L. Martensen, Dogmatiske Oplysninger (Kbh: C.A. Reitzel, 1850), p. 69.

> Hegelian and the tendencies stemming from it, had not reached a more definite understanding and a sharper criticism of their relation to the problems of Christian theology.[20]

The specifics of Nielsen's criticism of Martensen's dogmatics need not be examined here, since they will be discussed later. It is important to see that Martensen both acknowledges the influence of Mynster's "Either-Or" and admits that a continued study of Hegelian thought and related movements has at least made his understanding better and his criticism more definite. Nielsen argued that the 1849 *Christian Dogmatics* of Martensen borrowed *much more* from the Hegelian dialectic than the dissertation on autonomy had done. At this point we would expect that, however far from the position of the dissertation *Den christelige Dogmatik* might be in its theological presuppositions and method, it would be closer to the dissertation in its concern for positivity than to the writings of 1837-1841 which are ignored by both Martensen and Nielsen. Only an examination of the theological work of 1842-49 and of the *Christian Dogmatics* itself will tell whether this is true.

2. *Apokatastasis* as a Theological Problem

Perhaps the best way to examine the development of Martensen's theological method in the years after 1842 will be to study his treatment of the problem which concerned him in the latest essay which precedes this period, the last of his ventures into the relation between aesthetics and theology:

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[20] *ibid*. pp. 68-69.

> ...if one adopts the viewpoint of the recent theological metaphysic on the *apokatastasis* of all things, then the comic will win out over the tragic, like the simplest comedy on the stage. Or better said, the dialectic between the comic and the tragic will come to rest in the humoristic, the not merely negative, but positive comic, which relates itself to irony as does profundity to cleverness.... Precisely because the humoristic viewpoint sees the whole world not simply through a moral medium, but also through a metaphysical one, it sees all opposed positions as dialectical...[21]

As we have seen, Martensen goes on from this judgment to argue that the comic deserves a major role in any Protestant apocalypse, a role which it has failed to get in the *Divine Comedy* of Dante. Martensen's *Nye Digte* review leaves the reader wondering how the young theologian would handle the difficult ethical and theological problems raised by such a concentration upon the metaphysical and speculative background of Christianity. The first suggestion we get of how Martensen would treat *apokatastasis* in a theological context comes in mid-1843 with the publication of his duscussion of the Baptist question, *Den christelige Daab*. In this work Martensen tries to equate the sacrament of baptism with the initial calling of the disciples by Jesus. As is clear from the passage already quoted,[22] the Christian faith is treated as a faith in authority, in the case of the disciples a direct faith in the authority of Christ, in the case of the baptized infant an implicit faith in the authority of the Church. Baptism is to be regarded as the "faith-grounding sacrament" and is to be seen as necessarily infant baptism, since it is given by grace apart from the will and it is from this seed that mature faith grows.[23] An attempt to relate his view of baptism and baptismal grace to doctrines of predestination on the one hand and to Pelagianism on the other leads Martensen into a discussion of apokatastasis:

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[21] "Nye Digte af J.L. Heiberg," *Fædrelandet*, No. 399, p. 3212; cf. *supra*, Ch. 7, p. 202. The doctrine of the *apokatastasis panton*, or the eschatological restoration of *all men* to righteousness before God, was first formulated by Origen. It was reasserted by Schleiermacher (the "recent theological metaphysic"), in opposition to the moral theory of Kant, as a way of making clear the universality and power of divine grace. Cf. I.A. Dorner, *A System of Christian Doctrine*, tr. A. Cave and J.S. Banks (Edinburgh, 1896), Vol. IV, pp. 415 ff.

> We cannot avoid touching on the question of the relation of the doctrine of infant baptism to the doctrine of apokatastasis, or the doctrine of the final return of all free creatures to life in God. It follows from the preceding that every characterization of apokatastasis which proceeds from the concept of a once-and-for-all (færdig) predestination is unacceptable. Abstract apokatastasis is no different from Calvinist predestination, except that it brings under the form of unity what is with Calvin split into a dualism. But once-and-for-all predestination is common to them both.[24]

On the other hand, any notion of apokatastasis which arises from a magical view of baptism, or a view of baptism which thinks of the sacrament itself as a concluded predestination is also inadequate. Here the conditional element in what is treated as an unconditional decision is neglected and again "the finite life of freedom is said to be an appearance."[25]

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[22] cf. supra, Ch. 8, p. 206.

[23] cf. Briefwechsel zwischen Martensen und Dorner, letter from Martensen to Dorner dated April 30, 1842, p. 67.

[24] Den christelige Daab, p. 49.

The doctrine of infant baptism as administered by a State Church, Martensen claims, openly aims at a universal *apokatastasis*, and there is good ground for wondering whether it can any more readily be united with a view which ties salvation to a moral process of the human will (believer's baptism) than with a doctrine of predestination which sees salvation as a process of "nature" (Calvinism). In fact it is worth asking whether the notion of infant baptism does not require as its "eschatological reflection" (*Gjenbillede*) a doctrine of *apokatastasis* which is not "fatalistic and immediate" but "free and dialectical".

> For no doubt it seems that the assumption that Christ could eternally lose some of those whom the Father has given into his hand--a loss which could only be grounded in an eternally insuperable opposition on the part of human freedom--threatens to draw us into the opposite of the fatalistic externality characterized above. Now we stand in danger of allowing the unconditional element in the divine decision to be annihilated in its conditions and to make blessedness and with it the actualization of the divine will into a purely hypothetical affair.[26]

Should this happen baptism would cease to be an actual, "thetic" predestination, and become nothing but a call to faith or a moral covenant, both finally Pelagian baptismal views.

The Church is unable to accept a purely *thetic* view of baptism such as could follow from a predestinarian view. Nor can it accept the purely *hypothetical* view resulting from Pelagianism:

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[25] *ibid*. p. 50.

[26] *ibid*. p. 51.

> ...though the Church...rejects the notion of a purely thetic predestination it does maintain a notion of development, from the standpoint of the Church Militant, without making its doctrine of predestination complete, without giving it the final conclusion. It is the case, as the Church has felt it to be, that this doctrine not simply cannot, but dare not be concluded from the standpoint of the militant Church. Though it may now seem that a conclusion can only be found in a dialectically developed apokatastasis, it is notorious on the other hand that speculation has often come to a conclusion too readily at just this point. In general it must be said that the assumption of a universal apokatastasis which proceeds from the almighty power of love over the human will, and the opposite assumption of a partial damnation, proceeding from the free opposition of the created human will, has developed into a massive antinomy for dogmatic thinking rather than resulting in some finished knowledge. Since in the present context we go no further into the metaphysical side of the matter, but remain at the sacramental standpoint, we may limit ourselves to the following comments.[27]

The comments which follow only reiterate the "dialectic" of baptismal freedom and grace which has been developed already. The theological task, in the face of this antinomy is nevertheless:

> ...to unite these conditions in one concept, to combine the invincible thesis of the choice by grace with the irremovable hypothesis of damnation; for in the believing consciousness which works for its blessedness under the presupposition of baptism _they are united practically_...[28]

Three points begin to emerge in these passages from Martensen: 1) there is still no facing of the metaphysical and the positive sides of theological issues at once. Here, although there is attention to the theological, "sacramental" requirements of a doctrine of _apokatastasis_ the metaphysical side of the issue is avoided. As in the outlines of moral philosophy the relation between the positive claims of dogmatics and fundamental metaphysical truths is left to be clarified elsewhere.[29] 2) the notion of "dialectic" begins to have the appearance of an attempt to express fundamental theological truths through the rational antinomies to which they lead. Though this penchant was clear in Martensen's writing from the first, in *Den christelige Daab* it is present in virtually every paragraph. The notion of infant baptism is said to result in what can only be called a "paradox" for the understanding, that here Christ takes the human soul as a virtual "stuff" for his unconditional grace-giving will.[30] Yet, and this leads to the third point, 3) faith cannot rest with the acceptance of paradox, though this is the limit of understanding (*Forstand*). Christian life itself has an intuition of the unity of paradoxical opposites which forces the Christian who would understand what he believes to make good that unity in a speculative, rational (*Fornuftlige*) synthesis.

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[27] _ibid_. p. 51-52.

[28] _ibid_. p. 53; italics mine.

What we have here is again little more than a "program" which leaves a host of questions to be asked. We are reminded of the judgment of the Copenhagen theological faculty on Martensen's prize essay on the subject of the relation between natural and revealed theology, "*non tam solutiones quam symbolae ad solvendam*," not so much solutions as tokens of solution.[31] Like so many of the earlier works, the work on baptism does not answer questions. Instead it raises new questions without settling the ones raised already. Martensen's authorship begins to resemble a leaning tower of assertions which is severely in need of new support lest it collapse under its own weight. The _Christian_ _Dogmatics_ was intended to supply that support, with as little shifting of the structure as possible.

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[29] cf. *supra*., Ch. 7. pp.

[30] *Den christelige Daab*, p. 47.

[31] cf. *supra*., Ch. 2, p. 48.

Before proceeding to examine the theological method of that dogmatics in the next section we will compare the discussion of _apokatastasis_ in that work with the discussions already studied in the _Nye_ _Digte_ review and in the baptism essay. The doctrine provides a good test of Martensen's manner of wielding the dialectic.

The first point which is notable about the discussion of _apokatastasis_ in _Den_ _christelige_ _Dogmatik_ is its place in the structure of the work. More attention will be given to the basic structure of the dogmatics later when we turn to the examination of the theological method of the work. But it is important to note here that the analysis of _apokatastasis_ takes its place in the basically trinitarian outline of the dogmatics as the culmination of the doctrine of the Spirit. Discussed first is the "procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son," then "the foundation and maintaining of the Church," and, finally, "the perfecting of the Church," under which Martensen brings the themes of the resurrection of the dead, the intermediate state of the creation, and, embracing the doctrine of _apokatastasis_, "the final coming of the Lord, and the consummation of all things".

The problem of _apokatastasis_ is said to arise with the question whether the end and goal of creation can be said to be a dualism of light and darkness, good and evil, blessed and damned.[32] The Church, Martensen says, has never taken a final doctrinal stand on this question, and there must be good reason why it has not. It is instructive to see how Martensen handles the sources on which he thinks such a decision is based. If the Church has not declared that there will be a final restoration of all moral beings it must be restrained from such a doctrine both by Scripture and by the "feeling"[33] that to abandon the doctrine of eternal damnation would be to rob the Christian consciousness of salvation of its serious character.[34] On the other hand both the history of the Church and Scripture do speak of a universal apokatastasis. And these expressions, in turn, find their root in no mere lack of seriousness on the part of believers, but in a feeling of humanity (Humanitetsfølelse) rooted in the very essence of Christianity. Martensen draws upon both Scripture and the history of the Church as sources, and finds an equivocal answer. But he also appeals both to a "feeling" regarding the character of the Christian consciousness of salvation and to an "essence of Christianity" which finds its expression both in Scripture and in the history of the Church. How are these "sources" treated explicitly in the examination of *apokatastasis*?

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[32] Den christelige Dogmatik, §283, p. 565; Christian Dogmatics, p. 474. The English translation, Christian Dogmatics, by William Urwick (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1890), is not from the Danish edition, but from the second edition (1870) of Martensen's translation of the work into German, in 1856. It does not agree in every respect with the Danish original, but the differences are due to free choice of language and not to any significant change of thought between 1849 and 1856. Cf. Julius Martensen, Mindre Skrifter og Taler af Biskop Martensen, p. 6, for the publication history of Den christelige Dogmatik. Page references to the English translation will be given, for comparison, though the Danish edition of 1849 is used here.

[33] the Danish lacks "if not a conviction"; cf. Christian Dogmatics, p. 475.

[34] Den christelige Dogmatik, p. 566.

Den christelige Dogmatik turns first to the discussion of Scripture (§284). Here one meets the antinomy which he will also meet elsewhere. Both eternal damnation and universal salvation can be prooftexted. But this embarrassment for the simple believer as well as for the biblical theologian only leads into another antinomy with respect to the Word of God:

> This antithesis (*Modsætning*) in the very statements of Scripture shows that Scripture itself cannot give us a final, dogmatic solution.
>
> That God's Word cannot contradict itself and that the present antinomy must be essentially solved in the depths of God's Word is something we willingly grant. We only maintain that this solution is nowhere expressly given and we ask whether we may not glimpse (*Ane*) divine wisdom in the fact that a final solution is not given us while we continue in the current of time and of development.[35]

The paragraph divisions (§§285-287) of the following sections of the discussion of apokatastasis seem to suggest another division of "sources" for the discussion than the introductory paragraph (§283). Following the development of the antinomy implicit in Scripture (§284), Martensen proceeds in §285 to discuss the findings of "speculation" in the problem. In §286 he contrasts the conclusions about *apokatastasis* which follow on the one hand from the "Idea of God," on the other from "the perspective of anthropology, psychology and ethics". Within the same paragraph the influences of both these opposed viewpoints are seen as apparent in the history of the Church. In §287 Martensen seems to summarize the conclusions of the preceding paragraphs: "Each of the sides of the antithesis presented here has a point of contact in the Christian consciousness itself."[36] But it is not clear whether the "Christian consciousness" is exhaustively expressed in 1) Scripture, 2) speculation, 3) Church history, or whether it is something more than any one or all of these. It is further unclear how "anthropology, psychology and ethics" as a perspective (Betragtning) is related to these sources. Finally, where, in the explicit discussion of apokatastasis which appears in Den christelige Dogmatik, is the "essence of Christianity" to be found? In the discussion of apokatastasis alone an inventory of sources pertinent to the dogmatic examination of the doctrine would have to include: 1) Scripture, 2) speculation, 3) Church history, 4) the perspective of anthropology, psychology and ethics, 5) the Christian consciousness, 6) the essence of Christianity. Does the discussion of apokatastasis in the dogmatics allow any conclusions as to the relative weights of these "sources" or any more adequate organization than this simple-minded enumeration which we have wrested from the paragraphs under examination?

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[35] *ibid*. p. 567; *Christian Dogmatics* (hereafter CD), p. 476.

We have seen that Scripture leads to an antinomy on universal restoration. What of "speculation"? "It is often said that no speculation can escape admitting a universal apokatastasis." Martensen agrees that this is true insofar as this notion springs from a viewpoint which is both the highest and most comprehensive in Christian belief, "the teleology of the divine love".[37] This notion of the teleology of divine love is impossible to harmonize both with concepts of a power of God which would finally force all creation under its sway and with concepts of a merely moral state of the world which reveals God's justice but not his love. What is apparent from Martensen's handling of the bearing of speculation upon apokatastasis is that this speculation already proceeds from a fundamental Christian notion, the teleology of the divine love, which has its sources outside speculation. At least in the case of apokatastasis, speculation provides no independent source for arriving at dogmatic decisions. Indeed it is difficult to say what it does provide beyond what could be seen as a one-sided reflection upon the content of Scripture. We are led to ask if there is no speculative reflection upon, for example, the justice of God. What principle not apparent in these paragraphs of the dogmatics guides Martensen to the choice of the teleology of the divine love as the special motif for speculation?

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[36] ibid. p. 573; CD, p. 481.

Before drawing too hasty a conclusion from the fruits of speculation on love's teleology, however, we should note that Martensen begins his discussion of speculation or "thought" with the prediction that "...the same antinomy which appears in Scripture is apparent also for thought."[38] Speculation, them, must not be limited to the contemplation of the teleology of divine love. Toward what else does it turn its contemplative eye? It is now that Martensen speaks of the perspective of "anthropology, psychology and ethics". Is it now Christian anthropology, psychology and ethics with which we are concerned, as in the case of teleology? Certainly the immediate context is Christian belief, since it is damnation and salvation with which we are concerned and since the crucial question is whether universal restoration is possible. Martensen's examples allow no ready decision, however:

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[37] ibid. p. 568; CD, p. 476. The meaning of this sentence is garbled in the English translation.

> ...already this existence on earth shows us the fearful law of necessity with which the evil takes on more and more the stamp of nature in the individual. But psychological experience also demonstrates that a powerful turning point can be reached in the human soul wherewith the old can be put aside and the character of the individual take a new direction.[39]

Here speculation is turned toward "existence on earth" and "psychological experience" as its sources. The Christian limitation upon its free range appears immediately, though, in that "we are unconditionally required" to place an absolute terminus (terminus peremptorius) for the possibility of conversion at the end of history, at the second coming of Christ.[40] Origen's odyssey of the soul in search of conversion from world to world, until it find its goal, is rejected, since "this notion is irreconcilable with the Christian view (Anskuelse) for which the final coming of the Lord is absolutely conclusive...so that after this final coming there can be no talk of history and historical progress..."[41] Again, Scripture seems to have provided the boundary for speculation, limiting its range to a commentary upon the lessons of daily experience and psychological observation.

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[38] ibid.

[39] ibid. p. 570; CD, p. 478.

[40] ibid.

Church history appears as an independent source for dogmatic decision on apokatastasis only in the sense that Martensen appeals to its confirmation of the results of speculation upon divine love and the experience of evil. Patristic metaphysics commonly regarded evil as privation, hence favored apokatastasis. Augustine, as he reached into the psychology of sin, was driven to oppose apokatastasis with the reality of eternal damnation. Schleiermacher's concentration upon the Christian consciousness of grace leads him back to universal restoration.[42] The history of the Church, then, repeats the antinomy of Scripture and speculation.

"Each of the sides of the antithesis presented here has a point of contact in the Christian consciousness itself." Have we, then, in this Christian consciousness still another and perhaps most fundamental source for dogmatic decision? This question cannot be answered from within Martensen's discussion of apokatastasis. In the paragraph which follows this declaration about the Christian consciousness the only examples of "the Christian consciousness" given are biblical proof-texts.[43] Obviously, a wider investigation in the dogmatics will be needed before we can gain any clarity on Martensen's theological method.

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[41] ibid. p. 571; CD, p. 479.

[42] ibid. pp. 572-3; CD, pp. 480-1.

Apokatastasis, the dogmatics concludes, is finally an antinomy, "a cross for thought which must not and dare not, from the standpoint of the Church militant, be taken away."[44] Yet once more a felt harmony does supersede the antinomy which through all time will be a cross for thought:

> ...practically, these ideas [the opposite sides of the antinomy] are by no means irreconcilable; indeed they must necessarily be united in every Christian consciousness which still finds itself in conflict.[45]

As in the argument of the baptism essay the "invincible thesis" is united with the "irremovable hypothesis" in the believing consciousness, but practically and not theoretically.[46]

If we now ask what "major role" the categories of the comic, the humoristic, and speculation itself, the aesthetic categories of the Nye Digte review, play in this "Protestant apocalypse" of dogmatics,[47] it is difficult to believe that they play any significant role at all. In both the baptism essay and the dogmatics the categories of the comic and the humoristic are missing entirely in the place where they would be expected, according to the theological aesthetics of the Nye Digte review, to bring their greatest influence to bear. Indeed, instead of falling back upon the monistic metaphysical presuppositions which underlie the delineation of the humoristic in the Nye Digte review, Martensen limits the purview of speculation to a "teleology of divine love" which clearly has its bounds within Scripture. Again positivity and metaphysical speculation are sundered at a point where the writings of 1837-41 had led us to expect harmony, reunion, reconciliation. The reasons for this are not clear in the exposition of one crucial doctrine, *apokatastasis*. We have now, in conclusion, to see whether they are clarified in the one place where we can both expect and require such a clarification, in the methodological introduction to the *Christian Dogmatics* itself.

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[43] ibid. §287.

[44] ibid. p. 575; CD, p. 483. Martensen's text in both Danish and German is more urgent than the English translator's "never shall be, never must be". It is like the language of Den christelige Daab, cf. supra. Ch. 8, p. 223.

[45] ibid. p. 576; CD, p. 483.

[46] cf. supra. Ch. 8, p. 223.

[47] cf. supra. Ch 8, p. 220.

3. Explicit theological method

> To what extent I have allowed myself to be taught by the signs of the times with respect to the question of the relation of knowing to faith which is so widely disputed, the work [*Den christelige Dogmatik*] will have to make clear. ...In the direction which the philosophical movements have taken in the most recent period I have found no reason to give up the thought which formed the basis of my first theological writing: *On the Autonomy of the Human Self-Consciousness in Recent Dogmatic Theology*, the thought that "it is by no means religion which must borrow its importance and its significance from speculative thinking, but that it is speculative thinking which requires religion as its principle". This autonomy of the self-consciousness...has since passed with astonishing rapidity into new developments and concluded with the unqualified claim that dogmatics is impossible because there is no revelation and no other light than that

of nature and the self-consciousness itself.[48]

In the foreword to the first edition of the dogmatics we find Martensen consciously adhering to the position of his dissertation on the relation between speculative thinking and religion. Autonomous speculation has led to the excesses of Straussianism. Yet speculation is by no means to be abandoned. This "negative speculation"[49] has forced Christian theology to a deeper self-examination and has compelled it "to make a more fundamental distinction between a science which is only externally accommodated to Christianity and a science which, born of Christianity itself, develops according to its own consistency...".[50] Such a science would be unconcerned with the question of whether its methods agreed with those of systems which had their bases outside Christianity: "...certain and satisfied in itself" it would proceed to work "according to Christianity's and revelations's own law".[51]

There follows this a passage which was immediately to raise the ire of both Rasmus Nielsen and Søren Kierkegaard, since each was certain that it was aimed at himself:

> That an internally consistent theological thinking, indeed a theological speculation, is both possible and necessary, is a conviction which I hope to maintain even

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[48] ibid. pp. I-II; this foreword for the first, second, and fourth Danish editions is omitted in the German and English translations; cf. De Autonomia, p. 10.

[49] ibid.; the expression recalls Schelling's description of Hegel's philosophy in the 1841 Berlin lectures.

[50] ibid.

[51] ibid.

> if it should be shown that my own work is in error. As little as negative speculation has been able to bring me to abandon it, have the objections proposed more recently in the name of faith itself. From a psychological perspective it is entirely explicable that nowadays there are many who are suspicious of any science of faith and believe that science belongs only to free thinking and paganism. It is true of every age that it is not science, not theology, but faith alone which is the one thing needful for all of us. They who thus feel no desire to think about their faith are within their rights if they, for their own part, view knowledge as unnecessary. And they who feel no inclination to consistent thought, but satisfy themselves with thinking in straw-thoughts and aphorisms, fancies and allusions also are within their rights if they consider coherent knowledge unnecessary.

Yet when it is argued today as a kind of dogma that no speculation upon Christian truths is legitimate and that for the believer the very notion a science of faith is self-contradictory, then, Martensen says, he can only judge that such claims "even when I have heard or seen them expressed with the paradoxy of brilliance, have so little convinced me that I can only see in them a great misunderstanding and a new, or better said, an ancient delusion."[52] Christian dogmatics, then, is to be a science within faith. What this means, and how it is related to the course of Martensen's whole theological development, is what we will now try to discover.

> Method is...the law which the truth itself has imposed upon human thought that it may come to knowledge of the truth, the eternal path upon which the infinite truth will be discovered by the finite spirit; it is the necessary link between the object of knowledge and the knowing subject.[53]

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[52] ibid. pp. ii-iii. There can be no doubt that Martensen has in mind both the pseudonymous "authorship" of Kierkegaard and Rasmus Nielsen's "Kierkegaardian" conversion, revealed to the public late in 1849 in Evangelietroen og den moderne Bevisthed (Kbh: Reitzel, 1849).

[53] De Autonomia, p. 3; cf. above Ch. IV, p. 83.

To anyone reading these words from Martensen's licentiate dissertation, written in 1836, it would seem that the question of theological method is not only crucial but also that there could be no question of the possibility of more than one "science" or more than one method for discovering the truth. In fact, Martensen's words in De Autonomia leave little place for uncertainty on the point. There must be an "objective method" in the search for truth, a single such method, or there will be no point of contact between God and man in knowledge. Philosophy and theology cannot, then, disagree in method. Both are in search of the truth. Their specific difference is to be found in the reflexive nature of philosophy. Philosophy might be said to have method as its characteristic concern. As a scientia scientiae it becomes the foundation of every kind of positive knowledge, including theology.[54] What is the reader of the 1836 dissertation now to make of this description of a Christian "science" in the Christian Dogmatics of 1849:

> ...a science...born of Christianity itself, also develops itself in accord with its own internal consistency (Conseqvens), untroubled whether it agrees with the concept of science put forward by systems which have their principle outside Christianity, but certain and satisfied in itself when it proceeds according to Christianity's and revelation's own law.[55]

In the light of the dissertation's emphasis upon the unity of method, this cleft between a dogmatic procedure according to "Christianity's and revelation's own law" and methods ("concepts of science") advocated by non-Christian systems is surprising to say the least. Especially is it surprising when we read that such a theological science, concerned only with its own internal consistency, could be untroubled (ubekymret) whether its method agreed with other philosophical methods. Is the theological task, as conceived in the dogmatics, something quite different from the theological quest of truth described in De Autonomia? Again, this question can be answered only within the text of the dogmatics. We expect too much from the preface if we ask for a solution of the problem there. Yet the preface to the Christian Dogmatics already raises the question of how far we can expect Martensen to pursue his avowed agreement with the argument of his own dissertation. We will return to this question after an examination of the concept of theological method in the body of the dogmatics itself.

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[54] ibid. p. 4.

[55] Den christelige Dogmatik, p. ii.

Martensen describes the task of the introduction to dogmatics as the description of the genus cognoscendi, the manner of knowing, peculiar to the science of dogmatics.[56] Accordingly, the discussion of theological method is set within the context of the examination of the genus cognoscendi of a scientific theology. A tally of the "sources" of knowledge in dogmatics which Martensen explicates in the introduction can be compared fruitfully with the functional list of sources drawn from the discussions of apokatastasis in Den christelige Daab and the Dogmatics itself. Whereas before[57] we found 1) Scripture, 2) speculation,

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[56] Den christelige Dogmatik, p. 7; CD, p. 4.

[57] cf. supra. Ch. 8, p. 228.

3) Church history, 4) the perspective of anthropology, psychology and ethics, 5) the Christian consciousness, and 6) the essence of Christianity, Martensen's more methodologically self-conscious discussion in the introduction leads to another list: 1) conscience, 2) sacred history, 3) Scripture, 4) Church and tradition, 5) the "internal canon" of the regenerated mind, and 6) the "Christian Idea of Truth".[58] Elements of the two lists can be correlated easily. Scripture is a category in both. Church history in the first list and "Church and tradition" in the second can both be brought under the broader heading of "Sacred History" in the second list. But this leaves out four categories from the first list (speculation, the "perspective" of anthropology, psychology and ethics, the Christian consciousness, and the "essence of Christianity") and three from the second (conscience, the "internal canon" of the regenerated mind, and the "Christian Idea of Truth). Considerable light can be shed on Martensen's theological method by a comparison of these categories.

It is first of all surprising to discover that the concept of conscience plays no explicit role in the dogmatics beyond the introduction to the work. Any reader of Martensen's dissertation would expect it to have a central role in dogmatics, yet I think it is possible to show that its omission from the list of functional sources in the discussion of apokatastasis is no accident. As we have seen,[59] conscience had played in De Autonomia the role of a concept which "with immediate clarity and certainty defines man's absolute condition, his place in the entire universe, his position in relation to God...". In the outline for a moral philosophy published in 1841 Martensen had, as we have seen, brought the apparently supernaturalistic autonomy of conscience as presented in the dissertation down to the level of mediation with "the ethical consciousness of the community".[60] Now we find a further modification of the concept of conscience which in effect strips it of the distinctive role it had played in De Autonomia. It is clear that Martensen's treatment of conscience in the dissertation calls into question such uses of the term as appear in expressions like "good or evil conscience," and "the Protestant demand for certainty of conscience". His equation of conscience with "clear knowledge," "immediate clarity and certainty" makes obscure such an equation as "in conscience bound" with "believes". Yet all of these usages are Martensen's own in the dogmatics.[61] It makes the matter no clearer when elements of the dissertation usage of conscience reappear in the dogmatics, for example the definition of conscience, in an emendation of Hegel's view of religious knowledge as immediate, as the original, primitive knowledge at the basis of speculation.[62] It gradually dawns upon the reader of the dogmatics that, although much of the language used about conscience there accords with that in the dissertation, the words have been emptied of their earlier meaning.

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[58] This list is nowhere set forth by Martensen as such, but it can be derived readily from a study of the introduction to Den christelige Dogmatik. Passim paragraph references follow: Conscience (§§ 5, 9, 12, 29, 73); sacred history (§§12, 16); Scripture (§§12, 16, 22, 27); Church and tradition (§§22, 23, 28); "Internal canon" (§§24, 27); Christian Idea of Truth (§29).

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[59] cf. supra. Ch. VII, p. 190.

[60] cf. supra. Ch. VII, p. 190f.

[61] cf. Den christelige Dogmatik, §§ 229, 232, 8.

A comparative examination of the discussions of conscience in the dissertation and the dogmatics shows that certain themes do carry through. In both works conscience is a personal relationship.[63] In both there is an emphasis upon the certainty of conscience and upon the centrality of its cognitive character.[64] In both it is stressed, in a manner recalling Kant's discussion of the autonomy of practical reason, that conscience is the essential foundation of the freedom of the will.[65] Yet the similarity ends here. And even within these similarities of expression there are significant differences between the dissertation and the dogmatics. In the dogmatics the "existential" aspect of conscience is heavily stressed:

> Conscience is mankind's original, co-knowledge with God of his personal, existential relation to him, an immediate, sensible co-knowledge with God. For as I know myself in my conscience, so do I live and exist. All relationship between God and man can only get religious significance by either originating in or being drawn into this basic relation. All certainty about divine or human affairs is only a religious certainty when it is

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[62] ibid. § 8.

[63] De Autonomia, p. 21; Den christelige Dogmatik, §5.

[64] De Autonomia, p. 11; Den christelige Dogmatik, §5, §8.

[65] De Autonomia, p. 15f.; Den christelige Dogmatik, §73.

a certainty of conscience.[66]

Here the attempt is made to combine the personal and existential aspect of conscience, the conscience of the Lutheran tradition, with the speculative conscience of the dissertation. But the effort is only half-hearted and is abandoned almost as soon as begun, for the insistence upon the cognitive clarity and immediacy of conscience in the dissertation, what could only amount to an intellectual intuition, is now obscured by the equation of an "existential relation" (personlige Existentialforhold) to God with an "immediate, sensible co-knowledge" (en umiddelbar, følelig Samviden) with God. It is true that Martensen pointed out in the dissertation that reason was not the whole of man's relation to God, that reason was only an element in the God-relation and not the specific definition of man.[67] Yet the dissertation is entirely unsuccessful in pointing up the relation between knowledge and the other elements, whatever they may be, in man's relation to God. The relation between knowledge and will remains especially obscure in spite of its centrality for the argument of De Autonomia.[68] The full force of Martensen's failure to give an adequate account of the cognitive and non-cognitive elements in conscience now comes through in the dogmatics. The appeal to the cognitive aspect of conscience continues throughout Den christelige Dogmatik. Martensen's language in the dogmatics is often such that it would be easy to miss the change in emphasis in his discussion of conscience, a change which amounts to a fundamental modification of his earlier position. Conscience affords a "speculative comprehension" of Christian truth, a comprehension which is said to rest upon "speculative vision". "A speculative vision must always be presupposed if the representation is not to lose itself in an external species of understanding, or confine itself to a characterization of the Christian notions in their practical, purely utilitarian meaning."[69] But it is crucial that we see how the nature of this speculative vision (speculativ Skuen) is described: "Indeed we must always maintain that conceptual comprehension (Begribningen) is the piecemeal aspect of our knowing, while wholeness lies in the fullness of intuition which is not exhausted through any conceptual analysis (Begrebsudvikling)."[70]

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[66] Den christelige Dogmatik, p. 9; CD, p. 6.

[67] cf. supra Ch. IV, p. 88.

[68] cf. supra Ch. V, p. 130f.

Now it begins to become clear that in the dogmatics conscience is an intuition upon which speculative comprehension must be made to rest. Like the more purely cognitive conscience of De Autonomia conscience is primitive and original and to this extent privileged in a way which is impossible in Hegel's philosophy of religion. Martensen seems to try to have both Baader's fideism and Hegel's self-immolating dialectic when he says:

> When Hegel characterizes religious knowledge as an immediate knowledge we too can appropriate this expression, only by the immediate we do not mean the lower, the in-

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[69] Den christelige Dogmatik, p. 79; CD, p. 65.

[70] ibid. pp. 79-80; CD, p. 65.

> complete which is to be superseded by philosophy as the fulfillment, but rather the original, primitive knowledge which is the basis of speculation.[71]

This appropriation of Hegelian language is of course entirely external, since nothing remains of Hegel's meaning, unless one uses Heiberg's notion of the Goethean Urform and Heiberg's revision of the dialectic to "interpret" Hegel.[72] Martensen's intention in the dogmatics is even clearer when he continues:

> Religious knowledge of God is not knowledge in the form of abstract thought, but the idea of God gains form in a comprehensive intuition (en omfattende Anskuelse) of the world and of the life of man in its relation to God, an intuition of heaven and earth, of nature and history, heaven and hell. Piety comes to know not only through the thought which is contained in and springs from the conscience-relation, but also through the imagination (Forestilling) which arises from this relation. When we accordingly name not only reason, but also fantasy (Phantasien) the organ of religious knowledge, when we say that no one can think the living God without fantasy, this claim may sound strange to many. But experience shows that no religion of major historical significance has appeared without bringing with it a comprehensive fantasy-intuition (Phantasie-anskuelse) in which the invisible is blended with the visible, whether this blending of visible and invisible only had significance as myth and symbol or appeared with the actuality of divine revelation.[73]

Even the sacred history of Judaism and Christianity, let alone the traditions of Greek and Norse religion, are incomprehensible without a religious intuition and fantasy corresponding to them. In this respect intuition and fantasy are as essential to revealed religion as to paganism. This fantasy is itself grounded in an existential relation of religion and is not an epiphenomenon of art or culture:

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[71] ibid. p. 13; CD, p. 9.

[72] cf. supra Ch. V.

[73] Den christelige Dogmatik, p. 13; CD, p. 9.

> It must always be maintained that the fantasy-intuition of religion is originally an intuition in religion, an intuition in the religious existential relationship, not a product of culture or of art. Even of the myths it is true that they are not products of culture, but are on the contrary presupposed by cultural consciousness.[74]

In the dogmatics, the cognitive element in the conscience-relation is always placed within the broader context of the basic intuition which the "existential" conscience-relation affords. The implications of this treatment of conscience for theological method differ widely from the implications of the view of conscience in the dissertation.

The pervasive theme of Ueber Lenau's Faust, De Autonomia and the Betragtninger was that conscience contains an ineradicable certainty that man is a creature of God and in all his knowing and acting has the creator God as his presupposition.[75] The dogma of creation was said to be derived from this basic and inescapable conviction. Any doubt turned against this dogma was said to be turned against human conscience. Even the dogma of the Trinity was said to rest upon the dogma of creation as grounded in conscience.[76] It is striking to discover that conscience no longer serves this theological function in the dogmatics. Rather, it is pointed out that the conscience-relation pertains only to theism, which supposes a knowing and willing creator-God. But the theistic position is not made to rest upon the probative force of the conscience-relation.[77] To the contrary, it is argued in the dogmatics that none of the so-called arguments for the existence of God, all "formally invalid as syllogistic proofs," leads to a knowledge of the true nature of God so long as the witness of revelation is lacking.[78] The "proofs" are only general points of departure for the development of the "primitive God-consciousness," which can be seen as latent in the conscience-relation.[79]

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[74] ibid. p. 14; CD, p. 9-10. Martensen's point is entirely effaced by the English translator, who says: "It is true even of myths that they are no product of culture but, on the contrary, are implied in culture." Myths are not merely implied in culture; they are its foundation. There is no cultural consciousness without its mythical foundation.

[75] "Betragtninger over Ideen af Faust," Perseus I, p. 49.

[76] Ueber Lenau's Faust, p. 4; cf. supra Ch. III, p. 79.

The study of the modifications of the concept of conscience in _Den christelige Dogmatik_ leads to the conclusion that Martensen has made a virtual about-face in theological method since _De Autonomia_. The positivity of the Christian faith has become his central concern, and the impossibility of deriving the truths of the Christian revelation from conscience or the primitive religious consciousness is emphasized. Especially is this true in the case of the doctrine of the Trinity, which is the product of revelation and does not rest upon a metaphysical deduction:

> The Christian doctrine of one God in three centers of revelation, each of which in itself reveals the whole of God, is not derived from the purely metaphysical approach

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[77] _Den christelige Dogmatik_, p. 9f.; _CD_, p. 6.

[78] _ibid_. p. 90; _CD_, p. 73f.

[79] _ibid_.

> but has developed from faith in the facts of revelation. The simple, historical faith in Father, Son and Spirit expresses itself in its great simplicity in the Apostles' Creed which is still used in Christian baptism.[80]

In the dogmatics, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit begins to supplant the conscience as the foundation of accord between fides historica and the human consciousness. More than anything else this accounts for the minimal role played by the concept of conscience in the dogmatics.

In a manner which recalls the dissertation Martensen makes much in the dogmatics of the necessity for the believer to be able to reproduce for himself the truths of Christian doctrine in a relatively independent manner. In accord with the Protestant emphasis upon appropriation of the truth, he must find the truths of the fides historica to be his own truths. It is not, however, the conscience or the primitive religious consciousness which makes possible this affirmation:

> When we say that the Christian, reborn consciousness must be able to represent scientifically, out of its own depths, the teachings of Scripture and Church we say nothing other than what lies in the correctly understood doctrine of the Testimonium spiritus sancti. The witness of the Spirit is taken far too narrowly if it is taken only as a practical witness in the conscience, in the feelings, in the heart and not at the same time as a witness in which the Spirit of God witnesses through man's thinking and knowing as the Spirit of Truth. Though we well know that the witness of the proof of power is the fundamental witness on which everything above all depends, yet Christian knowing is also a constituent in the fulfillment of the witness which the Spirit makes

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[80] ibid. p. 124; CD, p. 103. In this respect the dogmatics fails entirely to fulfill the promise of Martensen to make the Trinity the "key to the whole world-system". Though the structure of the dogmatics is externally trinitarian, a speculative doctrine of the Trinity is not its "key". Cf. supra, Ch. VII, p. 177.

> to the truth of Christianity. In that we assign the testimonium spiritus sancti not merely practical, but also theoretical significance, and presuppose in the believing consciousness a Christian truth-idea which is met by the positive given; in that we thus acknowledge a relatively independent source of Christianity different from Scripture and Church we teach in a theoretical respect nothing other than what one without thinking about it admits both in an ethical and in an aesthetic sense. ...Just as we can thus speak of a Christian ethical idea without which no independent ethical activity is possible, and just as we speak of a Christian idea of beauty without which Christian art is unthinkable, so we must also be able to speak of a Christian truth-idea without which a Christian science, without which the whole dogmatic effort which has expressed itself in the most significant works of the ancient and modern period, indeed, without which even the development of ecclesiastical creeds would be impossible and unthinkable.[81]

To the conscience and the primitive religious consciousness of Martensen's early work and the dissertation there is now added an explicit concept of the witness of the Holy Spirit which is an attribute of only the believing consciousness as reborn in Christ. In this respect the believing will takes on a crucial cognitive role which it could not serve in the *De Autonomia*. The rebirth of human consciousness, though subject to the grace of a God freely revealing himself, is also a matter of will:

> The religious consciousness fulfills itself first in religious will. In feeling and knowing God seeks to draw man into his realm but first in the will religion determines itself as man's personal relation to God, as a *cultus* relation from the side of man. No man can entirely escape being moved by religious feelings; no man can escape being in a passive relation to God, though only for a fleeting moment; no one can entirely escape the light of religious knowledge which presses upon him in conscience. But it remains with a man whether he will decide to let these feelings concern him, whether he will

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[81] *ibid*. p. 70; *CD*, p. 57.

> give himself up and set himself in a free cultus-relation to the revealed God. The will is therefore the decisive element in the religious consciousness.[82]

This believing will, which Martensen describes as the most profound aspect of the will, is faith. Yet faith is broader than the joining of knowledge and will which are involved in "belief that...", propositional belief. Knowledge, depth of feeling, energy of will are united in faith:

> Faith is a life of feeling, a life of the feeling self (Gemytsliv) in God (insofar as we mean by the feeling self the ground of personal life, in which everything still moves within an indeterminate whole) and no one is a believer who has not felt himself in God and God in himself. Faith knows what it believes and it intuits the divine truths in the turmoil of life in the world. Though this knowledge is not conceptual comprehension and this intuition not face to face vision, which is only to come in the future life; though in clarity it is less than these, it is inferior to none of them in certainty, for it is precisely the essence of faith to be the secure, confident certainty concerning those things which are not seen.[83]

But it is obvious that the ground of this new feeling self (Gemyt) is not merely the conscience. The specific activity of the Holy Spirit is involved in this act of faith. Though Martensen can echo the dissertation in saying that the only source of religious certainty is to be found in conscience,[84] this claim is qualified significantly when he argues that the only entirely straightforward and unambiguous revelation is to be found in history:

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[82] ibid. p. 15; CD, p. 10f.

[83] ibid. p. 15f.; CD, p. 11.

[84] ibid. p. 9; CD, p. 6.

> ...direct, unambiguous revelation can only be found in Spirit's own realm, in the realm of Word, conscience, freedom, or history. Revelation and history are therefore inseparable, but were there no other history than world history, God's revelation would still lack an adequate medium. Certainly world history shows us a development of ideas, of divine potencies and powers but this world-historical development which, according to its objective character asks only about the whole, the race, seems to regard the individual with indifference. That this course of the world serves to accomplish the goal of a holy will, a kingdom of God where God through the whole places himself in a personal relation to every individual soul--indeed this is felt in the conscience, but we seek in vain in the general course of the world for such a revelation in which we can find rest.[85]

The unambiguous revelation of God in history requires, then, sacred history "in which God reveals himself as God". It involves as such the notion of a covenant defined as God's historical entry into specific, personal relation with man and election, seen as a selection of events from profane history. "The revelation here indicated [embracing the "sacred history of Christ"], involved in sacred history and propagated by the Church, we call the special, the positive revelation in contrast with the general revelation in nature and the ethical world order which are present in the purely natural development of mankind."[86]

Conscience alone is inadequate as the source of God's unambiguous self-revelation. What, finally, is its place in the genus cognoscendi of theological science? Martensen's specific discussion of conscience in the dogmatics is sketchy at best and inevitably disappointing when compared with De Autonomia. If it were possible merely to presuppose the dissertation as the foundation for the dogmatics, as Martensen's preface to the dogmatics leads one to believe, there would be little problem. But, as we have seen, it is not possible to do this. From what it is possible to draw together from the dogmatics itself, conscience is man's intuitive God relation, embracing cognition, feeling and will, but not as such bringing them into the unitive act which is faith. Conscience is not as such cognitive, though it is a medium of knowledge, a source of the kind of presentiment or anticipatory knowledge (Anelse) which we have met already in Steffens and in Sibbern and in Martensen's earliest work. From the viewpoint of the dogmatics one has to posit a rebirth of conscience itself in justifying faith, so that the question of accord between grace and nature cannot be settled by the discussion of conscience. Precisely at this point it is possible to see that Martensen's failure to emphasize the dependence of the doctrine of creation upon conscience in the dogmatics shows a new appreciation of the disruption of the God-man relation brought about by sin. For the author of De Autonomia no change was brought about in the essential God-man relation due to sin. Hence conscience could, after sin, continue to "reveal" the true creator-creature relation of God and man. Now Martensen is clear that the fact of human sin is something quite distinct from finitude or creaturehood:

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[85] ibid. p. 17f.; CD, p. 12f.; the English translation misses Martensen's nuance by translating "dette forenemmes vel i Samvittigheden" as "this we may learn from conscience". I take it that Martensen's point is that although this may be ambiguously present in the feeling relation of conscience it cannot be learned simply from conscience.

[86] ibid. p. 18f.; CD, p. 13f.

> But the basic problem of religion lies deeper still than the problem of creation. The dualism of heaven and earth is not merely the dualism between creator and creature, but between the holy God and the sinful world. Paganism does not know this distinction. For the evil is for paganism only limitation, ignorance, a lack in nature, a fate, which pertains to the finite, but not sin, not the disruption of a holy relation to God, springing from the will of the creature.[87]

For the Martensen of the dogmatics the only adequate theology must be a theology produced by a regenerated mind. The simple awareness of human creaturehood afforded by the conscience of De Autonomia is no longer an adequate foundation for Christian theology. It is difficult to see how a "new era in theology" could spring from De Autonomia if the modifications of its position carried through in the dogmatics are taken seriously.[88]

On the basis of this examination of the concept of conscience in the dogmatics it should be possible to ascertain its relation to the other "sources" of knowledge in dogmatics discussed earlier.[89] First, conscience is a medium and not an independent source of knowledge. Yet its relation to what Martensen called "the internal canon" of the regenerated mind and the "Christian truth-idea" should be evident. Since Martensen has called into question entirely whatever independent contribution conscience makes in the determination of Christian truth we are left only with the "internal canon" and the "Christian truth-idea" as non-positive "sources" of Christian knowledge. We have seen that religious imagination plays a role in religious knowledge, but one which is inevitably subordinate to the intuitions of conscience, hence, in Christianity, to the canon of the reborn mind and the Christian truth-idea. Similarly, as we shall see, speculation plays a role in the articulation of Christian knowledge, but it is questionable that it should be termed an independent source of knowledge. All, then, that remain are the "positive" sources of Christian truth, holy scripture, and Church and tradition, embraced under the single concept, sacred history.

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[87] ibid. p. 23; CD, p. 17.

[88] cf. supra, Ch. VII, §1.

[89] cf. supra, Ch. VIII, p. 237f.

We might venture to say that for Martensen there is a twofold source of Christian knowledge, the positive source of sacred history, and the cognitive "grace" involved in the existence of an internal canon of the reborn mind, what could be equated with the Christian truth-idea. These would then be intuited in the conscience as their medium, a medium which was not entirely neutral to its content but rather one which played a discerning role. This would be satisfactory if the character of conscience as anything other than medium in the Christian faith, did not appear to have been annuled by the dogmatics itself. Lacking any distinctive character, we find what we might expect, that in the dogmatics conscience can play all of the roles we have described. It is a medium of relationship between God and man. It is the relationship. It is immanental as that with which all positive revelation must accord. It is positive and historical as expressive of the distinction between man in the use of his freedom and man as a thing of nature.[90] No more need be said to show that in Den christelige Dogmatik conscience is fruitless as a theological principle. The work entirely lacks any definite concept of conscience.

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[90] cf. supra Ch. VIII, p. 249; Den christelige Dogmatik, p. 17f.

In view of the fate of conscience in the dogmatics Martensen seems to have left us with a positivistic theology of the regenerate mind, a supernaturalism of the kind he thought antiquated in his writings from 1837 to 1841, a kind of theology which his disciples thought he had overcome in his dissertation. Yet if one does reconcile himself to the view that the dogmatics is a positivistic theology, he finds the work just as puzzling as he does when he reads it expecting a sequel to De Autonomia. Recall the words of the Danish preface, "That...theological speculation is both possible and necessary is a conviction which I hope to maintain even if it should be shown that my own work is in error."[91] Speculation, like conscience, is a term which is found repeatedly at central points in De Autonomia and Den christelige Dogmatik. In the case of speculation the concept was further developed in Martensen's collaboration with Heiberg until, as we have seen, it was not unfair to Martensen's position in 1841 to say that speculation, understood as metaphysical vision into the eternal contrast between divine essence and human phenomenon, "is the essential background of every Christian account of the world."[92] It takes no profound examination to see that, in the dogmatics, speculation, like the concepts of method and conscience has been transformed. The transformation is indicated already in the passage from the preface quoted above, in that "theological speculation" is equated with "an internally consistent theological thinking".[93]

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[91] ibid. p. ii.

[92] cf. supra, Ch. VII, p. 203.

The Martensen of the dogmatics continues to insist that the presentation of Christian doctrine must rest upon "speculative vision" if it would be anything other than abstract, propositional understanding or the unreflective application of practical maxims.[94] But as is already clear from the discussion of conscience, speculation now has its foundation in the intuition of conscience and is precisely the piecemeal or fragmentary element in knowledge when compared to the fullness of that intuition. When the concept of conscience suffers the reduction which we have seen it suffer in the dogmatics, speculation cannot help suffering equally. What the dogmatics calls the urge to speculate or to comprehend, the mediating effort to comprehend antitheses in the unity of the Idea, falls short of the fullness of faith. Martensen seems to admit that the concept of speculation virtually has been volitalized away in the dogmatics when he summarizes his discussion of the concept:

> The sound view will therefore acknowledge that speculative comprehension itself is a highly fluid and dialectical concept which does not let itself be dismissed with a curt Yes or No, nor let itself be dismissed with the opinion that it must either be perfect or not exist at all, for it exists precisely as _becoming_. Every conclusion will therefore as concept be only relative, every solution of a problem will yet be a new and sharper posing of the problem. The cognitive conclusion will still contain

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[93] _Den christelige Dogmatik_, p. ii.

[94] _ibid_. p. 79; _CD_, p. 65; cf. _supra_, Ch. VIII, p. 242.

> the divinatory, which points forward to a higher solution.[95]

Doubtless this could be said of the Hegelian dialectic, as it can be said of the views of dialectic we have seen in Martensen's work from the Priisopgave through the Grundrids til en Moralphilosophiens System. But this is only because the concept of dialectic indicated here is broad and vague enough to include all of them. It is evident that the decisions which are determinant for the function of speculation in the dogmatics have been made already with the conclusions Martensen draws about the relation between conscience and positive revelation. We should expect that, as is actually the case in the discussion of apokatastasis, speculation will not play the role of an independent source of theological knowledge in Den christelige Dogmatik. When it does appear to do so, as in the discussion of the fall, it is with an inconsistency which is nowhere cleared up in the dogmatics:

> When we thus explain the universal phenomenon of sin on the basis of an act of human freedom which was performed at the beginning of the development of the human race by the individual who must be characterized as the initiating personality of the race, we do not stand here merely on the authority of the biblical tradition. For just the spiritual contemplation of the phenomenon of evil, as it lies before us in human life, leads us back with necessity to the Fall, so that we necessarily must postulate it even if it was not recorded in the Bible.[96]

In Den christelige Dogmatik the concept of speculation is equally as vague and indefinite as that of conscience. The careful reader is led to conclude with Kierkegaard's private judgment, expressed only in his Papirer: "As a philosopher Martensen is: promising--by no means a dialectician, and as a Christian he is also merely promising. Everywhere there are sheerly rhetorical categories--which are well able to charm (bedaare) men."[97] Quite apart from Kierkegaard's often repeated ad hominem about Martensen's existence as a Christian, the charge that his philosophical analysis is merely promissory and his categories only rhetorical is justified.

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[95] ibid. p. 80; CD, p. 66.

[96] ibid. p. 210; CD, p. 179.

Much of Martensen's work prior to the dogmatics had this same promissory character. It was possible to excuse this in most of his work, with the exception of De Autonomia, since the work had the character of occasional writing.[98] But in one way or another all of this work looked forward to the publication of the dogmatics for the solution of the problems contained there. The most generous reading of the dogmatics still leads to the conclusion that the fundamental problems continue to be avoided. If there is more clarity in Den christelige Dogmatik on the relation between speculation, dialectical analysis, and faith it is only because the ground has been shifted and the claims of works published since 1836 tacitly abandoned. Hence Martensen does not answer questions posed by his earlier analysis of conscience or by his intense conversation with Heiberg. He uses his own earlier language even more loosely than before and, in the guise of a speculative theology, sets forth a theological view which owes more to the intuitionism of Mynster and Jacobi than the reader of his essays on Hegel and Heiberg would think possible. Again, Kierkegaard sees what has happened. First, in the controversy over the principle of excluded middle, Martensen tries to weaken Mynster with the charge that he has remained with the antiquated "Either-Or" of Jacobi. Now, in the dogmatics, Mynster appears as the essential dogmatician who will "be vindicated in his time".[99]

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[97] Papirer, X^{1}A 558 (1849).

[98] cf. supra, Ch. VII,

Søren Holm rightly argues that Martensen's Christian Dogmatics shows up the Achilles heel in his whole theological system. Holm's summary judgment, in a brief discussion of Martensen as a philosopher of religion, is that Martensen always failed to investigate the relation between knowledge from faith, revealed knowledge, and general or universal philosophical knowledge. "Martensen has by no means illuminated the relation of the will to knowledge in the cognition of revelation; here contradiction and unclarity seem to be in the foreground."[100] This conclusion is amply justified by the investigation of Martensen's entire authorship up to and including the dogmatics. If there had been question about what the promises of Martensen's work would bring, questions were needed no longer. In a work of great speculative "promise," positivity almost unobtrusively had gained the upper hand. Indeed, in accord with Harald Høffding's sarcastic question, whether according to Martensen's dogmatics the reborn believer need not possess a new logic, we might conclude that in truth positivity had won the only hand.[101]

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[99] Papirer, X^2A 155.

[100] "Hovedtyper i Dansk Religionsfilosofi," in Søren Holm, Religionsfilosofiske Essays (Kbh: Gyldendal, 1943), p. 103.

It is striking that at the acme of Martensen's theological development, in his dogmatics, we are forced to ask the same questions which we asked about his earliest essays, the Priisopgave and the Kolthoff essay.[102] The stress of his very earliest theological thinking on the poetic imagination and its influence in religion has returned in the dogmatics. Often Martensen seems to be dominated by the fascination with Steffens' effort to make Christianity the "all ruling and all illumining center" in a total view of the world and life which had held him in 1827. But the specific path of the Priisopgave and the Kolthoff essay had been to seek in "speculation" and "concept" the organ of union which Steffens' work demanded. Our estimate of this attempt was that it failed. The more self-conscious effort of the dogmatics fails for the same reasons as the earliest work. The relation between sacred history and the Christian truth-idea involves the same problems as the relation in the Kolthoff essay between the historical events of the Christian tradition and the "eternal history" seen in the mirror of the Christian Idea. The effort of the dogmatics to solve this problem, as we have seen, leads into a theology of regeneration in which the relation between the natural man and the redeemed man becomes entirely obscure. Martensen avoids this problem only by obscuring it in his discussion of conscience, speculation, and the Christian truth-idea. The problem of faith, as we met it in the Priisopgave and the Kolthoff essay, also returns to haunt Martensen in the dogmatics. As Holm notes, there is still no adequate distinction between knowledge and faith. It remains as difficult in the Christian Dogmatics as in the earliest essays to understand why the positive should be held fast as such, why the "moment" should have eternal significance. Again, Martensen can only escape this problem by claiming a point of contact between external history and "internal history" in the reborn consciousness, a contact which is unintelligible outside a faith conviction for which it needs no demonstration. If this problem does not appear clearly in the dogmatics it is only because it has been clouded by an ambiguous treatment of history. It is not difficult to understand the exasperation of Kierkegaard when he read Den christelige Dogmatik in the autumn of 1849:

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[101] cf. S. Holm, op. cit., p. 102.

[102] cf. supra, Ch. II, p. 59.

> It is really ridiculous! There has been talk about System and Science, and Science, etc.--so finally the System comes out. Thou gentle God and Father, the most popular of my writings is stronger in the definition of concepts, and my pseudonym Johannes Climacus is seven times stronger in the definition of concepts. Martensen's Dogmatik is indeed popular, but it lacks powerful fantasy or anything of the kind which could give it some value. The only scientific activity I have found in it is that it is divided into paragraphs. He has no more categories than Mynster. And interestingly enough, it is Mynster who is most often cited, and as--a dogmatician. And it was Mynster who once in his own day had to topple the System.[103]

Martensen's Dogmatik lacks neither fantasy nor insight, but it is best characterized with the very words Martensen had used to mock Kierkegaard and Rasmus Nielsen: it is theologizing with "straw-thoughts and aphorisms, fancies and allusions".[104] Only vagueness, ambiguity and the appeal to an architectonic which on close examination is seen to be wholly external, makes the Christian Dogmatics, as the culmination of Martensen's theological work, appear to be the System.

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[103] Papirer, X^1A 556.

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[104] cf. supra, Ch. VIII, p. 235.

CONCLUSION

> To supply a corrective is really a work of resignation.
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> When one begins, the delusion which is triumphant in the world looks down proudly on the poor corrective, "that is antiquated, finished and done with". etc.
>
> And then, when the corrective with its silent but profound effect has taken the courage from the delusion by its threatening attitude, people stealthily begin to make use of the corrective and let it appear as though they themselves had said that. Or as a precaution a certain amount of time is allowed to elapse, the time which the corrective takes to work. During that time one is officially silent, one does not write. Then if one observes that the corrective is coming into power one comes forward and makes a hidden use of the corrective--and accepts the honor of being a moderating influence. If that is a success one goes one step further. Since one only takes over part of the corrective, and since on the other hand the corrective must, in order to have any effect, steer by the light of paradox: one drops the corrective as an exaggeration.
>
> Cowardly sneaking, that is what Martensen is capable of.
>
> How easy it is with the finite goal. One is Professor, has a secure position, income, honor and reputation--and, still more, one's effort is readily understood. It is obvious that that is being serious. In this way everything worldly is reconciled with itself.
>
> But give a relation to the Idea, give a more pure ideal existence and you will be as if superfluous, a figure of nonsense.[1]

This bitter passage from Kierkegaard's papers, written in the autumn of 1849, has seldom been seen as what it shown to be by the present study, a close commentary upon the relationship between the authorship of Hans Lassen Martensen and that of Søren Kierkegaard. The chronology is fairly transparent. Kierkegaard sees the years of Martensen's ascendancy at the University, 1837-1841, through the publication of De Autonomia, as the years of the triumphant delusion. But it is clear that he also thinks that his own onslaught on "mediation" and "the System" in the pseudonymous writings from Either-Or in 1843 through the Concluding Unscientific Postscript in 1846 had been the working of the corrective "with its silent but profound effect".[2] Now there is "stealthy" appropriation of the corrective such as appears in Martensen's move toward positivity and his heralding of the "paradox" of apokatastasis in Den christelige Daab (1843). There follow six years of professorial silence ["...one is officially silent, one does not write"] until, noting that the corrective has come to power, one makes hidden use of it and lets oneself be honored as a moderating influence [the covert attack upon the "paradoxy of brilliance" and the appropriation of existential categories for the discussion of conscience in Den christelige Dogmatik (1849)].

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[1] S. Kierkegaard, Papirer X^1A 658. All but the final two paragraphs are from the translation by Alexander Dru, The Journals of Søren Kierkegaard (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), §957.

Kierkegaard could see the final stage of Martensen's tactics already in the dogmatics, in that the whole Kierkegaardian approach to the relation of faith and knowledge is ridiculed in the preface, while the body of the work offers no adequately reasoned alternative. He found Martensen's position in the Dogmatic Elucidations (Dogmatiske Oplysninger) of 1850 similarly hostile. Neither the dogmatics nor Dogmatic

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[2] Den christelige Daab was published in May, 1843, four months after Either-Or. Nor should the likely influence of The Concept of Irony on Martensen be neglected.

Elucidations attacks Kierkegaard directly, any more than any one of Kierkegaard's writings, signed or pseudonymous, is a direct attack upon Martensen. The immediate occasion for the "elucidations" was the large number of critical reviews which attacked Den christelige Dogmatik shortly after its publication in July, 1849. One of these, Rasmus Nielsen's Mag. S. Kierkegaards "Johannes Climacus" og Dr. H. Martensens "Christelige Dogmatik": En undersøgende Anmedelse, attempted to bring the viewpoints of Kierkegaard and Martensen into direct conflict. Even then, both Kierkegaard and Martensen avoided the fray. Kierkegaard withdrew from his association with Nielsen, protesting that Nielsen had tried to make a scientific theological principle out of his indirect, pseudonymous claim, in the Postscript, that the highest concept that faith can reach is that it cannot conceive or comprehend itself.[3] Martensen, rightly taking the pseudonymity of the "Johannes Climacus" writings seriously, attacks only Rasmus Nielsen's use of the pseudonymous literature. But he treats the theses which Nielsen has collated verbatim from the Postscript with contempt: "...what is true in them is not new and what is new not true."[4] Further, Martensen makes a point of his lack of acquaintance with "this prolix literature". His penchant is for direct communication and, "fortunately, the Christian faith too has from the beginning made use of direct communication rather than the indirect or experimental communication of the pseudonymous literature."[5] No shaft aimed at Kierkegaard could have carried a sharper barb, as Kierkegaard's insistence upon the incognito of Christ, expressed in Anti-Climacus' Training in Christianity, well shows. Yet this thesis on the direct cognizability of revelation is a feature both of the dogmatics and of the "elucidation" of the dogmatics.[6]

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[3] cf. Papirer X^{6}B 114.

[4] Dogmatiske Oplysninger (Kbh: Reitzel, 1850), p. 14.

The extent of Martensen's acquaintance with the "prolix" Kierkegaardian authorship has not been the subject of study here, nor has there been any effort to determine what Kierkegaard's actual influence upon Martensen, if any, may have been. This is the subject of another very much needed inquiry, a difficult inquiry at best, since the paucity of explicit sources makes it largely conjectural. Any such study should begin with the work of the late Carl Roos on the treatment of the Faust theme in the early work of Martensen and Kierkegaard. What is revealed there is a net of "influences" in which, as the reader of Ueber Lenau's Faust could predict, Kierkegaard saw Martensen playing Wagner to his own Faust. It is presently impossible to say whether the distinctive theses of Ueber Lenau's Faust on doubt, autonomy, and the relation between sin and doubt were first heard on the lips of Kierkegaard or on the lips of his private tutor in 1834, Martensen.[7]

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[5] ibid. p. 13.

[6] cf. Den christelige Dogmatik, pp. 320ff.; CD, pp. 270ff: e.g., "...the entire human appearance of Christ produces a superhuman impression and hence inspires confidence and fear, love and awe." Martensen never makes it clear how this claim is reconciled with his attack upon "the low standpoint of artificial religion, in which the inner expands into the outer..." [ibid. p. 334; CD, p. 282].

Another subject of inquiry for which the present study is the foundation is the problem of Martensen's influence upon Kierkegaard. Whether we look for direct borrowing from Martensen (this is at least possible in the case of the work of each on Faust) or for explicit discussion of Martensen's ideas as such we will most often be disappointed. In spite of hundreds of journal entries concerning Martensen which follow the publication of the dogmatics one finds very little of substance in Kierkegaard's open and explicit criticism of Martensen. But it is quite another matter if we look for indirect responses to the various stages of Martensen's theological itinerary in the writings of Kierkegaard from The Concept of Irony, in 1840, to Training in Christianity, in 1850. When we do this we discover that Kierkegaard's authorship, as an essentially polemical and corrective task, does shift its targets. And the suggestion becomes increasingly plausible that one of the primary shifting targets was a theologian who moved from privatdocent to Bishop of Sjælland and from the halfway hegelianism of the Priisopgave to the intuitionism of the Christian Dogmatics in the sixteen years between 1833 and 1849.

The present study clearly supports the conclusion that the writings of Kierkegaard demand very careful study in relation to those of Martensen, especially in the crucial period of Kierkegaard's development, 1840-1843. It also supports the conclusion that Heiberg's modifications of the logic of Hegel may play a far more central role in Kierkegaard's estimate of "the System" than most Kierkegaard scholarship has indicated.[8]

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[7] cf. Carl Roos, Kierkegaard og Goethe, pp. 124ff.

No doubt one of the primary reasons for Kierkegaard's preoccupation with Martensen, especially with the Martensen of the dogmatics, is the basic category confusion involved in his theological work, the confusion of faith and knowledge, of intuition with speculation, of faith with immediate knowledge. It is clear from, e.g. the Philosophical Fragments, that Kierkegaard saw himself as a Danish Socrates who could assume the basis of the Christian faith as historically given and remembered in the Church. His task, within the frame of a presupposed dogmatic clarity, was ironically to bring the dogma to life. In the Philosophical Fragments Climacus is already aware of the category confusions which exist, and the task of the Fragments is to reintroduce clarity into the basic categories. It is by no means to introduce new categories. The Concluding Scientific Postscript was written on the presupposition that the Fragments had done its work. Martensen's Dogmatics made it abundantly clear that this was not the case, and its widespread popular acceptance confirmed Kierkegaard in the conviction that a whole new founding of Christianity was necessary in Protestantism, "especially in Denmark," hence Anti-Climacus and Training in Christianity: away with the assumption that all are Christian; away with the assumption that we all know what Christianity is. Bring back the New Testament and the offensive contemporaneity of Jesus of Nazareth. Become contemporary with the paradox. Begin again.

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[8] Lars Bejerholm's Lund dissertation "Meddelelsens Dialektik": Studier i Søren Kierkegaards teorier om språk, kommunikation och pseudonymitet (Kbh: Munksgaard, 1962) is the first study to give any attention to the significance for Kierkegaard of Heiberg's modifications of Hegel, and even he dismisses the problem with a laconic comment: "SK's Hegel criticism is therefore quite complicated and cannot be taken into consideration here." (p. 96f.)

As is well known, on April 15, 1854, Hans Lassen Martensen succeeded Jacob Peter Mynster as Bishop of Sjælland. The head of all the theological confusion regnant in Denmark became the head of the Danish Church. The attack on Christendom now was possible. In a late entry in his papers, Kierkegaard makes the revealing remark that he could not have wished anyone other than Martensen to become bishop. Now the weakest side of the Establishment is exposed. Like a fisherman waiting for a bite or a detective waiting for a conclusive clue before he moves in on the criminal, Kierkegaard says, he has waited for the elevation of Martensen to the bishop's chair. Had Martensen not become bishop, the "attack" could not have been made. Now that he has, everything is fulfilled as Kierkegaard wished it.[9]

This cursory sketch of an aspect of Kierkegaard's relation to Martensen must appear conjectural in its brevity, but I think there is no doubt that it can be supported with closer study. The little noted fact that Martensen's elevation to the bishopric was exactly what Kierkegaard required to launch the "attack upon Christendom" says much about the place of Martensen in Kierkegaard's authorship. It was not as a significant thinker that Kierkegaard responded in his journals and indirectly in the pseudonyms to almost everything Martensen wrote. It was to

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[9] S. Kierkegaard, Papirer, XI^{3}B 89; cf. XI^{3}B 159.

Martensen as the head of all the theological category confusion with which Protestantism, "especially in Denmark" was afflicted.

All that it has been possible to do in this study is to locate the confusion which in its apparent clarity and "charm" brought out the gadfly in Kierkegaard and to make plausible the claim that until Kierkegaard's relation to Martensen is understood in detail we will have little chance to understand Kierkegaard at all.

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ABSTRACT

The present work has both an intrinsic and an extrinsic thesis. The setting is within the broader context of the study of the thought of Kierkegaard. The extrinsic thesis is that the work of Kierkegaard is essentially polemical in character and that it cannot be understood without taking into account the highly specific nature of his polemics against Danish Hegelianism. I take the special target of these polemics to be the attempts of the Danish theologian, Hans Lassen Martensen (1808-1884) to bend the Hegelian philosophical method to his own theological purposes.

The intrinsic thesis of my investigation of Martensen's thought is that Martensen's development is almost entirely within the lines of a form of theological intuitionism to which his use of Hegel bears only an external relation. Hence, if it is supposedly "Hegelianism" which Kierkegaard attacks in the writings of Martensen, it is a highly modified and atypical form of Hegelianism.

Martensen's theological intuitionism develops through four stages in the period which is pertinent for the study of Kierkegaard, the years 1833 to 1850. No attempt is made to trace Martensen's thought past the year of Kierkegaard's death (1855).

The introduction to the dissertation develops the extrinsic thesis of the work. The first chapter gives the biographical and cultural setting for the development of Martensen's characteristic theological interests and problems.

The second chapter examines the earliest published statements of

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Martensen's theological position. Here the historical Christian faith is taken to be the manifestation of a religious _a priori_, called by Martensen a "Christian religious idealism" which is at this time inadequately distinguished from the historical revelation itself. Martensen fails both to indicate the historical distinctiveness of the Christian faith and to show the manner in which this religious _a priori_ is present to consciousness. In this period Martensen makes no effort to distinguish his position from Hegel's, and his vagueness does not allow a settlement of the faith-knowledge question either for or against the Hegelian view of faith as immediacy.

In chapters three and four Martensen's thought in the period 1834-36 is examined. The focus of his concern now becomes the _nature_ of the religious _a priori_ and the _manner_ of holding it fast. The religious _a priori_ is found to center in the concept of God as creator and man as creature. Conscience (_Samvittighed_) as a cognition of the holiness of the Creator becomes the central element. The contrast between faith and doubt is made to parallel a contrast between faith and temptation, and the achievement of faith is made a moral problem: _ought_ there to be a limit beyond which autonomous philosophical thought (Descartes-Hegel) may not go? With respect to doubt, Martensen nevertheless insists that since the Lutheran Reformation doubt has been an essential element in the achievement of selfhood and individuality before God. In the works of this period Martensen fails to make clear the exact role of doubt in the Christian conscience. Accordingly the nature of faith and its relation to conscience as religious _a priori_ remains obscure. The autonomy of Hegelian philosophy is con-

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stantly attacked by Martensen, but he fails to show how he will develop an alternative philosophical theology which is required to ground itself in conscience.

In chapters five, six and seven the period of Martensen's closest approach to "Hegelian" thought is examined. In the years 1837-42 the main influence upon Martensen's estimate of Hegel is the Danish poet and critic, Johann Ludvig Heiberg (1791-1860). The relations of the thought of Heiberg and Martensen are examined carefully. One sees that Martensen continues to correct Hegel in the direction of intuitionism, but now Martensen claims Hegel's work as a positive contribution to theology. Two steps are taken. First, Heiberg's modification of the structure of the Hegelian logic, in order to allow for the achievement of a final synthesis,is tacitly accepted. Second, Heiberg's claim that the existence of God is the extrinsic presupposition of the Hegelian system is also accepted. Martensen is sufficiently aware that these views are not Hegel's that he talks of "going beyond" Hegel. But he also now makes an explicit effort to employ the Hegelian dialectic to develop the content of the religious *a priori*. This brings him into direct conflict between the openness of the Hegelian immanental dialectic and the aesthetic and intuitive closure of Heiberg's version of the dialectic. It also brings to the fore the conflict between Hegel's view of the historical *given* and the specific revealed content of the Christian faith which is said to be a once-and-for-all *given*. Martensen tries to meet this difficulty by falling back upon God as the extrinsic presupposition of the dialectical system,but can do this only at the expense of uncovering his real disagreement with both Heiberg and Hegel. This leads to the fourth and mature period.

In chapter eight Martensen's Christian Dogmatics (1849) is examined and shown to be only superficially the speculative dogmatics which it pretends to be. In it, the intuitionist claims which had been present from the earliest work are shown to rest upon an analysis of the reborn Christian consciousness. The "dialectic" becomes a method of analysis of the content of reborn consciousness, and loses its apparent contact with the dialectic of Hegel. Yet the vocabulary of conscience of Martensen's second period is retained, along with the aesthetic and speculative language of the third period. The result is a dogmatics which lacks any evident foundation and which is subject to the criticisms directed at it by Kierkegaard in his Papirer. The stage is set for Kierkegaard's "Attack upon Christendom" when Martensen as the head of all the theological category confusion in Denmark is made the head of the Danish Church (1854).

BIOGRAPHY

I was born in Richmond, Indiana in 1930, the son of Silas S. Horn, and India C. Horn. I was educated through high school in the Richmond public schools, graduating in 1948. I attended Earlham College 1950-54, received the A.B. degree with a major in philosophy in 1954. In 1954 I began work at Union Theological Seminary, New York City. I matriculated for the Th.D. degree in philosophy of religion in 1956, and completed residence work there in 1958.

On two occasions I have studied in Denmark: In the summer of 1953, I worked on Kierkegaard in Copenhagen. From February through September, 1963 I studied Martensen and Heiberg materials at the University of Copenhagen and in the Royal Library.

During the years 1958-60 I was assistant professor and chairman of the Biblical Literature department at Haverford College. During the year 1960-61 I was visiting assistant professor of Religion at Haverford. In 1960 I was appointed assistant professor of Philosophy of Religion at Union Theological Seminary, and taught there until 1966. Since July, 1966 I have been associate professor and chairman of the Philosophy department at Earlham College.

In July, 1952 I was married to Phyllis Mann. She died in September, 1958. In June, 1960 I was married to Jane Higginbottom. We have one child, Mary Claire, now four years old.